

Democracy index 2013

Democracy in limbo

A report from The Economist Intelligence Unit





The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2013

Democracy in limbo

This is the sixth edition of the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy index. It reflects the situation at the end of 2013. In 2013 global democracy was in limbo, in the sense that, as has been the pattern in recent years, there was little overall change--there was neither significant progress nor regression over the course of the year. Average regional scores in 2013 were similar to scores in 2012.

The first edition of the index, published in *The Economist's The World in 2007*, measured the state of democracy in September 2006; the second edition covered the situation towards the end of 2008; the third as of November 2010, the fourth at the end of 2011 and the fifth at the end of 2012.

The index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories--this covers almost the entire population of the world and the vast majority of the world's states (micro states are excluded). The Democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Countries are placed within one of four types of regimes: full democracies; flawed democracies; hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes.

Free and fair elections and civil liberties are necessary conditions for democracy, but they are unlikely to be sufficient for a full and consolidated democracy if unaccompanied by transparent and at least minimally efficient government, sufficient political participation and a supportive democratic political culture. It is not easy to build a sturdy democracy. Even in long-established ones, democracy can corrode if not nurtured and protected.

Stagnation of democracy

Key recent developments include:

- The rise of movements for democratic change across the Arab world led many to expect a new wave of democratisation. But it has become apparent that democracy in the region remains a highly uncertain prospect.
- Poor economic performance and weak political leadership in the developed world.
- Popular confidence in political institutions continues to decline in many developed countries.
- US democracy has been adversely affected by a deepening of the polarisation of the political scene and political brinkmanship.
- In eastern Europe democracy declined in 10 countries in 2012 and in seven in 2013.
- Rampant crime in some countries--in particular, violence and drug-trafficking--continues to have a negative impact on democracy in Latin America.



Erosion of democracy in Europe

Global backsliding in democracy had been evident for some time and strengthened in the wake of the 2008-09 global economic crisis. Between 2006 and 2008 there was stagnation of democracy; between 2008 and 2010 there was regression across the world. Following a regression in 2011, in western Europe in 2012 there was a stabilisation in democratic trends, followed by another minor deterioration in 2013. In 2011 seven countries in western Europe suffered a decline in their democracy score; in 2012 none had a decline, but in 2013 seven countries again suffered a decline. The main reason for the earlier decline was the erosion of sovereignty and democratic accountability associated with the effects of and responses to the euro zone crisis (five of the countries that experienced a decline in their scores are members of the euro zone--Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland). Most dramatically, in two countries (Greece and Italy) democratically elected leaders were replaced by technocrats. In 2013 harsh austerity and a new recession tested the resilience of Europe’s political institutions.

Longer-term trends

The global record in democratisation since the start of its so-called third wave in 1974, and acceleration after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, has been impressive. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s measure of democracy, one-half of the world’s population now lives in a democracy of some sort. However, in recent years there has been backsliding on previously attained progress in democratisation. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 accentuated some existing negative trends in political development.

Table 1

Democracy index 2013, by regime type

	No. of countries	% of countries	% of world population
Full democracies	25	15.0	11.0
Flawed democracies	54	32.4	36.0
Hybrid regimes	36	21.5	16.0
Authoritarian regimes	52	31.1	37.0

Note. “World” population refers to the total population of the 167 countries covered by the index. Since this excludes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire actual estimated world population.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

A political malaise in east-central Europe has led to disappointment and questioning of the strength of the region’s democratic transition. Media freedoms have been eroded across Latin America and populist forces with dubious democratic credentials have come to the fore in a few countries in the region. In the developed West, a precipitous decline in political participation, weaknesses in the functioning of government and security-related curbs on civil liberties are having a corrosive effect on some long-established democracies.

Although almost one-half of the world’s countries can be considered to be democracies, in our index the number of “full democracies” is low, at only 25 countries; 54 countries are rated as “flawed



democracies". Of the remaining 88 countries in our index, 52 are authoritarian and 36 are considered to be "hybrid regimes". As could be expected, the developed OECD countries dominate among full democracies, although there are two Latin American countries, one east European country and one African country, which suggests that the level of development is not a binding constraint. Only two Asian countries are represented: Japan and South Korea.

Slightly less than one-half of the world's population lives in a democracy of some sort, although only 11% reside in full democracies. Some 2.6bn people, more than one-third of the world's population, still lives under authoritarian rule (with a large share being, of course, in China).

Table 2
Democracy Index 2013

	Overall score	Rank	Electoral process	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Full democracies							
Norway	9.93	1	10.00	9.64	10.00	10.00	10.00
Sweden	9.73	2	9.58	9.64	9.44	10.00	10.00
Iceland	9.65	3	10.00	9.64	8.89	10.00	9.71
Denmark	9.38	4	9.58	9.64	8.89	9.38	9.41
New Zealand	9.26	5	10.00	9.29	8.89	8.13	10.00
Australia	9.13	6	9.58	8.93	7.78	9.38	10.00
Switzerland	9.09	7	9.58	9.29	7.78	9.38	9.41
Canada	9.08	8	9.58	9.29	7.78	8.75	10.00
Finland	9.03	9	10.00	8.93	7.78	8.75	9.71
Luxembourg	8.88	10	10.00	9.29	6.67	8.75	9.71
Netherlands	8.84	11	9.58	8.21	8.89	8.13	9.41
Ireland	8.68	12	9.58	7.86	7.22	8.75	10.00
Austria	8.48	13	9.58	7.50	7.78	8.13	9.41
United Kingdom	8.31	14	9.58	7.14	6.67	8.75	9.41
Germany	8.31	15	9.58	7.50	7.22	8.13	9.12
Malta	8.28	16	9.17	8.21	5.56	8.75	9.71
Uruguay	8.17	=17	10.00	8.93	4.44	7.50	10.00
Mauritius	8.17	=17	9.17	8.21	5.00	8.75	9.71
USA	8.11	19	9.17	7.50	7.22	8.13	8.53
Japan	8.08	20	9.17	8.21	6.11	7.50	9.41
Czech Republic	8.06	=21	9.58	7.14	6.67	7.50	9.41
South Korea	8.06	=21	9.17	7.86	7.22	7.50	8.53
Belgium	8.05	23	9.58	8.21	5.56	7.50	9.41
Costa Rica	8.03	24	9.58	7.86	6.11	6.88	9.71



Table 2
Democracy Index 2013

	Overall score	Rank	Electoral process	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Spain	8.02	25	9.58	7.50	6.11	7.50	9.41
Flawed democracies							
Botswana	7.98	26	9.17	7.14	6.67	7.50	9.41
France	7.92	=27	9.58	6.79	7.22	7.50	8.53
Cape Verde	7.92	=27	9.17	7.86	7.22	6.25	9.12
South Africa	7.90	29	8.75	8.21	7.78	6.25	8.53
Slovenia	7.88	30	9.58	7.50	7.22	6.25	8.82
Italy	7.85	31	9.58	6.43	7.22	7.50	8.53
Chile	7.80	32	9.58	8.93	3.89	6.88	9.71
India	7.69	33	9.58	7.14	6.67	5.63	9.41
Greece	7.65	=34	9.58	5.71	6.67	6.88	9.41
Portugal	7.65	=34	9.58	5.71	6.67	6.88	9.41
Estonia	7.61	36	9.58	7.14	5.00	7.50	8.82
Taiwan	7.57	37	9.58	7.14	6.11	5.63	9.41
Lithuania	7.54	38	9.58	6.07	6.11	6.25	9.71
Israel	7.53	39	8.75	7.50	8.33	7.50	5.59
Jamaica	7.39	40	9.17	6.79	5.00	6.88	9.12
Slovakia	7.35	41	9.58	7.50	5.56	5.00	9.12
Cyprus	7.29	42	9.17	6.43	6.11	5.63	9.12
Timor-Leste	7.24	43	8.67	7.14	5.56	6.88	7.94
Poland	7.12	=44	9.58	6.43	6.11	4.38	9.12
Brazil	7.12	=44	9.58	7.50	5.00	4.38	9.12
Panama	7.08	46	9.58	6.43	5.56	5.00	8.82
Latvia	7.05	47	9.58	5.36	5.56	5.63	9.12
Trinidad and Tobago	6.99	48	9.58	7.14	5.00	5.00	8.24
Hungary	6.96	49	9.17	6.07	4.44	6.88	8.24
Croatia	6.93	50	9.17	6.07	5.56	5.63	8.24
Mexico	6.91	51	8.75	6.79	6.67	5.00	7.35
Argentina	6.84	52	8.75	5.71	5.56	6.25	7.94
Bulgaria	6.83	53	9.17	5.71	6.67	4.38	8.24
Indonesia	6.82	54	6.92	7.50	6.67	6.25	6.76
Suriname	6.77	55	9.17	6.43	5.00	5.00	8.24
Dominican Republic	6.74	56	8.75	6.07	5.00	6.25	7.65
Serbia	6.67	57	9.17	5.71	6.11	5.00	7.35



