

Y·E·S 2015

EUISS YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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
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
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EUISS Yearbook of European Security Y·E·S 2015

**Maps
Facts
Figures
Documents
2014**



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Foreword

2014 will probably be remembered as a watershed year for European security, with a number of different developments converging to mark a major turning point. In the east, the unrest in Ukraine that started with the mass protests in Maidan Square set in motion a spiralling chain of events – President Yanukovich’s flight, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the separatist revolt in the Donbass, the downing of flight MH17, the first Minsk agreement and its aftermath – that led to a serious and still ongoing international crisis, raising the spectre of a new Cold War in Europe. In the south, the sudden rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as the mounting chaos in Libya and Yemen, propagated further violence and upheaval in the post-2011 Arab world. Finally, terrorism brought bloodshed to the heart of Europe, with the attack against the Jewish Museum in Brussels – bound to be seen in a completely different light after the other attacks carried out in Paris and Copenhagen in early 2015.

Russia’s overt challenge to the post-Cold War order in Europe, including unabashed incursions into a neighbouring sovereign state and the extensive use of ‘hybrid’ tactics; the unravelling of the regional order in the Arab world and the spread of proxy (civil) wars fuelled by sectarian and power rivalries; the breakdown of the traditional boundary between external and internal security, highlighted also by waves of refugees and returnees (the so-called foreign fighters) entering the EU – these are all salient and troubling features of the past year which will surely cast a long shadow over the next one. Their cumulative impact has been so strong as to prompt repeated calls for a comprehensive reassessment of the Union’s security posture in a fast-changing global – and especially regional – environment.

Beyond these shocking events and developments lie, of course, structural issues and trends that predate 2014 and look set to stay. They are likely to (re)define European security at least in the medium term – and possibly longer. Their onset has coincided with the appointment of a new team at the helm of the EU, following the elections for the European Parliament in June 2014. The new EU leaders will have to deal with a less secure Europe surrounded by a less stable neighbourhood. They will have to address rising challenges with diminishing resources and return to old-fashioned deterrence while devising new forms of prevention. And they will have to coordinate policies much more effectively both inside the Union (across common institutions and among member states) and outside, with allies and partners worldwide. The new European Commission, including HR/VP Federica Mogherini and her ‘cluster’ of Commissioners, entered office in November 2014 with a strong awareness of this need for ‘joined-up’ policymaking. This challenge is likely to shape their entire mandate.

This third edition of the *Yearbook of European Security* (YES) marks its coming of age at a time of turmoil and change. The Institute's Yearbook has gradually established itself as a key instrument of consultation – a printed repository of relevant information – for all those who, out of professional or personal interest, follow the Union's own coming of age as an autonomous player on the international scene. It offers the usual 'mapping' survey (devoted this year, in the run-up to the Paris Climate Conference, to the link between climate change, security and state fragility) plus documents, facts, graphs and figures – some explained, others self-explanatory. And it is the only such instrument which takes a specifically EU angle, looking at global security issues through a European lens. Insofar as good policymaking needs to be well-informed and evidence-based, *YES 2015* can claim to be an indispensable starting point.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This edition of YES, coordinated once again this year by Philip Worré with his usual care and professionalism, has benefited in particular from a truly collective effort by the EUISS junior team. More specifically, Miruna Bouros worked on the EU sanctions; José Luengo-Cabrera on the timeline; Pierre Minard on the UNSC voting record and the core documents; and Katharina Wolf on defence spending. Beatrice Berton, Cameron Johnston, Massimo Pellegrino, Gergana Petkova, Clodagh Quain and Balazs Ujvari have also helped in checking facts and figures throughout. As in previous years, Gearóid Cronin contributed his valuable editorial input while Denise Lamps prepared the EUISS Activities Report. But *YES 2015* would have not come to light (and print) without the excellent design and formatting work done by Christian Dietrich – to whom we owe a special thanks.

Antonio Missiroli
Paris, March 2015

Mapping



Climate change, conflict and fragility

*Gerald Stang*¹

Climate change has long been recognised as an environmental problem and increasingly as an economic hazard. However it has taken substantially longer for the potential stability and security threat posed by a changing climate to be widely recognised. A recent rash of Malthusian predictions have claimed that climate change could bring social and political catastrophe, with rapid population growth and poorly managed economic development leading to violent conflict over the earth's dwindling resources. Sample publications evoking a dystopian future include: 'Will water supplies provoke World War III?', 'Climate Wars: The Fight for Survival as the World Overheats,' and 'Climate Wars: What People Will Be Killed For in the 21st Century.' Such rhetoric may seem both intentionally exaggerated and overly simplistic, ignoring human capacity for adaptation and the many other factors involved in any potential road to conflict. But as mankind has an unfortunately long track record both of conflict and of acting for short-term gain, regardless of cost, the potential security challenges associated with climate change cannot be summarily dismissed.

There can be little doubt that the effects of human-induced climate change are already being felt, and there are claims that this is already increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. In Syria, human-induced climate change has been identified as responsible for a temperature increase of more than 1°C since 1900 and a 10% reduction in wet season precipitation [Kelley et al, 2015]. The major drought that struck the region from 2006 to 2010, destroying the livelihoods of thousands of Syrians and instigating a wave of internal migration, is seen as a key factor (among many) driving the discontent that brought Syrians into the streets in 2011 to protest against the regime. Similar observations have been made regarding the Darfur conflict in Sudan, which even UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon described as partly arising from an environmental crisis.

But despite the fact that changing environmental conditions were disruptive to these countries, it may not be possible to disentangle the role of climate change from the other factors involved. Both Sudan and Syria have exclusionary governments, a history of violence, major political and social divisions and uneven economic progress. Both Syria and Darfur have experienced more than five-fold population growth over the last

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50 years, leading to major increases in resource requirements, and making any disruption (climate-related or otherwise) to livelihoods and food security even more socially explosive. For Darfur and Syria, therefore, a link between environmental problems and conflict seems plausible, but it can be very difficult to define clear causal links.

This analysis aims to investigate what regions of the world may be particularly vulnerable to security challenges arising from climate change. It first looks at the most recent climate change predictions to determine which parts of the globe might be particularly exposed to climate impacts. It then briefly analyses current trends in conflict around the world and describes how climate change impacts will create compound risk factors that add pressure to existing fragility challenges. Finally, it compares multiple efforts to map fragility and vulnerability to climate change impacts, highlighting particular regions of concern.


MAPPING A CHANGING CLIMATE

The idea that environmental changes could lead to a heightened risk of conflict has been discussed for decades, but the inevitable and growing impact of a changing climate has made the issue increasingly urgent. Climate modelling has improved significantly in the last decade, allowing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to assign higher degrees of certainty to some of their predictions about what tomorrow's climate may look like.

As Figure 1 shows, however, while the IPCC forecasts with a high degree of certainty that temperatures will continue to rise across all regions of the globe (and at higher rates in Africa and the Arctic), the particular impacts on weather patterns, precipitation levels, ecosystems and seasonal shifts remain uncertain for many areas. Few of the projections in Figure 1 are made with 'high confidence', and the trends for dryness and drought across much of the map show inconsistent trends or signals. The increase in temperature is predicted to negatively affect agricultural yields and food supply across entire regions, notably in tropical and subtropical areas, regardless of additional effects of more local precipitation changes. Reduced availability of renewable surface water and groundwater resources is expected in most dry subtropical regions.

The likelihood and severity of heatwaves and droughts is predicted to increase in southern Africa, Central America/Mexico, south Australia/New Zealand, north-eastern Brazil, central and southern Europe and the Mediterranean. Heavy precipitation events are expected to increase in East Africa, in parts of south, southeast and east Asia, and in many northern latitudes. Increases in the severity and frequency of cyclones and other storm events may trigger floods in many of these regions. Rising seas will cause flooding, erosion, loss of wetlands and, in the very long term, complete submergence for low-lying areas.