Table 2
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	Overall score	Rank	Electoral process	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Lesotho	6.66	58	8.25	5.71	6.67	5.63	7.06
Colombia	6.55	59	9.17	7.14	3.89	3.75	8.82
Romania	6.54	=60	9.58	6.07	4.44	4.38	8.24
Peru	6.54	=60	9.17	5.00	5.00	5.00	8.53
El Salvador	6.53	62	9.17	6.07	3.89	5.00	8.53
Mongolia	6.51	63	9.17	5.71	4.44	5.00	8.24
Malaysia	6.49	64	6.92	7.86	5.56	6.25	5.88
Hong Kong	6.42	65	4.75	6.07	5.00	6.88	9.41
Philippines	6.41	66	8.33	5.36	6.11	3.13	9.12
Papua New Guinea	6.36	67	7.33	6.07	3.89	6.25	8.24
Ghana	6.33	68	8.33	5.36	5.56	5.63	6.76
Moldova	6.32	69	8.75	5.00	5.56	4.38	7.94
Zambia	6.26	=70	7.92	5.36	4.44	6.25	7.35
Paraguay	6.26	=70	8.33	5.36	5.00	4.38	8.24
Thailand	6.25	72	7.83	6.07	5.56	5.00	6.76
Namibia	6.24	73	5.67	5.00	6.67	5.63	8.24
Macedonia	6.16	74	7.75	4.64	6.11	4.38	7.94
Senegal	6.15	75	7.92	5.71	4.44	5.63	7.06
Guyana	6.05	76	7.92	5.36	5.56	4.38	7.06
Malawi	6.00	77	7.00	5.00	5.56	6.25	6.18
Hybrid regimes							
Georgia	5.95	78	8.67	4.64	5.56	5.00	5.88
Montenegro	5.94	79	7.92	5.36	5.00	4.38	7.06
Singapore	5.92	80	4.33	7.14	3.89	6.88	7.35
Mali	5.90	81	7.83	3.93	5.00	6.25	6.47
Benin	5.87	=82	7.33	6.07	4.44	5.63	5.88
Ecuador	5.87	=82	8.25	4.64	5.00	4.38	7.06
Bangladesh	5.86	84	7.42	5.43	5.00	4.38	7.06
Honduras	5.84	=85	8.75	5.71	3.89	4.38	6.47
Ukraine	5.84	=85	7.92	4.29	5.56	4.38	7.06
Guatemala	5.81	87	7.92	6.07	3.33	4.38	7.35
Bolivia	5.79	88	7.00	5.00	5.56	3.75	7.65
Tanzania	5.77	89	7.42	4.64	5.56	5.63	5.59
Tunisia	5.76	90	6.17	5.00	6.67	6.25	4.71



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	Overall score	Rank	Electoral process	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Sri Lanka	5.69	91	6.17	5.36	4.44	6.88	5.59
Albania	5.67	92	7.00	4.00	5.00	5.00	7.35
Turkey	5.63	93	7.92	6.43	5.00	5.00	3.82
Nicaragua	5.46	94	6.17	4.00	4.44	5.63	7.06
Uganda	5.22	95	5.67	3.57	4.44	6.25	6.18
Kenya	5.13	96	4.33	4.29	6.11	5.63	5.29
Venezuela	5.07	97	5.25	4.29	5.56	4.38	5.88
Lebanon	5.05	98	5.67	1.79	7.22	5.00	5.59
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.02	99	6.50	2.93	3.33	5.00	7.35
Liberia	4.95	100	7.83	0.79	5.56	5.00	5.59
Bhutan	4.82	=101	7.50	5.36	3.33	4.38	3.53
Libya	4.82	=101	4.33	4.64	3.89	5.63	5.59
Palestine	4.80	103	5.17	2.86	7.78	4.38	3.82
Nepal	4.77	=104	3.92	4.29	4.44	5.63	5.59
Mozambique	4.77	=104	4.42	3.57	6.11	5.63	4.12
Kyrgyz Republic	4.69	106	6.58	2.21	5.00	4.38	5.29
Pakistan	4.64	=107	6.00	5.36	2.78	3.75	5.29
Sierra Leone	4.64	=107	7.00	1.86	2.78	6.25	5.29
Cambodia	4.60	109	4.42	6.07	2.78	5.63	4.12
Madagascar	4.32	110	3.83	2.14	5.00	5.63	5.00
Mauritania	4.17	111	3.42	4.29	5.00	3.13	5.00
Burkina Faso	4.15	112	4.42	3.57	3.33	5.00	4.41
Iraq	4.10	113	4.33	0.79	7.22	3.75	4.41
Niger	4.08	114	7.08	1.14	2.78	4.38	5.00
Morocco	4.07	115	3.50	4.64	2.78	5.00	4.41
Armenia	4.02	116	4.33	2.86	3.89	3.13	5.88
Authoritarian regimes							
Haiti	3.94	117	4.75	2.21	2.22	3.75	6.76
Ethiopia	3.83	=118	0.00	3.57	5.56	5.63	4.41
Algeria	3.83	=118	3.00	2.21	3.89	5.63	4.41
Kuwait	3.78	120	3.17	3.93	3.89	4.38	3.53
Nigeria	3.77	121	5.67	3.21	3.33	3.13	3.53
Jordan	3.76	=122	3.17	3.93	4.44	3.75	3.53
Gabon	3.76	=122	3.00	2.21	4.44	5.00	4.12



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	Overall score	Rank	Electoral process	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Fiji	3.61	124	0.42	2.86	3.89	5.00	5.88
Russia	3.59	125	3.50	2.86	5.00	2.50	4.12
Cuba	3.52	=126	1.75	4.64	3.89	4.38	2.94
Comoros	3.52	=126	3.92	2.21	3.89	3.75	3.82
Togo	3.45	128	4.00	0.79	3.33	5.00	4.12
Burundi	3.41	=129	3.00	2.21	3.89	5.00	2.94
Cameroon	3.41	=129	0.75	3.57	3.89	5.00	3.82
Rwanda	3.38	131	0.83	5.00	2.22	5.00	3.82
Angola	3.35	132	0.92	3.21	5.00	4.38	3.24
Gambia	3.31	133	2.17	3.93	2.22	5.00	3.24
Vietnam	3.29	134	0.00	3.93	3.89	6.88	1.76
Egypt	3.27	135	2.17	2.50	5.00	3.75	2.94
Oman	3.26	136	0.00	3.93	3.89	4.38	4.12
Côte d'Ivoire	3.25	137	0.00	1.79	5.00	5.63	3.82
Swaziland	3.20	138	0.92	2.86	2.78	5.63	3.82
Qatar	3.18	139	0.00	3.93	2.22	5.63	4.12
Azerbaijan	3.06	=140	1.75	1.79	3.33	3.75	4.71
Kazakhstan	3.06	=140	0.50	2.14	3.89	4.38	4.41
Belarus	3.04	142	1.75	2.86	3.89	4.38	2.35
China	3.00	143	0.00	4.64	3.89	5.00	1.47
Djibouti	2.96	144	0.83	1.79	3.33	5.63	3.24
Congo (Brazzaville)	2.89	145	1.25	2.86	3.33	3.75	3.24
Bahrain	2.87	146	1.25	3.57	2.78	4.38	2.35
Guinea	2.84	147	3.50	0.43	3.89	3.75	2.65
Yemen	2.79	148	1.33	1.43	5.00	5.00	1.18
Myanmar	2.76	149	1.50	2.14	2.78	5.63	1.76
Zimbabwe	2.67	150	0.50	1.29	3.33	5.00	3.24
Sudan	2.54	151	0.00	1.79	4.44	5.00	1.47
United Arab Emirates	2.52	152	0.00	3.57	1.11	5.00	2.94
Tajikistan	2.51	153	1.83	0.79	2.22	6.25	1.47
Afghanistan	2.48	154	2.50	0.79	2.78	2.50	3.82
Eritrea	2.40	155	0.00	2.86	1.11	6.88	1.18
Laos	2.21	156	0.00	3.21	1.67	5.00	1.18



Table 2
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	Overall score	Rank	Electoral process	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties
Iran	1.98	157	0.00	2.86	2.78	2.50	1.76
Syria	1.86	158	0.00	0.36	3.33	5.63	0.00
Democratic Republic of Congo	1.83	159	1.33	0.71	2.22	3.13	1.76
Saudi Arabia	1.82	160	0.00	2.86	1.67	3.13	1.47
Equatorial Guinea	1.77	161	0.00	0.79	2.22	4.38	1.47
Uzbekistan	1.72	=162	0.08	0.79	2.78	4.38	0.59
Turkmenistan	1.72	=162	0.00	0.79	2.22	5.00	0.59
Chad	1.50	164	0.00	0.00	1.11	3.75	2.65
Central African Republic	1.49	165	0.92	0.00	1.67	2.50	2.35
Guinea-Bissau	1.26	166	0.42	0.00	1.67	1.88	2.35
North Korea	1.08	167	0.00	2.50	1.67	1.25	0.00

Flawed democracies are concentrated in Latin America and eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent in Asia. Despite progress in Latin American democratisation in recent decades, many countries in the region have fragile democracies. Levels of political participation are generally low and democratic cultures are weak. There has also been significant backsliding in recent years in some areas such as media freedoms.

Much of eastern Europe illustrates the difference between formal and substantive democracy. The new EU members from the region have pretty much equal levels of political freedoms and civil liberties as the old developed EU, but lag significantly in political participation and political culture—a reflection of widespread popular disenchantment with the transition and weaknesses of democratic development. Only one country from the region, the Czech Republic, is rated a full democracy.

Changes in 2013

The results of the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) *Democracy Index 2013* show that the democracy score declined in 2013 for 45 countries out of the 167 that are covered. The score increased in 48 countries and it stayed the same in 74. In most regions the average democracy score for 2013 is similar to the 2012 score.



Table 3
Democracy across the regions

	No. of countries	Democracy index average	Full democracies	Flawed democracies	Hybrid regimes	Authoritarian regimes
North America						
2013	2	8.59	2	0	0	0
2012	2	8.59	2	0	0	0
Western Europe						
2013	21	8.41	15	5	1	0
2012	21	8.44	15	5	1	0
Eastern Europe						
2013	28	5.53	1	14	6	7
2012	28	5.51	1	14	6	7
Latin America & the Caribbean						
2013	24	6.38	2	14	7	1
2012	24	6.36	2	14	7	1
Asia & Australasia						
2013	28	5.61	4	10	7	7
2012	28	5.56	4	10	7	7
Middle East & North Africa						
2013	20	3.68	0	1	7	12
2012	20	3.73	0	1	4	15
Sub-Saharan Africa						
2013	44	4.36	1	10	9	24
2012	44	4.32	1	9	11	23
Total						
2013	167	5.53	25	54	36	52
2012	167	5.52	25	53	36	53

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Decline in media freedoms

A noticeable decline in media freedoms, affecting all regions to some extent, has accelerated since 2008. This has affected mainly electronic media, which is often under state control or heavy state influence—although repression and infringements of the freedom of expression have also extended to the print media and, most recently, the Internet.

The reasons for this decline are complex and varied. Underlying negative trends were exacerbated by the 2008-09 global economic crisis. Many governments have felt increasingly vulnerable and threatened and have reacted by intensifying their efforts to control the media and impede free



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expression. Increasing unemployment and job insecurity have fostered a climate of fear and self-censorship among journalists in many countries. The concentration of media ownership has tended to increase, which has had a negative impact on the diversity of views and the freedom of expression. Advanced nations have become more inward-looking and hence less interested and capable of monitoring and pressurising emerging market governments to ensure freedom of the press. In authoritarian regimes, which have often become stronger and more confident, state control and repression of any independent media is a given and has if anything tended to get worse, with increasing attacks on independent journalists.

Table 4
Democracy Index 2010-2013

	2013	2012	2011	2010
US	8.11	8.11	8.11	8.18
Canada	9.08	9.08	9.08	9.08
Austria	8.48	8.62	8.49	8.49
Belgium	8.05	8.05	8.05	8.05
Cyprus	7.29	7.29	7.29	7.29
Denmark	9.38	9.52	9.52	9.52
Finland	9.03	9.06	9.06	9.19
France	7.92	7.88	7.77	7.77
Germany	8.31	8.34	8.34	8.38
Greece	7.65	7.65	7.65	7.92
Iceland	9.65	9.65	9.65	9.65
Ireland	8.68	8.56	8.56	8.79
Italy	7.85	7.74	7.74	7.83
Luxembourg	8.88	8.88	8.88	8.88
Malta	8.28	8.28	8.28	8.28
Netherlands	8.84	8.99	8.99	8.99
Norway	9.93	9.93	9.8	9.8
Portugal	7.65	7.92	7.81	8.02
Spain	8.02	8.02	8.02	8.16
Sweden	9.73	9.73	9.5	9.5
Switzerland	9.09	9.09	9.09	9.09
Turkey	5.63	5.76	5.73	5.73
United Kingdom	8.31	8.21	8.16	8.16
Albania	5.67	5.67	5.81	5.86
Armenia	4.02	4.09	4.09	4.09



Table 4
Democracy Index 2010-2013

	2013	2012	2011	2010
Azerbaijan	3.06	3.15	3.15	3.15
Belarus	3.04	3.04	3.16	3.34
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.02	5.11	5.24	5.32
Bulgaria	6.83	6.72	6.78	6.84
Croatia	6.93	6.93	6.73	6.81
Czech Republic	8.06	8.19	8.19	8.19
Estonia	7.61	7.61	7.61	7.68
Georgia	5.95	5.53	4.74	4.59
Hungary	6.96	6.96	7.04	7.21
Kazakhstan	3.06	2.95	3.24	3.3
Kyrgyz Republic	4.69	4.69	4.34	4.31
Latvia	7.05	7.05	7.05	7.05
Lithuania	7.54	7.24	7.24	7.24
Macedonia	6.16	6.16	6.16	6.16
Moldova	6.32	6.32	6.32	6.33
Montenegro	5.94	6.05	6.15	6.27
Poland	7.12	7.12	7.12	7.05
Romania	6.54	6.54	6.54	6.6
Russia	3.59	3.74	3.92	4.26
Serbia	6.67	6.33	6.33	6.33
Slovakia	7.35	7.35	7.35	7.35
Slovenia	7.88	7.88	7.76	7.69
Tajikistan	2.51	2.51	2.51	2.51
Turkmenistan	1.72	1.72	1.72	1.72
Ukraine	5.84	5.91	5.94	6.3
Uzbekistan	1.72	1.72	1.74	1.74
Argentina	6.84	6.84	6.84	6.84
Bolivia	5.79	5.84	5.84	5.92
Brazil	7.12	7.12	7.12	7.12
Chile	7.8	7.54	7.54	7.67
Colombia	6.55	6.63	6.63	6.55
Costa Rica	8.03	8.1	8.1	8.04
Cuba	3.52	3.52	3.52	3.52
Dominican Republic	6.74	6.49	6.2	6.2

Table 4
Democracy Index 2010-2013

	2013	2012	2011	2010
Ecuador	5.87	5.78	5.72	5.77
El Salvador	6.53	6.47	6.47	6.47
Guatemala	5.81	5.88	5.88	6.05
Guyana	6.05	6.05	6.05	6.05
Haiti	3.94	3.96	4	4
Honduras	5.84	5.84	5.84	5.76
Jamaica	7.39	7.39	7.13	7.21
Mexico	6.91	6.9	6.93	6.93
Nicaragua	5.46	5.56	5.56	5.73
Panama	7.08	7.08	7.08	7.15
Paraguay	6.26	6.26	6.4	6.4
Peru	6.54	6.47	6.59	6.4
Suriname	6.77	6.65	6.65	6.65
Trinidad and Tobago	6.99	6.99	7.16	7.16
Uruguay	8.17	8.17	8.17	8.1
Venezuela	5.07	5.15	5.08	5.18
Afghanistan	2.48	2.48	2.48	2.48
Australia	9.13	9.22	9.22	9.22
Bangladesh	5.86	5.86	5.86	5.87
Bhutan	4.82	4.65	4.57	4.68
Cambodia	4.6	4.96	4.87	4.87
China	3	3	3.14	3.14
Fiji	3.61	3.67	3.67	3.62
Hong Kong	6.42	6.42	5.92	5.92
India	7.69	7.52	7.3	7.28
Indonesia	6.82	6.76	6.53	6.53
Japan	8.08	8.08	8.08	8.08
Laos	2.21	2.32	2.1	2.1
Malaysia	6.49	6.41	6.19	6.19
Mongolia	6.51	6.35	6.23	6.36
Myanmar	2.76	2.35	1.77	1.77
Nepal	4.77	4.16	4.24	4.24
New Zealand	9.26	9.26	9.26	9.26

Table 4
Democracy Index 2010-2013

	2013	2012	2011	2010
North Korea	1.08	1.08	1.08	1.08
Pakistan	4.64	4.57	4.55	4.55
Papua New Guinea	6.36	6.32	6.32	6.54
Philippines	6.41	6.3	6.12	6.12
Singapore	5.92	5.88	5.89	5.89
South Korea	8.06	8.13	8.06	8.11
Sri Lanka	5.69	5.75	6.58	6.64
Taiwan	7.57	7.57	7.46	7.52
Thailand	6.25	6.55	6.55	6.55
Timor-Leste	7.24	7.16	7.22	7.22
Vietnam	3.29	2.89	2.96	2.94
Algeria	3.83	3.83	3.44	3.44
Bahrain	2.87	2.53	2.92	3.49
Egypt	3.27	4.56	3.95	3.07
Iran	1.98	1.98	1.98	1.94
Iraq	4.1	4.1	4.03	4
Israel	7.53	7.53	7.53	7.48
Jordan	3.76	3.76	3.89	3.74
Kuwait	3.78	3.78	3.74	3.88
Lebanon	5.05	5.05	5.32	5.82
Libya	4.82	5.15	3.55	1.94
Morocco	4.07	4.07	3.83	3.79
Oman	3.26	3.26	3.26	2.86
Palestine	4.8	4.8	4.97	5.44
Qatar	3.18	3.18	3.18	3.09
Saudi Arabia	1.82	1.71	1.77	1.84
Sudan	2.54	2.38	2.38	2.42
Syria	1.86	1.63	1.99	2.31
Tunisia	5.76	5.67	5.53	2.79
United Arab Emirates	2.52	2.58	2.58	2.52
Yemen	2.79	3.12	2.57	2.64
Angola	3.35	3.35	3.32	3.32
Benin	5.87	6	6.06	6.17