FIGURE 1: PREDICTED CLIMATE IMPACTS FOR 2071-2100: WORLDWIDE



Sources for data: C. B. Field et al, 'IPCC Working Group II Technical Summary for Fifth Assessment Report', 2014; Climate and Development Knowledge Network, 2014.

But in raising questions about stability, fragility and conflict, it is the unknowable, the erratic, the variable and the uncertain that may be the most troublesome aspects of climate change.

FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO CONFLICT?

The possibility that climate change could lead to higher risks of conflict, becoming a ‘threat multiplier’, makes it important to develop sufficient understanding of the potential mechanisms connecting climate change and conflict and what steps would need to be taken to avoid potential crises. Debate continues to rage over the scientific evidence that connects past and current conflicts to climate change. Several studies have tried to isolate particular climate factors (temperature change or droughts) and quantitatively determine whether they could lead to increased likelihood of conflict – with uncertain and controversial results.

A prominent recent review of 50 quantitative studies of climate change and conflict claimed consistent support for a causal association between the two for a wide range of time and spatial scales [Hsiang and Burke, 2014]. The authors found that temperature shifts were linked to significant increases in both interpersonal and intergroup conflict. They referenced one key study, for example, which found that the hotter and drier phase of the regular El Niño-Southern Oscillation doubled the probability that any given country in the tropics would experience civil conflict. The authors themselves noted a mismatch between the gradual pace of climate change and the rapid pace of evolution in human societies, but were still confident in concluding that ‘conflict increases and social stability decreases when temperatures are hot and precipitation is extreme.’

Critics responded to the paper’s claims, arguing that its conclusions could not be supported, considering the inconsistent selection and bundling of studies over a wide range of conflict phenomena (from angry honking of car horns to imperial wars), time scales (from hours to millennia) and actors (from individuals to ancient civilisations) [Buhaug et al, 2014]. There thus remains limited consensus regarding *proof* that particular climatic impacts lead to increased conflict likelihood. However, there is a growing consensus that there are real connections between climate change impacts and the range of factors that influence risks of fragility and conflict. The IPCC has noted that ‘some of the factors that increase the risk of violent conflict within states are sensitive to climate change (medium agreement, medium evidence)’, including a history of violence, low incomes, economic contraction, bad neighbourhoods, and deficient state institutions [Adger et al, 2014]. And while it is unfortunately true that the decades ahead will witness more severe changes in the earth’s climate, providing us with much more data to test hypotheses about climate-conflict links, today’s policymakers cannot wait for conclusive evidence that lays out clear paths of interaction before they take action. To

this end, the next section looks briefly at the nature of conflicts today to see where they are taking place, how they are being fought, and what risk factors are involved.


MAPPING CONFLICT TODAY

Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in Figure 2 shows that after climbing for 30 years, the total number of conflicts involving states peaked with the end of the Cold War and went into a decade-long decline that has since levelled out. The number of intense conflicts (or wars – involving more than 1,000 battle deaths) has also dropped; Figure 3 shows that, in the last decade, less than 10% of all conflicts can be classified as war. UCDP data also shows that the majority of today’s conflicts are intra-state, sometimes internationalised, with interstate conflict having all but disappeared. While the turbulence of 2014, with the invasion of Crimea and the evident questioning of the Sykes-Picot framework for parts of the Middle East, may show a different balance once the data is published, in 2013 the UCDP counted zero inter-state conflicts, 24 internal conflicts involving the state, 9 internationalised state conflicts (Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda, Afghanistan, Somalia, Central African Republic, and Mali) and 48 non-state conflicts.

FIGURE 2: STATE AND NON-STATE CONFLICTS



FIGURE 3: CONFLICT INTENSITY SINCE 1989



Sources for data: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2014a, 1946–2013; UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 2.5-2014, 1989-2013.


Importantly, the number of intense state conflicts has dropped. For 2013, the UCDP listed seven high-intensity conflicts (Iraq, DRC, Nigeria, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and South Sudan), down from a peak of 16 in 1988.

Data on conflicts that do not involve states (non-state conflicts) has not been collected for as long as data on conflicts involving states. The UCDP data since 1989 shows no clear trend for the number of non-state conflicts. High-intensity non-state conflicts dropped from a peak of 4 in 1993 to zero in 2013. Since 1989, battle death numbers from non-state conflicts have been approximately an order of magnitude smaller than for state conflicts.

Geographically, Africa has accounted for two thirds of non-state conflicts and roughly the same ratio for battle deaths since 1989, while Asia accounted for half of the rest. For state conflicts, however, Asia has accounted for 40% of all conflicts since 1989, with Africa accounting for 33%. In 2013, these two regions each accounted for 39% of all state conflicts (13 out of 33).

Figure 4 shows that the majority of conflicts in any given year occur in the most fragile countries – understood as the top 20% of the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index (FSI) rankings. According to UCDP data, from 2004 to 2013, 63 different countries experienced conflicts at different levels; 60% of these countries appear in the top 20% of the FSI lists. During that period, 57 different countries appeared in the top 20% of the FSI lists; 67% of them experienced at least one conflict. This shows the close correlation between fragility and conflict, with fragility often an outcome of conflict and a contributor to conflict risks.

FIGURE 4: SHARE OF CONFLICTS IN MOST FRAGILE COUNTRIES (TOP 20% OF FSI LISTS)



Sources for data: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2014a, 1946 – 2013; UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 2.5-2014, 1989-2013; Fund for Peace - Fragile States Index

but both human societies and nation states are certainly less violent than they used to be. In particular, the near-complete disappearance of interstate conflict in recent years suggests that non-violent means for nation states to resolve potentially conflictual issues (of any type) are increasingly effective. The factors that have led to the decrease in interstate war continue to be strengthened – especially the long fading of the post-colonial era and the solidification of nation states within their current borders.

Unfortunately, new conflicts continue to appear. With conflict increasingly found within states, and often without the participation of the state itself, a larger number of violent conflicts can be described as ‘local.’ It thus seems that conflict prevention is increasingly becoming more about preventing states from breaking down than about the prevention of attacks between them. The possibility that Pakistan will go to war with India, for example, is still a serious worry, but it is Pakistan’s own internal conflict issues that are counted in the conflict database and are higher on the agenda of global policymakers.

What to make of these trends? There is still a lot of violent conflict in the world, but interstate wars are disappearing and the intensity of violent conflicts has been declining. The UCDP data is consistent with much wider trends that show an impressive decline in human conflict has been taking place not merely between states over the last few years, but across multiple geographic and political scales over decades and centuries [Pinker, 2011]. The reasons behind this decline are the subject of much debate,

This trend toward fewer interstate conflicts, should it continue, would serve to undermine one popular theme in climate-security discussions which has focused on how climate change impacts may directly pit the interests of different states against each other, potentially leading to violence. In particular, as many internationally shared rivers, lakes and groundwater supplies come under pressure (due to both climate change impacts and changing demand) transboundary tensions over water may intensify. But though real risks remain, reviews of relevant agreements throughout the twentieth century have shown that shared waters have often been sources of cooperation between states, even in otherwise conflictive relationships [Pohl et al, 2014].

Another clash of state interests may arise when rising sea levels inundate coastal areas, altering maritime border markers and leading to disputes over territorial seas and sea routes. Fortunately, the relatively slow pace of sea level rise predicted for the next century minimises the magnitude of this risk. A third clash of interests could arise from heightened tensions between countries attempting to secure key resources for their home markets. However, despite rhetoric to the contrary, even through the last few years of economic upheaval, trade liberalisation has continued its decades-long and near-universal expansion, including with respect to key natural resources. States have shown themselves increasingly likely to rely on open markets rather than direct control of the resource production areas.

Thus, while climate change impacts are felt across regions, the disruptive effects are most likely to manifest at a local level, directly affecting individuals and communities, rather than pushing interstate relations toward new trajectories of conflict. As a result, investigation of the security challenges posed by climate change will be very closely connected with human security and fragility issues.