Table 4
Democracy Index 2010-2013

	2013	2012	2011	2010
Botswana	7.98	7.85	7.63	7.63
Burkina Faso	4.15	3.52	3.59	3.59
Burundi	3.41	3.6	4.01	4.01
Cameroon	3.41	3.44	3.41	3.41
Cape Verde	7.92	7.92	7.92	7.94
Central African Republic	1.49	1.99	1.82	1.82
Chad	1.5	1.62	1.62	1.52
Comoros	3.52	3.52	3.52	3.41
Congo (Brazzaville)	2.89	2.89	2.89	2.89
Democratic Republic of Congo	1.83	1.92	2.15	2.15
Côte d'Ivoire	3.25	3.25	3.08	3.02
Djibouti	2.96	2.74	2.68	2.2
Equatorial Guinea	1.77	1.83	1.77	1.84
Eritrea	2.4	2.4	2.34	2.31
Ethiopia	3.83	3.72	3.79	3.68
Gabon	3.76	3.56	3.48	3.29
Gambia	3.31	3.31	3.38	3.38
Ghana	6.33	6.02	6.02	6.02
Guinea	2.84	2.79	2.79	2.79
Guinea-Bissau	1.26	1.43	1.99	1.99
Kenya	5.13	4.71	4.71	4.71
Lesotho	6.66	6.66	6.33	6.02
Liberia	4.95	4.95	5.07	5.07
Madagascar	4.32	3.93	3.93	3.94
Malawi	6	6.08	5.84	5.84
Mali	5.9	5.12	6.36	6.01
Mauritania	4.17	4.17	4.17	3.86
Mauritius	8.17	8.17	8.04	8.04
Mozambique	4.77	4.88	4.9	4.9
Namibia	6.24	6.24	6.24	6.23
Niger	4.08	4.16	4.16	3.38
Nigeria	3.77	3.77	3.83	3.47
Rwanda	3.38	3.36	3.25	3.25
Senegal	6.15	6.09	5.51	5.27
Sierra Leone	4.64	4.71	4.51	4.51



Table 4
Democracy Index 2010-2013

	2013	2012	2011	2010
South Africa	7.9	7.79	7.79	7.79
Swaziland	3.2	3.2	3.26	2.9
Tanzania	5.77	5.88	5.64	5.64
Togo	3.45	3.45	3.45	3.45
Uganda	5.22	5.16	5.13	5.05
Zambia	6.26	6.26	6.19	5.68
Zimbabwe	2.67	2.67	2.68	2.64

The Arab spring

Following a period of global stagnation and decline in democracy, will the Arab spring political upheavals result in a new wave of democratisation? Although the degree of vulnerability of authoritarian regimes differs significantly, the developments in MENA underline the possibilities for political change. Authoritarian regimes in MENA and elsewhere share similar characteristics, to a lesser or greater degree: human rights abuses and absence of basic freedoms; rampant corruption and nepotism; small elites control the bulk of the nation's assets; and governance and social provision are poor. Economic hardships in the form of stagnant or falling incomes, high unemployment and rising inflation have affected many countries. Some authoritarian regimes have young and restless populations. Long-serving, geriatric leaders are another common feature. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak had been in office for 29 years; former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was in power for 23 years. Elsewhere in MENA, Ali Abdullah Saleh had ruled Yemen since 1978, while Libya's Muammar al-Gaddafi had been in power for more than four decades.

In other regions such as the CIS, several autocrats have been in power for two decades or more. Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe has been in power for more than three decades, while the Castro brothers have held sway in Cuba for more than half a century. The longer ageing autocrats hang on to power, the more out-of-touch and corrupt their regimes tend to become, and the more of an anachronism and an affront they become to their peoples.

The extent of economic dynamism varies sharply across authoritarian states. Oil wealth is a double-edged sword. Some of the energy-rich states have been able to buy off the population and pre-empt unrest. On the other hand, minerals-based development magnifies all kinds of institutional pathologies, which can in turn provoke unrest. In terms of the level of development, countries must not be rich enough to be able to buy off restive populations, but they need to be rich enough to have a middle class, widespread internet access and sufficient numbers of educated young people who are able and willing to form the vanguard of a political revolution.



Timing

Why did the Arab uprisings occur after a long period in which authoritarian governments appeared to have been successfully consolidating their control? The interplay of a number of factors may provide an explanation: electoral fraud; succession crises; economic distress; increasing corruption; and neighbourhood effects.

An attempt by an authoritarian ruler to extend his rule or ensure that a hand-picked successor, usually an offspring, takes power is a catalyst for protest. Stealing elections has often galvanised opposition (for example, in Egypt or during the CIS “colour revolutions” in the middle of the previous decade). The blatant fraud in the parliamentary elections in Egypt held in November and December 2010 outraged and helped mobilise protesters, as did Mr Mubarak’s plan to install his son Gamal as the country’s next ruler. Cumulative effects can be important. Years of corruption and repression mean that with each passing year popular dissatisfaction with the regime increases. Neighbourhood demonstration effects have played a strong role in anti-regime protests; without Tunisia there would have been no Egypt. Finally, domestic political opposition is emboldened when external opposition or ambivalence towards ruling elites replaces previous support. An increased international focus constrains autocrats’ room for manoeuvre.

Most authoritarian leaders have a large security apparatus at their disposal to suppress dissent and can mobilise supporters to counter challenges to their regime. Many do not fear international opprobrium if they crack down. These factors may be enough to ward off regime change, at least in the short term, and a number of MENA authoritarian regimes have resorted to brutal repression to remain in power.

Democracy: from retreat to renewal

During the 1970s and 1980s more than 30 countries shifted from authoritarian to democratic political systems. In recent years, the post-1970s wave of democratisation has slowed or been reversed. In some respects the trend was made worse by the post-2008 economic crisis. There has been a decline in some aspects of governance, political participation and media freedoms, and a clear deterioration in attitudes associated with, or that are conducive to, democracy in many countries. Many governments have felt increasingly vulnerable and threatened and have reacted by intensifying their efforts to control the media and impede free expression.

We expect that political upheavals will indeed affect other authoritarian regimes. These may not all be successful and not all may necessarily take the form of mass popular uprisings. The outlook for democratic transition is, however, uncertain. As has been the case in recent years, major reversals in democratisation have taken place before. For example, a democratisation wave after the second world war ended with more than 20 countries subsequently sliding back to authoritarianism. That sort of rollback has not occurred recently. Democracy as a value retains strong universal appeal worldwide. Despite setbacks and overall stagnation, surveys show that most people in most places still want democracy. Trends such as globalisation, increasing education and expanding middle classes tend to



favour the organic development of democracy.

As the recent experience in MENA has also illustrated, democratisation in hitherto authoritarian states does not of course mean a transition to fully-fledged, consolidated democracies. Democracy means more than holding elections; it requires the development of a range of supportive institutions and attitudes. Such a transformation takes a very long time.

Democracy and economic crisis

Although economic crises can serve to undermine authoritarianism, there are also a number of ways in which democracy has been adversely affected by the economic and financial crisis. There has been a decline in some aspects of governance, political participation and media freedoms, and a clear deterioration in attitudes associated with, or conducive to, democracy in many countries, including in Europe.

Nations with a weak democratic tradition are by default vulnerable to setbacks. Many non-consolidated democracies are fragile and socioeconomic stress has led to backsliding on democracy in many countries. The underlying shallowness of democratic cultures—as revealed by disturbingly low scores for many countries in our index for political participation and political culture—has come to the fore.

The impact of the economic and financial crisis on political trends has been most marked in Europe, both east and west. Extremist political forces in Europe have not profited from the economic crisis as much as might have been feared, but populism and anti-immigrant sentiment has nevertheless been on the rise. Economic crises can threaten democracy, usually with a lag, through increased social unrest. So far, social unrest related to the financial and economic crisis has affected a limited number of countries.

Opinion polls show that confidence in public institutions in western Europe—already low before 2008 in many countries—has declined further since the onset of the crisis. Less than one fifth of west Europeans trust political parties and only about one third trust their governments and parliaments. Levels of public trust are exceptionally low in the eastern Europe. Less than 10% of people in this subregion trust political parties and less than one fifth trust their governments and their parliaments.



Regional patterns

Western Europe

Six out of the top ten countries in our index are in western Europe. However, there has been a significant erosion in democracy in the region in recent years. A total of 15 countries out of 21 experienced a decline in their overall score in 2010 compared with 2008, in large part related to the various effects of the economic crisis. Three countries (Greece, Italy and France) dropped out of the category of full democracies between 2008 and 2010; Portugal joined them in 2011. Seven countries had a decline in their score in 2011; none had an increase.

The main reason for the decline in democracy scores in recent years in the region was the erosion in sovereignty and democratic accountability associated with the effects of and responses to the euro zone crisis (five of seven countries that experienced a decline in their scores—Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland). Most dramatically, in two countries (Greece and Italy) democratically elected politicians were replaced by technocrats at the head of governments.

Policy in some countries is no longer being set by national legislatures and elected politicians, but is effectively set by official creditors, the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the IMF. The severity of austerity measures has tended to weaken social cohesion and diminish further trust in public institutions, which had already been declining since the 2008-09 economic crisis.

In many Western democracies, lack of public participation in the political process is a cause for concern, leading to a democratic deficit. In Germany, for example, membership of the major parties is in decline and election turnout is decreasing at all levels. The UK's political participation score is among the worst in the developed world.

European elections ratchet up domestic pressures

It is not the so-called earthquake that was shocking, but the fact that some mainstream politicians profess to have been shocked by it. The results of the European Parliament elections on May 22nd-25th confirmed that the turmoil of recent years has exacted a significant political price. This should not surprise us. Worryingly, it is likely to hamper policymaking across the EU at a time when the bloc's institutions are in flux. In some countries—Germany and Italy particularly—voters appear content with and supportive of their leaders. But the results in countries such as France, the UK and Greece highlight the Sisyphean task—made worse by

years of complacency—that policymakers now face in attempting to secure continent-wide approval for continuing—and, quite possibly, further—integration.

It is important to put the election results in perspective. Despite the high-profile success of various populist Eurosceptic forces, the European Parliament remains under the sway of the centre-left and centre-right parties (see chart below). Granted, these parties may struggle to respond in concert to the expansion of Euroscepticism in the parliament chamber from an irritant fringe to an emergent force. But the insurgents hold neither the levers nor the balance of power.

Home thoughts, from abroad

In so far as the elections herald a potential crisis of political legitimacy, they do so primarily at the



national level. The EU's hybrid governance structures have manifold problems, but voters' only meaningful political relationships are with their domestic representatives. If there is a breakdown of trust, we should expect this to be at the national level. Just as during the euro zone crisis a national breakdown of individual governments' budget deficits was much more telling than an aggregate figure for the bloc, so the EU's democratic deficit is best understood not primarily as a deficiency at the European level (although it is certainly that too) but as a failure of national politicians to respond to their voters' concerns.


The most dramatic result of the election—the victory of the Front national (FN) in France—should be understood in this way, in national terms. It reflects a crisis in the French political system more than a crisis of Europe. The two mainstream parties have lost touch with the electorate. In 2012 voters wanted to get rid of the former president Nicolas

voters wished to punish the two parties of the governing coalition, but without endorsing the centre-left opposition Labour Party, which, like the UMP in France, was all too recently the incumbent being punished. This explains the surge of the UK Independence Party (UKIP).

In both France and the UK, populist insurgents profited from a failure of the mainstream parties to connect with their electorates. In neither country did the two main parties manage to articulate (and thereby ease) voters' inchoate sense of dissatisfaction with the direction things have taken. Still less did they convince people that they could turn things around. This is also true in Greece, where Syriza Unifying Social Front (Syriza) was a clear victor; in Spain, where unprecedented fragmentation saw the combined vote of the two largest parties slump from 80% in 2009 to less than 50%; and in Ireland, where the deputy prime minister resigned following his party's electoral collapse.

European Parliament election results

(% of votes)



Source: European Parliament.

Sarkozy, but they endorsed François Hollande only reluctantly. Mr Hollande's approval ratings almost immediately began to display a significant degree of regret on voters' part and have worsened steadily. However, there is no corresponding swing of the pendulum back towards Mr Sarkozy's Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP). Instead, it is the far-right iconoclasts of the FN who have surged.

A similar pattern can be seen in the UK. Many

Exaggerated reports of the mainstream's death

Contrast this with the results in Germany and Italy, where voters opted decisively not only for mainstream parties but for mainstream parties of government. They did so for opposite reasons. In Germany, the electorate is broadly content with policy and with the political mainstream's responsiveness to voters' interests. In Italy, the landslide enjoyed by Matteo Renzi's Partito Democratico (PD) showed



the continuing power of mainstream politics when practised by a leader who is able to connect with the electorate.

Italy might have been the perfect breeding ground for a populist surge in these elections by Beppe Grillo's Movimento 5 Stelle, but Mr Renzi has dulled that movement's appeal by recognising what voters want and promising it to them: a radical departure from the sclerotic business-as-usual of Italian politics. In France and the UK, by contrast, no such clarity as to voters' preferences exists. Rather than steer the national mood, the mainstream parties in these two countries have appeared confused and buffeted by it. This has allowed a destabilising political vacuum to develop, opening an unusually large gap in the political market, which is being filled by charismatic leaders bearing simple political messages.

We should expect to see more of the same in coming years. We are at the beginning of a long electoral cycle across Europe that is likely to be more revealing of voters' disenchantment and disaffection than was the last such cycle. The previous cycle saw numerous incumbent governments ousted and replaced by their traditional rivals. But in many instances, these traditional rivals have been unable to deliver change on the scale that they explicitly or implicitly promised. So they too now find themselves battling their electorates' disaffection. Meanwhile, many voters appear willing to vote for "outsider" parties or candidates, who offer a more abrupt break with the status quo than do most mainstream opposition parties. Results in the Netherlands appear to have been an exception in this regard, with Geert Wilders' high-profile Party for Freedom (PVV) failing to match its pre-election expectations.

Parliamentary arithmetic now slightly more complicated

The impact of these elections at the European level is likely to be much less dramatic than it promises to be in a number of individual countries. Despite the surge in support for populist parties, a majority of seats is still controlled by the main groupings of the centre-

right and centre-left. The two biggest groupings—the centre-right European People's Party (EPP) and the centre-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)—enjoy a relatively slim majority of 53%, but that figure is boosted by a further 10% if the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) is included.

The likelihood of such cross-party consensus is strong in many areas. Rival groupings vote together in the European Parliament much more commonly than is usually the case in national parliaments. One reason for this is that political rivalries between EU institutions are often sharper than those within them. But there will be areas in which centrist consensus will be more difficult to achieve and therefore in which the prospect of a Eurosceptic blocking will become more likely.

New free-trade deals are one possible such issue. In the context of heightened economic uncertainty and many voters' feeling that globalisation may be to blame, concerns about the impact of major trade deals (notably a proposed agreement with the US) could see a sufficient number of centre-left and centre-right parliamentarians rebel to make parliamentary approval difficult. Similarly, proposals to deepen the EU's single market for services are likely to generate a greater degree of protectionism across the parliament than might previously have been the case.

The culture of EU politicking is unlikely to change

However, anyone expecting a fundamental shift in the way EU politics works following the elections is likely to be disappointed. This will become apparent within days of the results' announcement, as attention shifts to the choice of a replacement for José Manuel Barroso as president of the European Commission. The Lisbon treaty, which came into force in late 2009, subtly increases the European Parliament's power in this area. The basic division of labour remains unchanged: the heads of EU member state governments propose a candidate for the job, who the parliament must then approve or reject. The change introduced by Lisbon is that the



heads of government must now take account of the parliamentary election results when choosing their candidate.

The main groupings in the parliament have, unsurprisingly, adopted a maximalist interpretation of this new requirement. Prior to the election, each grouping selected a candidate for the Commission presidency—Jean-Claude Juncker for the EPP, Martin Schulz for the S&D—before busily spinning the line that in order to take account of the election results, the heads of government would have to nominate the candidate of whichever grouping emerged victorious. They have threatened to vote down any other candidate proposed by the heads of government.

The heads of government, in response, have

said that they are under no obligation to take their instructions from the parliament. They are correct on this point, both formally and in terms of what the current political mood requires. Neither Mr Juncker (the former prime minister of Luxembourg) nor Mr Schulz (president of the European Parliament) can be said to embody the rejectionist spirit of the election results. This is not to say that the heads of government will be any more adventurous when they come forward with a candidate. On the contrary, the most likely outcome in the days ahead is a period of horse-trading both within and between EU institutions that confirms many voters' intuition that Europe's policymakers are deaf to their calls for reform.

Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe has performed poorly in our democracy index in recent years. In 2011 12 countries in the region experienced declines in their scores. This followed a large decline in the average score for the region between 2008 and 2010, when 19 countries recorded a decline in their democracy scores. In 2012 in ten countries out of the 28 the democracy score declined and in 2013 in seven countries.

Authoritarian trends have become entrenched in most members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). But the setbacks to democracy have not means limited to that subregion. Democracy has also been eroded across east-central Europe. A common explanation for the emergence of political difficulties in this subregion is that the EU accession process had previously held together the fractious party-political systems of these countries, as mainstream parties united behind the reforms that were needed to gain EU membership. But once accession was achieved, and politics reverted to "natural" antagonistic patterns, the underlying fragility of east-central European political systems was exposed.

There are a number of possible reasons for this fragility. Most important is that although democratic forms are in place in the region, much of the substance of democracy, including a political culture based on trust, is absent. This is manifested in low levels of political participation beyond voting (and even turnout at elections is low in many countries), and very low levels of public confidence in institutions. A key underlying factor is that transition has resulted in a large stratum of discontented voters who feel that they have lost out. Another problem in the region is that party politics is fragmented, primarily reflecting the shallow roots of many parties and low voter identification with parties.

Attitudes to democracy

The 2008-09 global economic crisis had a disproportionately negative impact on eastern Europe compared with other emerging markets, such as developing Asia and Latin America. It also seems



to have reinforced a pre-existing mood of disappointment with the experience and results of the transition to democracy and market economies. A number of post-crisis surveys and reports point to a further decline in life satisfaction, support for markets and democracy and trust in institutions.