MAPPING RISK FACTORS

Several efforts have been made to map out how climate change impacts may potentially influence conflict and fragility risks. Since 2014, the EUISS has been part of a research consortium, funded by G7 member states, tasked with investigating links between climate change and fragility.² The following list, extracted and adapted from the consortium's analysis, identifies a series of compound risks where climate change interacts with other pressures.

2. In 2014, interested G7 members commissioned an international consortium consisting of International Alert, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the EU Institute for Security Studies, and adelphi (Lead) to conduct an independent study on climate change and fragility and establish an open online platform to share and disseminate the collected knowledge and research. The study and platform will be launched in May 2015.

- **Local resource competition**

Climate change is expected to alter rainfall patterns, change flows in glacier-fed rivers, affect agricultural yields, and lead to shifting seasons in many regions. These impacts may increase the likelihood of local conflict arising between competing user groups over diminished access to productive land and water for agricultural, industrial and urban use. Where rain-fed agriculture is less dominant, such as in the Fergana Valley of Central Asia, access to discrete water sources (groundwater, rivers, and lakes) has become a central issue, making water infrastructure and water management systems the locations of contention. In regions where irrigation is less widely used, including across most of Africa, access to productive and well-watered land becomes the central issue, with droughts and seasonal shifts potentially leading to intensified competition. The management of land distribution, land tenure and property rights is already an all too common issue leading to grievances and conflict around the world. Increasing disruptions to, and uncertainty regarding, the productivity and value of land due to climate impacts seem likely to exacerbate these management challenges.

- **Livelihood insecurity and migration**

The disruption of traditional livelihoods, particularly those related to climate-sensitive natural resources, such as farming and fishing, may push people to migrate, potentially increasing regional instability. In countries with undiversified economies and high reliance on a limited number of crops, these disruptions could be especially problematic, affecting the human security level of large numbers of people. Even the mere expectation of future climate impacts can be threatening. For developing small island states, for example, the spectre of rising seas is already leading to local challenges where expectations of eventual inundation are impacting on investment and the willingness of people to tie their lives to threatened areas. While people have long resorted to migration as a strategy to cope with weather changes, most commonly on a seasonal basis, climate change impacts may force more people to move who would not otherwise have migrated, often to cities and often to destinations that are themselves already facing poverty, fragility and scarcity of resources and employment.

- **Extreme weather events**

Climate-related disaster effects are expected to increase in the decades ahead due to both slow-onset disasters, generally involving droughts and chronic water scarcity, as well as rapid-onset storms and sea surges. When responses are poorly managed, disasters can compound grievances, strain governance systems, and entrench fragility by setting back development gains and initiating

episodes of social and political disruption. The impact of the flooding caused by storms and intense seasonal rainfall is made worse in many countries by the absence of protective infrastructure, the repeated rebuilding of homes in flood-prone areas, and poor land management practices that exacerbate flooding impacts. Disasters also add extra pressures onto vulnerable populations who live at subsistence levels and engage in high-risk coping strategies.

- **Food insecurity**

Climate-induced disruptions to food production are expected to add uncertainty and volatility to food markets, threatening food security and increasing the risk of civil unrest. The 2007-08 spike in global food prices, for example, led to riots in dozens of countries. Driven by continued rapid population growth in many developing countries, demand will continue to soar while rates of efficiency improvements in agriculture, already slowing, are expected to be negatively impacted by a changing climate. Disruptive effects are likely to be most severe for populations without access to alternative sources. Import-dependent countries are particularly sensitive to changes in food prices, as was seen in 2011 when key suppliers cut back exports due to production problems at home, leading to increased prices and food riots in Egypt and other states.

Multiple factors have been identified as affecting the likelihood that these compound risks could actually lead to increased fragility in certain regions. First, managing change is likely to be more difficult for populations already suffering from high baseline levels of poverty. Rapid changes are more likely to be disruptive in areas with high levels of dependence on narrow resource bases (notably where a large portion of the population relies on subsistence agriculture) and which have fewer resources to adapt to large-scale or rapid changes. Second, the likelihood of seeing a crisis progress towards violence will be influenced by the stability and legitimacy of key institutions, whether formal state frameworks or customary social institutions. Third, imbalances in power and rights can lead to grievances and tensions over resource allocation decisions and outcomes. Finally, a history of conflict can elevate risks of recurrence. All these exacerbating factors are often present in fragile states, marking them as being particularly at risk.

MAPPING FRAGILE AND CLIMATE-VULNERABLE STATES


The capacity of states and societies to manage change, including climate changes, can be measured along a spectrum of fragility. In places where societies are resilient and states have the capacity and legitimacy to act, pressures and shocks such as those related to climate change can be managed without leading to violent conflict. In fragile situations, such resilience is often missing. Fragility, however, is not merely a problem for

Box 1: Fragility and Climate Vulnerability Indexes

Several fragility indexes have been developed, using a range of methodologies. Although useful in understanding risks and planning policy responses, they are not predictive tools. Syria, for example, was not ranked as fragile on most indexes before it imploded, with most indexes measuring how ‘weak’ it was, but not how ‘brittle’. Table 1 outlines a selection of comprehensive (covering most of the world), recent (within the last two years), and comparable (via a coherent scoring or ranking system) fragility indexes. The first three look explicitly at fragility, taking a wide range of dimensions into account. The next three indexes are more narrowly focused on governance (WGI and BTI) or peace and conflict (GPI). Unsurprisingly, the first three have the highest levels of agreement for which countries populated the tops of their lists.

Among these, only the CIFP has an environmental focus, although others include individual environmental variables. But as the expected impacts of climate change are likely to bring about a different set of compound risks, it will be necessary to bring climate into the discussion.

MAP 1: FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX (2014)



Source: The Fund for Peace - Fragile States Index 2014.

MAP 2: ND-GAIN INDEX - VULNERABILITY & READINESS (2013)



Source: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (2013).

Several indexes have been developed to measure the vulnerability of states to the effects of climate change. The ND-GAIN index in Map 2, for example, uses 45 indicators to measure the exposure of populations, their sensitivity to climate effects, and their capacity to adapt. As with fragility indexes, some vulnerability indexes are narrowly focused on particular factors such as agricultural productivity or food security [de Sherbinin, 2013]. Three of them (ND-Gain, Maplecroft and Wheeler) produce full country rankings similar to the fragile states indexes.

While focused on different issues, there is enough overlap in themes to result in significant similarities in the outputs of the fragility and the vulnerability indexes (see Maps 1 & 2). The ND-Gain ranking, for example, with its emphasis on adaptive capacity, could almost be described as a fragility index with a stronger emphasis on the environment dimension; its ranking closely matches the CIFP fragility ranking, the only fragility index with a major environmental dimension.

Table 1 shows that fragility indexes prioritise security/military dimensions more than vulnerability indexes, though three of the vulnerability indexes listed include some security component. Of these, the CCAPS model is the most refined, with detailed mapping of vulnerability at the local level. It focuses on the risk of death due to climate change exposure, whether directly from disasters, or from secondary effects on health and personal security. The Smith & Vivekananda study is the only one analysed that directly maps climate-connected conflict risks, basing its analysis on existing fragility indexes. It lists 102 countries with a risk of significant negative knock-on socio-political effects from climate change and 46 with 'high risk of armed conflict'. The CIESIN lists, in comparison, did not use security indicators in its vulnerability calculations, but pre-selected countries with political instability risk factors.

TABLE 1: FRAGILITY AND VULNERABILITY INDEXES

	Dimensions & Categories						
	Climate/ Weather	Economic	Environmental	Health	Political/ Governance	Security/ Military	Social/ Human Development
Fragility indexes							
Fund for Peace Fragile States Index (FSI)		x			x	x	x
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Fragility Index		x	x		x	x	x
Center for Systemic Peace - State Fragility Index (SFI)		x			x	x	x
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs)					x	x	
Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI)		x			x		
Global Peace Index (GPI)						x	
Climate vulnerability indexes							
Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN)		x	x	x	x		x
DARA Climate Vulnerability Monitor (2012)	x	x	x	x			
Maplecroft Climate Change Vulnerability Index	x		x		x		x
Climate Vulnerability - David Wheeler (2011)	x	x	x		x		
Population Action International hotspots (2011)		x	x		x		x
CCAPS Climate Security Vulnerability Model (2014)	x			x	x		x
CIESIN Climate Vulnerability Lists (2008)	x		x		x		x
Smith & Vivekananda - A Climate of Conflict (2007)	x	x	x		x		x

'classic' fragile states. Fragility can also exist in particular moments, especially at times of political transition, as evidenced by several cases in the Arab world following the 2011 uprisings. And even within relatively stable countries, pockets of fragility may exist.

Comparisons among a series of fragility indexes and climate vulnerability indexes (see Box 1) analysed for this study show a significant amount of overlap, particularly of those poor and conflict-affected states that fill most of the top spots on the fragility indexes. This includes much of sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and South Asia. But all six fragility indexes broadly concur in having fragile states highly concentrated in Africa, with a few in the Middle East and South Asia. For example, only 10 African countries are not listed among the highest Alert and Warning categories on the FSI list (mapped in Box 1): Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa and Tunisia.

But a few regions of the world are ranked higher on the climate vulnerability indexes than in the fragility tables, notably Central America, the Caribbean, small island developing states (notably in Oceania) and the Sahel. The regional climatic predictions for these regions, involving changes to weather events, sea levels, and disaster frequency may be interpreted as being significant enough to alter their overall risk level.

While India, China and parts of Latin America are also expected to struggle with climate impacts, particularly more intense natural resource competition due to climate change and higher demand, they are generally better equipped, in terms of mediating institutions and adaptive capacity (to migrate, to invest in protective infrastructure, etc). Local tensions and conflicts are more likely to remain local and less likely to push entire countries into instability. Few middle income countries rank high on vulnerability indexes. At the centre of the climate change discussion, then, rests the challenges of African fragility.

Although climate impacts have been predicted to be problematic in southern Africa (droughts) and northern Africa (rainfall), neither of these regions are heavily represented at the top of the different climate vulnerability indexes, which each highlight major challenges instead in different parts of West, Central and East Africa. The higher adaptive capacity and better governance in the northern and southern areas of Africa are thus seen as likely to allow better management of any climate shocks. The Population Action International map on hotspots, with its particular emphasis on population growth, highlights West Africa, notably Nigeria, as an area where climate and demographic changes may lead to high vulnerability, while the NDGain index highlights the poorest landlocked regions of the Sahel and central Africa.

Large countries such as Nigeria contain regions which exhibit fragility characteristics, including extreme poverty, local conflicts and poor governance. But Nigeria's overall size and resources have helped it to absorb some local shocks without upsetting the whole country. Since Nigeria has less than a quarter of its population involved in agriculture – a very low proportion among developing countries – local water and

land scarcity changes may end up affecting a relatively small portion of the population. However, climatic impacts are expected to affect wide regions of the country, which may both influence the size and severity of existing pockets of fragility, as well as the capacity of neighbouring regions to react to and limit these changes.

The high variability in rank order of several countries in the Middle East (including Egypt, Syria and Libya) among the different indexes highlights the difficulty of making both the fragility and climate vulnerability assessments, and of extrapolating them to account for the identified climate-fragility risks. Climate modelling predicts increased heat and drying across the region, with negative impacts on agricultural yields. The Syrian example discussed at the beginning of this chapter shows how drought effects may contribute to heightened risks of instability. However, as many other countries in the region are already major food importers with relatively low employment in agriculture, changes to local food production may be less likely to disrupt food security, even if they struggle with other governance and political challenges.

Both the fragility indexes and the climate vulnerability indexes offer some value in determining the vulnerability of countries to the climate fragility risks outlined in the third section. Theoretically, if countries are ranked as highly fragile, then any change to climatic conditions can be destabilising. If a country is ranked lower (i.e. it is less fragile), then only a particularly substantial climatic change would likely be considered sufficient to push them towards increased fragility. Though the details of each index are important (further analysis would require a solid understanding of each index's methodologies and indicators) – the inclusion of a wide range of economic and governance and political issues within the fragility indexes make them good starting points for measuring a state's capacity to manage tensions over water and land scarcities, disaster events, and livelihoods and migration challenges. However, any index that were to specifically target compound climate fragility risks would benefit from refined focus on agricultural issues, food import dependence and natural resource management systems. It would also require bringing in a climate vulnerability angle focused on populations rather than states, with a sub-national lens (such as in the CCAPS index) that analysed local vulnerabilities and conflict threats.

CONCLUSION

There are significant links between climate change impacts and increased risk of fragility, but much work remains to be done to understand, map out, and respond to these risks. In particular, increasing scarcities of water and productive land can affect traditional livelihoods and may lead to local instability and migration. An increase in the severity and frequency of extreme weather events can also be destabilising. If poorly managed, these local instabilities have the potential to lead to heightened fragility.

Work on economic development and climate change adaptation issues will thus need to take into consideration the risk factors associated with fragility and conflict. And work on peacebuilding and conflict will need to take into account climatic factors. But the mapping of expected climate change impacts is very challenging. Mapping of how these climate impacts will affect fragility and stability challenges will be that much harder. The existing fragility and climate vulnerability indexes analysed above provide a good starting point for this work. They help to highlight which regions are expected to be the most vulnerable to conflict-fragility risks, starting with the world's most fragile states, which are poorly equipped to manage change of any type. But the lists of these states are not fixed, and too many countries could eventually find themselves on these watch lists if climate change impacts are not managed well. With climate impacts expected to increase in the years ahead, renewed emphasis on environmental factors may lead to a shift in which countries should be prioritised for support and early action to prevent increased fragility and the risk of violent conflict.

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Facts and figures



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The security policy toolbox

The global impact of the European Union is ensured by the application of its external policies through the use of specific external and security-related thematic instruments. Such ‘tools’ enable the EU to contribute to the political and economic stabilisation of developing countries, respond to humanitarian challenges, and deploy civilian missions and military operations to ensure lasting peace in conflict-ridden areas. The EU also further contributes to the multi-sectoral development of economies in its immediate vicinity, assists in post-crisis situations and helps prevent nuclear incidents. These ‘tools’ are established within a budgetary framework according to the priorities and limits of the multiannual financial framework (MFF), a spending plan that translates the EU priorities into financial terms and sets the maximum annual amounts which the EU may spend in different political fields. The EU disposes of several thematic and geographic financing instruments as well as a horizontal regulation on implementation modalities, the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR).

1. THEMATIC AND GEOGRAPHIC INSTRUMENTS

Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

IN SHORT

Acronym: IPA II
Reference Document: Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II)
Financial Envelope: €11.7bn (current prices, 2014-2020)

THE MATTER

Goal

To support the beneficiaries in adopting and implementing the political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and economic reforms required by those beneficiaries in order to comply with the Union’s values and to progressively align to the Union’s rules, standards, policies and practices, with a view to Union membership.

Programmes

Assistance is provided on the basis of country or multi-country indicative strategy papers (the ‘strategy papers’), established for the duration of the Union’s multiannual financial framework for the period from 2014 to 2020,

by the Commission in partnership with the beneficiaries. These strategy papers shall define the priorities for action towards meeting the objectives in the relevant policy areas and shall be adopted in accordance with the framework for assistance, taking relevant national strategies into account. The strategy papers shall include the indicative allocation of Union funds per policy area, as

applicable, broken down per year, and shall allow for addressing emerging needs. Finally, these strategy papers shall include the indicators for assessing progress with regard to attainment of the targets set therein.