Some negative trends have recently got worse. Hungary is perhaps the prime example among the EU's new member states in the region. Since winning a two thirds parliamentary majority in the 2010 election, the centre-right Fidesz party has systematically been taking over the country's previously independent institutions: the presidency, the state audit office, the media council and even the central bank are now all run by party placemen. Electoral reforms have undermined the opposition and smaller parties.

Although the formal trappings of democracy remain in place, today's Russia has been called a "managed" (or "stage managed") democracy. The Duma is now little more than a rubber-stamp parliament; regional governors are appointed directly; the main media are state-controlled; civil society organisations have come under pressure; and the state has increased its hold over the economy. The authorities brought criminal charges against many protesters and opposition leaders, attacked NGOs as "foreign agents and even convicted a dead man, whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky, for alleged corruption.

The announcement in September 2011 that the prime minister, Vladimir Putin, would seek to return to the presidency (a post that he occupied in 2000-08) was a retrograde and cynical step. It marked a decisive step in Russia's long-running slide towards outright authoritarianism. The decision made a mockery of the institution of the presidency and the electoral process. It exposed the Medvedev presidency as a charade used by Mr Putin to stay in power.

The protest movement in Russia that gathered pace after the 2011 flawed parliamentary poll has lost momentum. Yet although the threat to his rule is limited, Mr Putin appears unwilling to tolerate opposition, and he has backed a series of repressive measures. This includes controversial laws on treason, protests, foreign-funded non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and censorship. Weak institutions mean that Mr Putin's decision to return to the presidency marks a transformation of his rule into a highly personalistic regime. Mr Putin is now legally eligible for two six-year terms, possibly ruling until 2024—almost a quarter of a century after he first became president, in 2000—at which point he will be 71 years old. If he stays in power that long, he will have held the country's top job for longer than Leonid Brezhnev, who led the Soviet Union for 18 years. Only Stalin was in power for a longer period. The longer a leader is in office, the more out of touch with the public he becomes, and the more likely to commit serious errors of judgment.

In Ukraine the democratic gains of the Orange Revolution were severely undermined in 2013, including the conduct of elections, media freedoms and treatment of the opposition.

There are a number of similarities between the authoritarian regimes in the CIS and in MENA. There is rampant corruption, small elites control the bulk of their nations' assets, institutions have been corroded by the effects of minerals-based development (the Belarusian regime depends on Russian subsidies), and governance and social provision are poor. The Arab world has a young and restless



population; in the CIS, this applies to some Central Asian countries, especially Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

However, there are also differences. Growth in real GDP per head in the CIS has been far faster over the past decade than in MENA. Although unemployment tends to be under-reported in much of the CIS, rates are generally lower than in the MENA countries suffering from unrest. In most CIS states, the incidence of absolute poverty and the degree of income disparities also tend to be lower.

Many CIS countries are poor, and the median income per head in the CIS is much lower than the median income per head in MENA. However, some energy-rich CIS states have been able to buy off the population and pre-empt potential unrest by using some of their energy revenue to boost state salaries and benefits.

The greatest risk to existing rulers and elite structures may be the issue of succession. Both the Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, are more than 70 years old and have been in power for more than two decades. No clear successors have been lined up, which increases the potential for intra-elite in-fighting, and possibly public unrest when the incumbent dies or becomes incapacitated.

Asia and Australasia

The wide disparities in democratic development across Asia are captured in the results of our democracy index. The picture is exemplified by the Korean peninsula: South Korea is a full democracy, ranked 20th. By contrast, North Korea props up the global listings, coming last of the 167 countries covered by the index.

Although parts of the region—from North Korea and Laos, to Vietnam and China—are still entrenched authoritarian regimes, the past couple of decades have seen the spread of democracy in the region overall. Over the past decade, some 20 Asian countries have held elections, and many have undergone peaceful transitions in government. Despite its problems, India remains the world's most populous democracy. Yet even in the democratic countries, there are often significant problems in the functioning of political systems.

Democratic political cultures in Asia are often underdeveloped and shallow, even in the countries that have democratised. In only nine countries in the region do we rate elections as being both free and fair. Even in parts of the region that are not authoritarian there is often pressure on the independent media. In many countries, Asian Barometer polls show that more citizens believe that the nations' recent democratic transitions had brought no improvement to their lives than believe that the changes have been positive.

Latin America

There has been little change in this region in recent years. In most countries free and fair elections are now well established. The recent evidence from surveys on attitudes towards democracy is mixed. In some countries, surveys indicate a slow shift in public attitudes on many issues in a direction that is conducive to democracy. However, the sustainability of democracy in Latin America is being



endangered by the concentration of power, the world's most pronounced social and economic inequalities, and mounting insecurity and violence.

While most Latin American countries (14 out of 24) fall within the flawed democracy category, there is wide diversity across the region. For example, Uruguay is a full democracy with an index score of 8.17 (out of 10) and a global ranking of 17th, while Cuba, an authoritarian regime, ranks 126th.

Although the region was adversely affected by the 2008-09 recession—with the US-dependent Central American and Caribbean subregions hit particularly badly—most countries avoided social unrest and a rolling back of democracy. However, a key issue that is undermining democracy in much of the region is an upsurge in violent crime, linked in large part with the drug trade. The corrupting influence of organised crime and its ability to undermine the effectiveness of the security forces and the judicial authorities are a serious problem.

Electoral democracy, for the most part, is firmly entrenched in Latin America, but media freedoms have been eroded in recent years in several countries. Aside from Cuba (the only state in the region without any independent media), Venezuela has been the worst offender. The failure to uphold press freedom in some countries in the region in part reflects inadequate oversight bodies—a symptom of broader institutional weaknesses in Latin America. The executive remains very strong in many countries, the legislature is comparatively weak in many cases and most judiciaries suffer from some degree of politicisation.

The Middle East and North Africa

Despite the pro-democracy upheavals in the region and improvement in the region's average democracy score, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains the most repressive region in the world—13 out of 20 countries in the region are still categorised as authoritarian. Only in Tunisia has there really been any significant progress in democratisation. Elsewhere there has even been regression in reaction to popular protests—most notably in Syria. Three years after the outbreak of the regime-changing revolutions, the region remains unstable.

In Syria, the civil war between forces loyal to President Assad's regime and the opposition has so far cost more than 100,000 lives. In Lebanon, the Syrian conflict has strengthened sectarian clashes between factions in support of and opposed to the Assad regime.

Enormous oil rents are the means by which many governments in the region have entrenched autocratic rule. Rulers can finance far-reaching patronage networks and security apparatuses. Oil revenue removes the need to levy taxes, thereby reducing accountability. Civil society is very weak throughout most of the region.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Elections have become a normal occurrence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since the late 1990s the number of coups has fallen sharply, whereas the number of elections has increased. However, many elections are still rigged. Progress in democracy in the region has been slow and uneven, but nevertheless continues. The number of elections held annually in recent years has increased; since 2000 between



15 and 20 elections have been held each year. Although the holding of elections has become commonplace, not all ballots pass the test of being “free and fair” and many have been charades held by regimes clinging on to power.

The number of successful coups averaged about 20 per decade in 1960-2000. The number dropped to just six in the 2000s. Although coups have become more infrequent, conflict, failed governments and human-rights abuses remain widespread.

Only one state in the region (of the 44 assessed) remains a full democracy: the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius, which has maintained a strong democratic tradition since the country gained independence in 1968. The region has several flawed democracies, including South Africa, Benin, Cape Verde, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Ghana, Malawi and Zambia. There are ten hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes (23; over one-half of the total) continue to predominate.

Defining and measuring democracy

There is no consensus on how to measure democracy, definitions of democracy are contested and there is an ongoing lively debate on the subject. The issue is not only of academic interest. For example, although democracy-promotion is high on the list of US foreign policy priorities, there is no consensus within the US government on what constitutes a democracy. As one observer recently put it, “the world’s only superpower is rhetorically and militarily promoting a political system that remains undefined—and it is staking its credibility and treasure on that pursuit” (Horowitz, 2006, p 114).

Although the terms freedom and democracy are often used interchangeably, the two are not synonymous. Democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalise and thus ultimately protect freedom. Even if a consensus on precise definitions has proved elusive, most observers today would agree that, at a minimum, the fundamental features of a democracy include government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed, the existence of free and fair elections, the protection of minority rights and respect for basic human rights. Democracy presupposes equality before the law, due process and political pluralism. A question arises whether reference to these basic features is sufficient for a satisfactory concept of democracy. As discussed below, there is a question of how far the definition may need to be widened.

Some insist that democracy is necessarily a dichotomous concept—a state is either democratic or not. But most measures now appear to adhere to a continuous concept, with the possibility of varying degrees of democracy. At present, the best-known measure is produced by the US-based Freedom House organisation. The average of their indexes, on a 1 to 7 scale, of political freedom (based on 10 indicators) and of civil liberties (based on 15 indicators) is often taken to be a measure of democracy.

The index is available for all countries, and stretches back to the early 1970s. It has been used heavily in empirical investigations of the relationship between democracy and various economic and social variables. The so-called Polity Project provides, for a smaller number of countries, measures of democracy and regime types, based on rather minimalist definitions, stretching back to the 19th century. These have also been used in empirical work.