Scope


Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Kosovo*, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Note

IPA II is the successor to the first IPA, as set out in the 2007-2013 MFF

MAP: 2014 IPA II BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES



* Under UNSCR 1244/1999; ** IPA funding put on hold

European Neighbourhood Instrument

IN SHORT

Acronym:	ENI
Reference Document:	Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument
Financial Envelope:	 €15.4bn (2014-2020)

THE MATTER

Goal

Developing the special relationship founded on co-operation, peace and security, mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights with partner countries. Promotion of enhanced political cooperation, deep and sustainable democracy, and progressive economic integration.

Programmes

Bilateral, multi-country and cross-border cooperation programmes, covering *inter alia* human rights, good governance and the rule of law, institutional cooperation and capacity development, support to civil society actors and to their role in reform processes and democratic transitions, sustainable and inclusive economic development, development of social sectors, in particular for the youth, trade and private-sector development, agriculture and rural development, sustainable management

of natural resources, the energy sector, transport and infrastructure, education and skills development, mobility and migration management, confidence-building and other measures contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts.

Scope


16 ENI Partner Countries: ENI South - Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), Syria*, Tunisia; ENI East - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine.

* EU Cooperation with Syria is currently suspended due to the political situation

Note

Replaced the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)

MAP: ENI PARTNER COUNTRIES



* EU Cooperation with Syria is currently suspended due to the political situation

Development Cooperation Instrument

IN SHORT

Acronym: DCI

Reference Document: Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020

Financial Envelope:  €19.7bn (2014-2020)

THE MATTER

Goal


The reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty by fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development, and consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international law.

Programmes

Geographic, thematic and a Pan-African

Programme, covering human rights, democracy and good governance: inclusive and sustainable growth for human development, and other themes such as migration and asylum. The programmes are of a multi-regional, multi-country and/or cross-cutting nature. The objective of the Pan-African programme is to support the strategic partnership between Africa and the EU to cover activities of a trans-regional, continental or global nature in and with Africa.

CHART: DCI DISTRIBUTION PER PROGRAMME



values in million €

Partnership Instrument

IN SHORT

Acronym: PI

Reference Document: Regulation (EU) No 234/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries

Financial Envelope:  €1bn (2014-2020)

THE MATTER

Goal

Support measures that respond in an effective and flexible manner to objectives arising from the Union's bilateral, regional or multilateral relationships with third countries and address challenges of global concern and ensure an adequate follow-up to decisions taken at a multilateral level.

Programmes

Financing of measures based on cooperation policies set out in instruments, such as agreements, declarations and action plans, agreed between the Union and the international

organisations concerned or between the Union and the third countries and regions concerned, using a differentiated and flexible approach. The instruments promote, develop and consolidate *inter alia* the principles of democracy, equality, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.

Scope

All third countries, regions and territories may be eligible for cooperation under the PI.

Note

Replaces the Industrialised Countries Instrument (ICI/ICI+)

CHART: PI DISTRIBUTION PER OBJECTIVE

OBJECTIVE 2

INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF 'EUROPE 2020' & PROJECTION OF UNION'S INTERNAL POLICIES

47.9%

OBJECTIVE 1

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND POLICY SUPPORT

35%

OBJECTIVE 3

REGULATORY COOPERATION, STANDARDS, MARKET ACCESS AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT & SUPPORT FOR THE NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EU TRADE AGREEMENTS

11.3%

OBJECTIVE 4

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY & OUTREACH

5.8%

values in million €

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

IN SHORT

Acronym: IcSP
Reference Document: Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace
Financial Envelope:  €2.3bn (2014-2020)

THE MATTER

Goal

Provide direct support for the Union’s external policies by increasing the efficiency and coherence of the Union’s actions in the areas of crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness, and in addressing global and trans-regional threats.

Programmes


Assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts, assistance

for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness, assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats, through thematic strategy papers and multiannual indicative programmes, and including exceptional assistance measures and interim response programmes.

Note

Replaced the Instrument for Stability (IfS)

CHART: IcSP DISTRIBUTION PER REGULATION



values in million €

European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights

IN SHORT

Acronym: EIDHR

Reference Document: Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide

Financial Envelope:  €1.3bn (current prices, 2014-2020)

THE MATTER

Goal

Assistance to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and of respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, by supporting, developing and consolidating democracy in third countries, enhancing participatory and representative democracy, strengthening the overall democratic cycle, and enhancing respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Programmes

Strategy papers setting out the Union's strategy for its assistance and containing priority areas selected for financing by the Union, specific objectives, expected results and performance indicators; annual action programmes, individual and support measures, and special measures.

Scope

Civil society organisations at local, national and international levels, human rights defenders and victims of repression and abuse.

CHART: EIDHR DISTRIBUTION PER TYPE OF RECIPIENT

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

90%

1,199.5

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
10%
133.3

values in million €

Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation

IN SHORT

Acronym:	INSC
Reference Document:	Council Regulation (Euratom) No 237/2014 of 13 December 2013 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
Financial Envelope:	€0.2bn (2014-2020)

THE MATTER

Goal

Support the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety, radiation protection, and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries.

Programmes


Annual action programmes—specifying objectives pursued, the fields of intervention, the measures and projects envisaged, the expected results, the management procedures and total amount of financing planned—shall be drawn up on the basis of a strategy paper and multi-annual indicative programmes. The action programmes shall be set out for each third country

or region and shall specify details concerning the implementation of cooperation provided. Exceptionally, in particular where an action programme has not yet been adopted, the Commission may adopt individual measures. In the event of unforeseen needs, circumstances or commitments, the Commission may adopt special measures not provided for in the indicative programming documents.

Scope

Cooperation may cover all third countries worldwide; priority should be given to accession countries and countries in the European Neighbourhood Area. A regional approach is favoured for countries in other regions.

MAP: COUNTRIES HAVING BENEFITTED FROM INSC COOPERATION IN 2014



Instrument for Greenland

IN SHORT

Acronym:	<i>n.a.</i>
Reference Document:	Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other
Financial Envelope:	 €0.2bn (2014-2020)

THE MATTER

Goal

To preserve the close and lasting links between the EU, Denmark and Greenland, while supporting the sustainable development of Greenland. The partnership acknowledges the geostrategic position of Greenland in the Arctic Region, the issues of exploration and exploitation of natural resources, including raw materials, and ensures enhanced cooperation and policy dialogue on those issues.

Programmes

An indicative Programming Document for the Sustainable Development of Greenland (PDSD) will be prepared by the Government of Greenland. The PSDS shall provide a coherent framework for the cooperation between the Union and Greenland, that is consistent with the overall purpose and scope, objectives, principles and policies of the Union. The preparation and implementation of the PSDS shall comply with the following principles of aid effectiveness: national ownership, partnership, coordination, harmonisation, alignment to national systems, mutual accountability and results orientation. The PSDS will draw on lessons learned and best practices and shall be based on consultations and dialogue with civil society, local authorities and other stakeholders in order to ensure their sufficient involvement and subsequent ownership of the PSDS. By 31 December 2017, the Government of Greenland, the Government of Denmark and the Commission shall undertake a mid-term review of the PSDS and its impact on Greenland as a whole.

principles of aid effectiveness: national ownership, partnership, coordination, harmonisation, alignment to national systems, mutual accountability and results orientation. The PSDS will draw on lessons learned and best practices and shall be based on consultations and dialogue with civil society, local authorities and other stakeholders in order to ensure their sufficient involvement and subsequent ownership of the PSDS. By 31 December 2017, the Government of Greenland, the Government of Denmark and the Commission shall undertake a mid-term review of the PSDS and its impact on Greenland as a whole.

Scope

EU, Denmark and Greenland.

MAP: INSTRUMENT FOR GREENLAND GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE



European Development Fund

IN SHORT

Acronym: EDF

Reference Document: Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council, on the financing of European Union aid under the multiannual financial framework for the period 2014 to 2020, in accordance with the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and on the allocation of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union applies (not yet in force)

Financial Envelope: 
 €30.5bn (11th EDF) for the period 2014-2020

THE MATTER

Goal

Originally created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and launched in 1959, the European Development Fund is the EU's main instrument for providing development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories (OCTs). It is financed by direct contributions from EU Member States according to a contribution key and is covered by its own financial rules. The total financial resources of the 11th EDF amount to EUR30.5 billion for the period 2014-2020.

Programmes

The EDF funds cooperation activities in the

fields of economic development, social and human development as well as regional cooperation and integration.


Allocation

EUR 29,089,000,000 to the ACP States; EUR 364,500,000 to the OCT; EUR 1,052,500,000 to the Commission for support expenditure.

Note

As it is not funded from the EU budget but from direct contributions from EU Member States, the EDF does not fall under the MFF. The EDF remains the main instrument for development cooperation in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (APC) as well as overseas countries and territories (OCT).

MAP: ACP AND OCT COUNTRIES



Common Implementing Regulations

IN SHORT

Acronym:	CIR
Reference	Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action
Document:	

THE MATTER

Goal

To ensure that the DCI, EIDHR, the ENI, the ISP, IPA II and PI are implemented in accordance with the objectives of the applicable Instrument, and in conformity with an effective protection of the financial interests of the Union. The Commission shall ensure that actions are implemented in accordance with the objectives of the applicable Instrument, and in conformity with an effective protection of the financial interests of the Union. The Commission shall use the most effective and efficient implementation methods. Where possible and appropriate in light of the nature of the action, the Commission shall also favour the use of the most simple procedures. The Commission shall favour the use of partner countries' sys-

tems when possible and appropriate in light of the nature of the action. The Union shall seek to promote, develop and consolidate the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms on which it is founded, on the basis of, where appropriate, dialogue and cooperation with partner countries and regions. The Union shall integrate those principles in the implementation of the Instruments.


Programmes

The CIR lays down the applicable guidelines in implementing the aforementioned instruments, provides frameworks for general financing provisions and support measures.

Scope

EU Instruments: DCI, EIDHR, ENI, ISP, IPA II and PI.

CHART: CIR SCOPE



Guarantee Fund for External Actions

IN SHORT

Acronym: GF

Reference Document: Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 of 25 May 2009 establishing a Guarantee Fund for external actions

Financial Envelope:  €1.9bn million excluding accrued interest and contributions receivable totalled, as at 31 December 2013

THE MATTER


Goal

To repay the Communities' creditors in the event of default by the beneficiary of a loan granted or guaranteed by the Communities or of a loan guarantee issued by the European Investment Bank for which the Communities provide a guarantee. The lending and guarantee operations are carried out for the benefit of a third country or for the purpose of financing projects in third countries.

Programmes

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is entrusted with the financial management of the Fund.

MAP: CEILING FOR EIB FINANCED OPERATIONS UNDER GF, 2014-2020



Macro-Financial Assistance

IN SHORT

Acronym: MFA

Reference Document: Latest report: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2013 COM(2014) 372

Financial Envelope:  €0.6bn (current prices, 2014-2020)

THE MATTER


Goal

To address exceptional external financing needs of countries that are geographically, economically and politically close to the EU. Its objective is to strengthen macroeconomic and financial stability in candidate and potential candidate countries, and in countries in the European neighbourhood, while encouraging the implementation of appropriate structural reforms.

Programmes

In 2014, MFA loans were disbursed, *inter alia*, to the Kyrgyz Republic (EUR 15,000,000); Jordan (EUR 180,000,000); Tunisia (EUR 200,000,000) and Ukraine (EUR 360,000,000 and EUR 1,000,000,000).

MAP: COUNTRIES HAVING BENEFITTED FROM MFA IN 2014



Instrument for Humanitarian Aid

IN SHORT

Acronym: *n.a.*
Reference Document: Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid
Financial Envelope:  €1bn (total appropriations for DG ECHO for 2014)

THE MATTER

Goal

The aim of the EU humanitarian aid policy is to provide assistance, relief and protection to people outside the EU who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, while promoting the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.


Programmes

Established following Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996, the Instrument aims to provide emergency assistance and support to victims of

items during emergencies to the improvement of the Instrument's own implementation process. In this framework, the Director of DG ECHO is in charge of primary emergency humanitarian actions (with a maximum amount of EUR 3 million and a maximum duration of three months). The European Commission is responsible for the managing and monitoring of the Instrument and for the actions relating to emergency operations up to EUR 30 million for a maximum of six months as well as non-urgent decisions up to a maximum of EUR 10 million.

natural disasters, outbreaks of fighting or other comparable circumstances. The instrument can be activated at the request of a wide range of actors, including NGOs. The measures, which cannot last longer than six months, are grant-financed and cover issues from supplying

CHART: INSTRUMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN AID LIMITS



2. GLOBAL EUROPE

In order to facilitate an overview of EU policies and priorities in this domain, instruments that touch upon external action have been grouped in a single part of the EU budget: Heading 4, 'Global Europe'. Nevertheless, some instruments remain based on the multiannual framework programme while others are only based on annual programmes or crisis situations.

Heading 4 includes the budget line of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which covers crisis management operations (CSDP missions), European Union Special Representatives, non-proliferation and disarmament missions, and other preparatory actions. 'Global Europe' also covers development assistance or humanitarian aid with the exception of the European Development Fund (EDF).

Budget Heading 4: Global Europe


In 2014, three instruments constituted roughly 72% of the commitment appropriations under Heading 4: the IPA, the ENI and the DCI. 2014 was the first year budgeted under the 2014-2020 MFF, and was characterised by a significant drop compared to 2013, although gradual increases are planned over the duration of the MFF.

TABLE 1: HEADING 4 2014-2020, MFF COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS

(million €)	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2014-2020
Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA)	1,573.77	1,605.25	1,637.35	1,670.10	1,703.50	1,737.57	1,771.13	11,698.67
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)	2,112.97	2,027.28	2,084.40	2,159.84	2,243.24	2,358.38	2,446.52	15,432.63
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	179.30	182.89	186.60	190.07	193.84	197.73	202.32	1,332.75
Instrument for Stability (IFS)	314.47	320.77	327.27	333.90	340.53	347.36	354.43	2,338.72

(million €)	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2014-2020
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	314.47	320.77	327.27	333.90	340.53	347.36	354.43	2,338.72
Partnership Instrument (PI)	113.30	119.23	126.33	134.39	143.87	154.68	162.96	954.76
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)	2,309.51	2,467.69	2,636.07	2,805.41	2,988.23	3,180.13	3,274.60	19,661.64
Humanitarian aid	905.28	918.84	932.77	945.43	959.35	978.66	981.36	6,621.70
Civil Protection and European Emergency Response Centre (ERC)	19.55	19.94	20.34	20.71	21.12	21.55	21.44	144.65
European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps EU Aid Volunteers (EUAV)	12.68	14.76	17.87	22.01	26.34	26.78	27.49	147.94
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)	30.55	31.16	31.80	32.33	32.97	33.63	32.88	225.32
Macro-financial Assistance	76.26	77.96	79.67	80.83	82.09	83.78	83.98	564.56
Guarantee Fund for External Actions	58.48	239.76	273.16	199.04	178.06	159.75	84.82	1,193.07
Agencies	20.72	21.14	21.56	21.99	22.43	22.88	23.34	154.06
Other	150.57	153.58	207.54	159.64	162.82	166.08	167.02	1,167.25
Margin	143.13	227.99	232.98	322.42	386.09	451.68	521.27	2,285.56
Total	8,335.00	8,749.00	9,143.00	9,432.00	9,825.00	10,268.00	10,510.00	66,262.00

FIGURE 1: HEADING 4, ANNUAL COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS 2013-2015



3. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)

The Common Foreign and Security Policy is the organised, common denominator between the Union's member states that deals with part of the Union's external relations.