Freedom House also measures a narrower concept, that of “electoral democracy”. Democracies in this minimal sense share at least one common, essential characteristic. Positions of political power are filled through regular, free, and fair elections between competing parties, and it is possible for an incumbent government to be turned out of office through elections. Freedom House criteria for an electoral democracy include:

- 1) A competitive, multiparty political system
- 2) Universal adult suffrage
- 3) Regularly contested elections conducted on the basis of secret ballots, reasonable ballot security and the absence of massive voter fraud
- 4) Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning

The Freedom House definition of political freedom is somewhat (though not much) more demanding than its criteria for electoral democracy—that is, it classifies more countries as electoral democracies than as “free” (some “partly free” countries are also categorised as “electoral democracies”). At the end of 2007, 121 out of 193 states were classified as “electoral democracies; of these, on a more stringent criterion, 90 states were classified as “free”. The Freedom House political freedom measure covers the electoral process and political pluralism and, to a lesser extent the functioning of government and a few aspects of participation.

A key difference in measures is between “thin”, or minimalist, and “thick”, or wider concepts of democracy (Coppedge, 2005). The thin concepts correspond closely to an immensely influential academic definition of democracy, that of Dahl’s concept of polyarchy (Dahl, 1970). Polyarchy has eight components, or institutional requirements: almost all adult citizens have the right to vote; almost all adult citizens are eligible for public office; political leaders have the right to compete for votes; elections are free and fair; all citizens are free to form and join political parties and other organisations; all citizens are free to express themselves on all political issues; diverse sources of information about politics exist and are protected by law; and government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

The Freedom House electoral democracy measure is a thin concept. Their measure of democracy based on political rights and civil liberties is “thicker” than the measure of “electoral democracy”. Other definitions of democracy have broadened to include aspects of society and political culture in democratic societies.

The Economist Intelligence Unit measure

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index is based on the view that measures of democracy that reflect the state of political freedoms and civil liberties are not “thick” enough. They do not encompass sufficiently or at all some features that determine how substantive democracy is or its quality. Freedom is an essential component of democracy, but not sufficient. In existing measures, the elements of political participation and functioning of government are taken into account only in a marginal and formal way.



The Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. The five categories are inter-related and form a coherent conceptual whole. The condition of having free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political freedom, is clearly the sine quo none of all definitions.

All modern definitions, except the most minimalist, also consider civil liberties to be a vital component of what is often called "liberal democracy". The principle of the protection of basic human rights is widely accepted. It is embodied in constitutions throughout the world as well as in the UN Charter and international agreements such as the Helsinki Final Act (the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe). Basic human rights include the freedom of speech, expression and the press; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly and association; and the right to due judicial process. All democracies are systems in which citizens freely make political decisions by majority rule. But rule by the majority is not necessarily democratic. In a democracy majority rule must be combined with guarantees of individual human rights and the rights of minorities.

Most measures also include aspects of the minimum quality of functioning of government. If democratically-based decisions cannot or are not implemented then the concept of democracy is not very meaningful or it becomes an empty shell.

Democracy is more than the sum of its institutions. A democratic political culture is also crucial for the legitimacy, smooth functioning and ultimately the sustainability of democracy. A culture of passivity and apathy, an obedient and docile citizenry, are not consistent with democracy. The electoral process periodically divides the population into winners and losers. A successful democratic political culture implies that the losing parties and their supporters accept the judgment of the voters, and allow for the peaceful transfer of power.

Participation is also a necessary component, as apathy and abstention are enemies of democracy. Even measures that focus predominantly on the processes of representative, liberal democracy include (although inadequately or insufficiently) some aspects of participation. In a democracy, government is only one element in a social fabric of many and varied institutions, political organisations, and associations. Citizens cannot be required to take part in the political process, and they are free to express their dissatisfaction by not participating. However, a healthy democracy requires the active, freely chosen participation of citizens in public life. Democracies flourish when citizens are willing to participate in public debate, elect representatives and join political parties. Without this broad, sustaining participation, democracy begins to wither and become the preserve of small, select groups.

At the same time, even our "thicker", more inclusive and wider measure of democracy does not include other aspects--which some authors argue are also crucial components of democracy--such as levels of economic and social well being. Thus our Index respects the dominant tradition that holds that a variety of social and economic outcomes can be consistent with political democracy, which is a separate concept.

Methodology

The Economist Intelligence Unit's index of democracy, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five category indexes.

The category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator scores in the category, converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Adjustments to the category scores are made if countries do not score a 1 in the following critical areas for democracy:

1. whether national elections are free and fair
2. the security of voters
3. the influence of foreign powers on government
4. the capability of the civil service to implement policies.

If the scores for the first three questions are 0 (or 0.5), one point (0.5 point) is deducted from the index in the relevant category (either the electoral process and pluralism or the functioning of government). If the score for 4 is 0, one point is deducted from the functioning of government category index.

The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes:

1. Full democracies--scores of 8-10
2. Flawed democracies--score of 6 to 7.9
3. Hybrid regimes--scores of 4 to 5.9
4. Authoritarian regimes--scores below 4

Threshold points for regime types depend on overall scores that are rounded to one decimal point.

Full democracies: Countries in which not only basic political freedoms and civil liberties are respected, but these will also tend to be underpinned by a political culture conducive to the flourishing of democracy. The functioning of government is satisfactory. Media are independent and diverse. There is an effective system of checks and balances. The judiciary is independent and judicial decisions are enforced. There are only limited problems in the functioning of democracies.

Flawed democracies: These countries also have free and fair elections and even if there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties will be respected. However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation.

Hybrid regimes: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies--in political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent.

Authoritarian regimes: In these states state political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed. Many countries in this category are outright dictatorships. Some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but these have little substance. Elections, if they do occur, are not free and fair. There is disregard for abuses and infringements of civil liberties. Media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime. There is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship. There is no independent judiciary.

The scoring system

We use a combination of a dichotomous and a three-point scoring system for the 60 indicators. A dichotomous 1-0 scoring system (1 for a yes and 0 for a no answer) is not without problems, but it has several distinct advantages over more refined scoring scales (such as the often-used 1-5 or 1-7). For many indicators, the possibility of a 0.5 score is introduced, to capture 'grey areas' where a simple yes (1) or no (0) is problematic, with guidelines as to when that should be used. Thus for many indicators there is a three-point scoring system, which represents a compromise between simple dichotomous scoring and the use of finer scales.

The problems of 1-5 or 1-7 scoring scales are numerous. For most indicators under such a system, it is extremely difficult to define meaningful and comparable criteria or guidelines for each score. This can lead to arbitrary, spurious and non-comparable scorings. For example, a score of 2 for one country may be scored a 3 in another and so on. Or one expert might score an indicator for a particular country in a different way to another expert. This contravenes a basic principle of measurement, that of so-called *reliability*—the degree to which a measurement procedure produces the same measurements every time, regardless of who is performing it. Two- and three-point systems do not guarantee reliability, but make it more likely.

Second, comparability between indicator scores and aggregation into a multi-dimensional index appears more valid with a two or three-point scale for each indicator (the dimensions being aggregated are similar across indicators). By contrast, with a 1-5 system, the scores are more likely to mean different things across the indicators (for example a 2 for one indicator may be more comparable to a 3 or 4 for another indicator, rather than a 2 for that indicator). The problems of a 1-5 or 1-7 system are magnified when attempting to extend the index to many regions and countries.

Features of the Economist Intelligence Unit index

Public opinion surveys

A crucial, differentiating aspect of our measure is that in addition to experts' assessments we use, where available, public opinion surveys—mainly the World Values Survey. Indicators based on the surveys predominate heavily in the political participation and political culture categories, and a few are used in the civil liberties and functioning of government categories.

In addition to the World Values Survey, other sources that can be leveraged include the Eurobarometer surveys, Gallup polls, Asian Barometer, Latin American Barometer, Afrobarometer and national surveys. In the case of countries for which survey results are missing, survey results for similar



countries and expert assessment are used to fill in gaps.

Participation and voter turnout

After increasing for many decades, there has been a trend of decreasing voter turnout in most established democracies since the 1960s. Low turnout may be due to disenchantment, but it can also be a sign of contentment. Many, however, see low turnout as undesirable, and there is much debate over the factors that affect turnout and how to increase it.

A high turnout is generally seen as evidence of the legitimacy of the current system. Contrary to widespread belief, there is in fact a close correlation between turnout and overall measures of democracy—that is, developed, consolidated democracies have, with very few exceptions, higher turnout (generally above 70%) than less established democracies.

The legislative and executive branches

The appropriate balance between these is much-disputed in political theory. In our model the clear predominance of the legislature is rated positively as there is a very strong correlation between legislative dominance and measures of overall democracy.

The model

I Electoral process and pluralism

1. Are elections for the national legislature and head of government free?

Consider whether elections are competitive in that electors are free to vote and are offered a range of choices.

1: Essentially unrestricted conditions for the presentation of candidates (for example, no bans on major parties)

0.5: There are some restrictions on the electoral process

0: A single-party system or major impediments exist (for example, bans on a major party or candidate)

2. Are elections for the national legislature and head of government fair?

1: No major irregularities in the voting process

0.5: Significant irregularities occur (intimidation, fraud), but do not affect significantly the overall outcome

0: Major irregularities occur and affect the outcome

Score 0 if score for question 1 is 0.