As outlined in Article 21, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, consolidated), its objectives are to:

- safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity
- consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law
- preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders
- foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty
- encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade
- help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development, and assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters
- promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

Budget


The CFSP's funds will increase slightly but steadily under the 2014-2020 MFF, while its budgetary weight in relation to Heading 4 and the EU budget at large is set to decline slightly.

TABLE 2: HEADING 4, COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, MFF COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS 2014-2020

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
CFSP Budget (million €)	314	321	327	334	341	347	354

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

FIGURE 2: CIVILIAN MISSIONS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 2014



CSDP civilian missions

There were 11 CSDP civilian missions in 2014. The costs detailed in the table below indicate estimated budgets. At the close of 2014, 68% of the international staff in CSDP civilian missions were seconded from EU member states and third countries. Their salaries were paid for by their countries and therefore did not weigh on the budgets of individual missions.

Civilian missions are financed directly by the EU's CFSP budget. Usually, the financial references are included in the Council decision establishing the mission and are revised according to further recommendations on the mission. The CFSP budget appears in the 'Global Europe' section of the EU budget.

TABLE 3: CSDP CIVILIAN MISSIONS, 2014

Name	Mission		Personnel			
	End of current mandate	Annualised budget (million €)	EU Member States	Third states	Local	Total
EULEX Kosovo	01/06/2016	90.00	656	32	748	1436
EUAM Ukraine	01/11/2016	13.10	53		0	53
EUMM Georgia	14/12/2015	18.30	258		129	387
EUBAM Rafah	01/06/2015	0.94	3		5	8
EUPOL COPPS	01/06/2015	9.80	57	3	43	103
EUPOL Afghanistan	01/12/2016	58.00	235		187	422
EUCAP Nestor	01/10/2015	17.90	76	3	29	108
EUCAP Sahel Niger	01/07/2016	9.16	46		31	77
EUBAM Libya	01/04/2015	26.00	16		4	20
EUCAP Sahel Mali	01/01/2016	7.33	41		6	47
EUSEC RD Congo	01/06/2015	6.13	26		25	51

Military operations

The clear distinction between the financing of EU civilian and military operations is specified in Article 41, Paragraph 2 TEU (consolidated):

'Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter [Chapter 2, Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy] gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise'.

The financing mechanism of CSDP military operations, known as ATHENA, is intended to provide funds for the common costs of operations. The complete list of costs covered by ATHENA (including transport, infrastructure, medical services, lodging, fuel, and others) is stated in the four annexes of Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP. Personnel and other items are financed on a ‘costs lie where they fall’ basis. It is estimated that the ATHENA mechanism covers between 10 to 40% of the total cost of an operation.

ATHENA is managed by a trio composed of an administrator, an operation commander and an accounting officer. Their actions remain under the responsibility of a special committee composed of one representative from each participating member state, as well as EEAS and EC representatives. A permanent revision procedure has been set up and each presidency has at least one meeting on the evolution of the ATHENA mechanism.

ATHENA makes the distinction between common costs (including those incurred in preparation for or following operations) and operational costs which are directly related to operations. All the costs not explicitly covered by ATHENA remain under the responsibility of the participating member states, even if the special committee can decide to include it in part B of annex III. EU exercise costs are also included even if capital acquisition, planning and preparatory phase of exercises, transports, barracks and lodging for forces are not included.

Five EU military missions benefited from ATHENA financing in 2014: EUFOR Althea, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali and EUFOR RCA. In addition, ATHENA financed the following past operations: AMIS 2 (Sudan, June 2005 - December 2007), EUFOR RD Congo (June - November 2006), EUFOR Tchad RCA (January 2008 - March 2009), EUFOR Libya (April - November 2011).

TABLE 4: CSDP MILITARY OPERATIONS, 2014

Name	Mission		Personnel	
	End of current mandate	Annualised common costs (million €)	Third states	Total
EUFOR ALTHEA	11/11/2015	10.20	227	600
EUTM Mali	18/05/2016	13.85	9	560
EUFOR RCA	15/03/2015	30.62	163	872
EUTM Somalia	31/03/2015	5.16	5	125
EU NAVFOR Somalia - Operation ATALANTA	01/12/2016	7.39	67	1200

Contributions of third states to CSDP operations

Approximately 45 non-EU states have participated in CSDP operations since the first mission (about 30 if the countries that have joined the EU since 2004 are subtracted). Over the course of 2014, third countries participated in at least nine CSDP missions, including all five military operations.

Countries are invited by the EU to participate in EU crisis management operations through the establishment of a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) for possible future participation. In 2014, three countries signed such EU-third party framework agreements on European Union crisis management operations: Chile, Colombia and the Republic of Korea.

TABLE 5: THIRD STATES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS IN 2014

Third States	CSDP Missions & Operations
Europe/North America	
Albania*	EUFOR ALTHEA
Canada*	EUTM Mali, EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL COPPS
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	EUFOR ALTHEA
Georgia*	EUTM Mali, EUFOR RCA
Montenegro*	EUTM Mali, EU NAVFOR Somalia
Moldova*	EUTM Mali
Norway*	EU NAVFOR Somalia, EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL COPPS, EUCAP Nestor
Serbia*	EUTM Mali, EUFOR RCA, EUTM Somalia, EU NAVFOR Somalia
Switzerland	EUFOR ALTHEA, EUTM Mali, EULEX Kosovo
Turkey*	EUFOR ALTHEA, EUFOR RCA, EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL COPPS
Ukraine*	EU NAVFOR Somalia
United States*	EULEX Kosovo, EUSEC RD Congo
Asia/Oceania	
Australia	EUCAP Nestor
New Zealand*	EU NAVFOR Somalia
Latin America	
Chile*	EUFOR ALTHEA

* Countries which have signed an FPA with the EU.

CSDP agencies' budgets

The table below shows the Member State contributions to each CSDP agency from 2008 to 2014.

TABLE 6: MEMBER STATES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO CSDP AGENCIES

(million €)	EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)	European Security and Defence College (ESDC)	EU Satellite Centre (EUSC)	European Defence Agency (EDA)
Legal basis	2001/554/CFSP 2006/1002/CFSP 2014/75/CFSP	2008/550/CFSP 2013/189/CFSP	2001/555/CFSP 2006/998/CFSP 2009/834/CFSP 2011/297/CFSP	2004/551/CFSP
Member State contribution 2008	3.80	‘Each Member State, Union institution, Union agency and institute, and the EEAS shall bear all costs related to its participation in the ESDC, including salaries, allowances, travel and subsistence expenses and costs related to organisational and administrative support of the ESDC training activities.’	11.56	24.28
Member State contribution 2009	3.94		12.20	27.69
Member State contribution 2010	4.02		12.33	28.73
Member State contribution 2011	4.02		12.33	29.03
Member State contribution 2012	4.02		12.33	29.09
Member State contribution 2013	3.99		12.28	29.06
Member State contribution 2014	3.99		12.28	29.15

FIGURE 3: MEMBER STATE CONTRIBUTIONS, EU INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (EUISS)




FIGURE 4: MEMBER STATE CONTRIBUTIONS, EU SATELLITE CENTRE (EUSC)





FIGURE 5: MEMBER STATE CONTRIBUTIONS, EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA)



Non-proliferation and disarmament actions in 2010-2014

The European Union continued its actions in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament throughout 2014 by adopting four decisions, including one authorising Member States to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty.