3. Are municipal elections both free and fair?

1: Are free and fair

0.5: Are free but not fair

0: Are neither free nor fair

4. Is there universal suffrage for all adults?

Bar generally accepted exclusions (for example, non-nationals; criminals; members of armed forces in some countries)



- 1: Yes
0: No
5. Can citizens cast their vote free of significant threats to their security from state or non-state bodies?
1: Yes
0: No
6. Do laws provide for broadly equal campaigning opportunities?
1: Yes
0.5: Yes formally, but in practice opportunities are limited for some candidates
0: No
7. Is the process of financing political parties transparent and generally accepted?
1: Yes
0.5: Not fully transparent
0: No
8. Following elections, are the constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another clear, established and accepted?
1: All three criteria are fulfilled
0.5: Two of the three criteria are fulfilled
0: Only one or none of the criteria is satisfied
9. Are citizens free to form political parties that are independent of the government?
1: Yes
0.5: There are some restrictions
0: No
10. Do opposition parties have a realistic prospect of achieving government?
1: Yes
0.5: There is a dominant two-party system in which other political forces never have any effective chance of taking part in national government
0: No
11. Is potential access to public office open to all citizens?
1: Yes
0.5: Formally unrestricted, but in practice restricted for some groups, or for citizens from some parts of the country
0: No
12. Are citizens free to form political and civic organisations, free of state interference and surveillance?
1: Yes
0.5: Officially free, but subject to some restrictions or interference
0: No



II Functioning of government

13. Do freely elected representatives determine government policy?

1: Yes

0.5: Exercise some meaningful influence

0: No

14. Is the legislature the supreme political body, with a clear supremacy over other branches of government?

1: Yes

0: No

15. Is there an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority?

1: Yes

0.5: Yes, but there are some serious flaws

0: No

16. Government is free of undue influence by the military or the security services

1: Yes

0.5: Influence is low, but the defence minister is not a civilian. If the current risk of a military coup is extremely low, but the country has a recent history of military rule or coups

0: No

17. Foreign powers and organisations do not determine important government functions or policies

1: Yes

0.5: Some features of a protectorate

0: No (significant presence of foreign troops; important decisions taken by foreign power; country is a protectorate)

18. Special economic, religious or other powerful domestic groups do not exercise significant political power, parallel to democratic institutions?

1: Yes

0.5: Exercise some meaningful influence

0: No

19. Are sufficient mechanisms and institutions in place for assuring government accountability to the electorate in between elections?

1: Yes

0.5. Yes, but serious flaws exist

0: No

20. Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

1: Yes

0: No



21. Is the functioning of government open and transparent, with sufficient public access to information?

1: Yes

0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist

0: No

22. How pervasive is corruption?

1: Corruption is not a major problem

0.5: Corruption is a significant issue

0: Pervasive corruption exists

23. Is the civil service willing and capable of implementing government policy?

1: Yes

0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist

0: No

24. Popular perceptions of the extent to which they have free choice and control over their lives

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think that they have a great deal of choice/control

1 if more than 70%

0.5 if 50-70%

0 if less than 50%

25. Public confidence in government

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey, Gallup polls, Eurobarometer, Latinobarometer

% of people who have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in government

1 if more than 40%

0.5 if 25-40%

0 if less than 25%

26. Public confidence in political parties

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence

1 if more than 40%



0.5 if 25–40%

0 if less than 25%

III Political participation

27. Voter participation/turn-out for national elections.

(average turnout in parliamentary elections since 2000. Turnout as proportion of population of voting age).

1 if consistently above 70%

0.5 if between 50% and 70%

0 if below 50%

If voting is obligatory, score 0. Score 0 if scores for questions 1 or 2 is 0.

28. Do ethnic, religious and other minorities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and voice in the political process?

1: Yes

0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist

0: No

29. Women in parliament

% of members of parliament who are women

1 if more than 20% of seats

0.5 if 10–20%

0 if less than 10%

30. Extent of political participation. Membership of political parties and political non-governmental organisations.

Score 1 if over 7% of population for either

Score 0.5 if 4% to 7%

Score 0 if under 4%.

If participation is forced, score 0.

31. Citizens' engagement with politics

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who are very or somewhat interested in politics

1 if over 60%

0.5 if 40% to 60%

0 if less than 40%

32. The preparedness of population to take part in lawful demonstrations.

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low



If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who have taken part in or would consider attending lawful demonstrations

1 if over 40%

0.5 if 30% to 40%

0 if less than 30%

33. Adult literacy

1 if over 90%

0.5 if 70% to 90%

0 if less than 70%

34. Extent to which adult population shows an interest in and follows politics in the news.

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey

% of population that follows politics in the news media (print, TV or radio) every day

1 if over 50%

0.5 if 30% to 50%

0 if less than 30%

35. The authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation.

1: Yes

0.5: Some attempts

0: No

Consider the role of the education system, and other promotional efforts Consider measures to facilitate voting by members of the diaspora.

If participation is forced, score 0.

IV Democratic political culture

36. Is there a sufficient degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable, functioning democracy?

1: Yes

0.5: Yes, but some serious doubts and risks

0: No

37. Perceptions of leadership; proportion of the population that desires a strong leader who bypasses parliament and elections.

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think it would be good or fairly good to have a strong leader who does not bother with



parliament and elections

1 if less than 30%

0.5 if 30% to 50%

0 if more than 50%

38. Perceptions of military rule; proportion of the population that would prefer military

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have army rule

1 if less than 10%

0.5 if 10% to 30%

0 if more than 30%

39. Perceptions of rule by experts or technocratic government; proportion of the population that would prefer rule by experts or technocrats.

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have experts, not government, make decisions for the country

1 if less than 50%

0.5 if 50% to 70%

0 if more than 70%

40. Perception of democracy and public order; proportion of the population that believes that democracies are not good at maintaining public order.

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who disagree with the view that democracies are not good at maintaining order

1 if more than 70%

0.5 if 50% to 70%

0 if less than 50%

Alternatively, % of people who think that punishing criminals is an essential characteristic of democracy

1 if more than 80%

0.5 if 60% to 80%



0 if less than 60%

41. Perception of democracy and the economic system; proportion of the population that believes that democracy benefits economic performance

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who disagree with the view that the economic system runs badly in democracies

1 if more than 80%

0.5 if 60% to 80%

0 if less than 60%

42. Degree of popular support for democracy

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who agree or strongly agree that democracy is better than any other form of government

1 if more than 90%

0.5 if 75% to 90%

0 if less than 75%

43. There is a strong tradition of the separation of church and state

1: Yes

0.5: Some residual influence of church on state

0: No

V Civil liberties

44. Is there a free electronic media?

1: Yes

0.5: Pluralistic, but state-controlled media are heavily favoured. One or two private owners dominate the media

0: No

45. Is there a free print media?

1: Yes

0.5: Pluralistic, but state-controlled media are heavily favoured. There is high degree of concentration of private ownership of national newspapers

0: No

46. Is there freedom of expression and protest (bar only generally accepted restrictions such as banning advocacy of violence)?

1: Yes

0.5: Minority view points are subject to some official harassment. Libel laws restrict heavily scope for free expression

0: No



47. Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?
- 1: Yes
 - 0.5: There is formal freedom, but high degree of conformity of opinion, including through self-censorship, or discouragement of minority or marginal views
 - 0: No
48. Are there political restrictions on access to the Internet?
- 1: No
 - 0.5: Some moderate restrictions
 - 0: Yes
49. Are citizens free to form professional organisations and trade unions?
- 1: Yes
 - 0.5: Officially free, but subject to some restrictions
 - 0: No
50. Do institutions provide citizens with the opportunity to successfully petition government to redress grievances?
- 1: Yes
 - 0.5: Some opportunities
 - 0: No
51. The use of torture by the state
- 1: Torture is not used
 - 0: Torture is used
52. The degree to which the judiciary is independent of government influence. Consider the views of international legal and judicial watchdogs. Have the courts ever issued an important judgement against the government, or a senior government official?
- 1: High
 - 0.5: Moderate
 - 0: Low
53. The degree of religious tolerance and freedom of religious expression. Are all religions permitted to operate freely, or are some restricted? Is the right to worship permitted both publicly and privately? Do some religious groups feel intimidated by others, even if the law requires equality and protection?
- 1: High
 - 0.5: Moderate
 - 0: Low
54. The degree to which citizens are treated equally under the law. Consider whether favoured members of groups are spared prosecution under the law.
- 1: High



0.5: Moderate

0: Low

55. Do citizens enjoy basic security?

1: Yes

0.5: Crime is so pervasive as to endanger security for large segments

0: No

56. Extent to which private property rights protected and private business is free from undue government influence

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

57. Extent to which citizens enjoy personal freedoms

Consider gender equality, right to travel, choice of work and study.

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

58. Popular perceptions on human rights protection; proportion of the population that think that basic human rights are well-protected.

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey:

% of people who think that human rights are respected in their country

1 if more than 70%

0.5 if 50% to 70%

0 if less than 50%

59. There is no significant discrimination on the basis of people's race, colour or creed.

1: Yes

0.5: Yes, but some significant exceptions

0: No

60. Extent to which the government invokes new risks and threats as an excuse for curbing civil liberties

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

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