TABLE 7: NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT ACTIONS, 2010-2014

Legal Basis	Action	Commitment (in €)
2010		
2009/1012/CFSP	Support of EU activities to promote the control of arms exports	787,000
2010/179/CFSP	Support of SEESAC arms control activities in Western Balkans	1,600,000
2010/336/CFSP	EU activities in support of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT-UNIDIR)	1,520,000

Legal Basis	Action	Commitment (in €)
2010/430/CFSP	Establishing a European network of independent think tanks	2,182,000
2010/461/CFSP	EU activities in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO)	5,280,000
2010/585/CFSP	EU support for the IAEA activities in the area of nuclear security ... (IAEA V)	9,966,000
2010/765/CFSP	EU action to counter the illicit trade of SALW by air (SIPRI)	900,000
	Total 2010	22,235,000
2011		
2010/799/CFSP	Confidence-building process - Zone free of WMD - Non-proliferation consortium	347,700
2011/428/CFSP	UNODA activities in support of UN programme of Action on SALW	2,150,000
	Total 2011	2,497,700
2012		
2012/121/CFSP	Activities to promote EU-China-Africa dialogue and co-operation on conventional arms controls	830,000
2012/166/CFSP	Support of activities of OPCW - EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD	2,140,000
2012/281/CFSP	International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities	1,490,000
2012/421/CFSP	Support of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)	1,700,000
2012/662/CFSP	OSCE - Small Arms and Light Weapons	890,000
2012/662/CFSP	UNDP - Small Arms and Light Weapons	790,000
2012/422/CFSP	WMD Free Zone II	352,000
2012/423/CFSP	Missile proliferation (HCOG II)	930,000
2012/699/CFSP	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO V)	5,185,028
2012/700/CFSP	Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014 (AP Landmines II)	1,030,000
2012/711/CFSP	Control of Arms Export (COARM Outreach)	1,860,000
	Total 2012	17,197,028

Legal Basis	Action	Commitment (in €)
2013		
2013/43/CFSP	Continued Union activities in support of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations	160,800
2013/320/CFSP	Support of physical security and stockpile management activities to reduce the risk of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition in Libya and its region	5,000,000
2013/391/CFSP	Support of the practical implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)	750,000
2013/517/CFSP	Support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of nuclear security and verification	8,050,000
2013/668/CFSP	Support of World Health Organisation activities in the area of biosafety and biosecurity	1,727,000
2013/698/CFSP	Support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit small arms and light weapons and other illicit conventional weapons and ammunition to reduce the risk of their illicit trade	2,320,000
2013/726/CFSP	Support of the UNSCR 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive Council EC-M-33/Dec 1	2,311,842
2013/730/CFSP	Support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South East Europe	5,127,650
2013/768/CFSP	EU activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty	5,200,000
	Total 2013	30,647,292
2014		
2014/42/CFSP	Amending Decision 2012/281/CFSP in the framework of the European Security Strategy in support of the Union proposal for an international Code of Conduct on outer-space activities	-
2014/129/CFSP	Promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks in support of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	3,600,000

Legal Basis	Action	Commitment (in €)
2014/165/EU	Authorising Member States to ratify, in the interests of the European Union, the Arms Trade Treaty	-
2014/913/CFSP	In support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	990,000
	Total 2014	4,590,000

4. REGIONAL PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

EU-UN

EU-UN cooperation in the field of CSDP started in earnest in 2003, when the EU launched Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and EUPM BiH took over policing Bosnia and Herzegovina from the United Nations International Police Task Force (UNIPTF). A joint consultative mechanism, the EU-UN Steering Committee, was set up that year following the first Joint Declaration on EU-UN co-operation in Crisis Management. EU-UN cooperation deepened in 2007 with the publication of a second joint statement encouraging regular senior-level dialogue between the EU troika and the UN Secretariat, as well as regular exchanges of views between the UN Secretariat and the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC). In the field, cooperation was further developed through parallel and sequential missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2006 as well as in Chad in 2008-09. In 2012, the EEAS elaborated an Action Plan on CSDP Support to UN peacekeeping that listed a series of concrete steps towards a reinforced EU-UN partnership. In 2013-14, the partnership found new grounds of development both in Mali and the Central African Republic, where the two institutions have been present simultaneously in various operations. In particular, the nine-month long EUFOR RCA acted as a bridging operation to the UN mission in the Central African Republic.

EU-NATO

EU-NATO relations are an important feature of the institutional structure of the CSDP. Although there is no explicit division of labour, this partnership is complementary in that the EU does not have the range of planning capabilities that NATO has, and NATO is less equipped with regard to the civilian expertise that adds value to many missions. The cooperation of the two organisations is also underpinned by a political dimension, as evidenced by regular meetings between EU-NATO leaders. For example, after taking office as HR/VP on 1 November 2014, Federica Mogherini dedicated her first bilateral meeting to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, with the aim of deepening EU-NATO relations.


The 'Berlin Plus' arrangements are at the core of this partnership. They cover EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities. The military operations carried out in the framework of this arrangement, adopted in 2003, include EUFOR Althea and EUNAVFOR Atalanta.

Besides these operational aspects, EU-NATO cooperation also encompasses an institutional dimension. On the one hand, a special EU cell has been created within the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to better prepare EU operations relying on NATO common assets and capabilities. On the other hand, NATO officials are regularly invited to informal EU defence ministerial meetings.

With respect to capabilities development, an EU-NATO capability group, composed of NATO allies and non-NATO EU member states that have a security agreement with NATO, was set up in Brussels in May 2003 with the task of regularly exchanging information on requirements common to both organisations, if both organisations so wish and if appropriate. The EDA's Pooling and Sharing initiative and NATO's Smart Defence initiative proved that this area of cooperation should be further developed in order to avoid any expensive duplication of efforts in the future. Beyond such institutionalised formats, reciprocal attendance of meetings at several levels and staff contacts play an important role in EU-NATO relations. For instance, NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU's Political and Security Committee hold regular meetings and NATO's Secretary General and the EU's HR/VP attend each other's summits.

One of the main remaining issues is the question of information sharing between the EU and NATO. Six EU member states currently do not participate as full members of NATO. In addition, as the Cyprus territorial dispute is not yet resolved, Turkey is maintaining its veto on an increase in its cooperation with the EU. This implies also that there is currently no agreement concerning the sharing of information between the two organisations although a specific agreement on the security of information has been signed within the Berlin Plus agreements.

FIGURE 6: MAP OF EU MEMBERSHIP, NATO MEMBERSHIP, NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND EU CANDIDATE COUNTRIES IN 2014



* Under UNSCR 1244/1999

5. EUROPEAN UNION SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES

The role of European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs) is defined in Article 28, Paragraph 1 TEU (consolidated) as follows:

‘Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.

If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to such a decision, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that decision and take the necessary decisions.’


EUSRs stand in close contact with the HR/VP pursuant to Article 33 TEU (consolidated):

‘The Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. The special representative shall carry out his mandate under the authority of the High Representative.’

The following map shows the names and mandates of the EUSRs in 2014, along with their respective budgetary allocations, annualised.

Each EUSR has to finance its office, staff, equipment, and the operational costs of its mission with the financial reference amount mentioned in the related Council Decisions and Joint Actions. Although the mandate of Bernardino Leon, the EUSR for the Southern Mediterranean Region, ran only until 30 June 2014, he was subsequently appointed the United Nations’ Secretary General’s Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and took office on 1 September 2014.

FIGURE 7: AREAS COVERED BY THE EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES IN 2014




6. SANCTIONS/RESTRICTIVE MEASURES

The EU applies sanctions or restrictive measures in pursuit of the objectives of EU external action as outlined in Article 21 TEU (consolidated). These measures serve as an instrument of the CFSP and are imposed by the EU on countries, organisations and individuals.

The Union applies the following types of sanctions or restrictive measures: diplomatic sanctions; suspensions of cooperation with a third country; boycotts of sport or cultural events; trade sanctions (general or specific trade sanctions, arms embargoes); financial sanctions (freezing of funds or economic resources, prohibition on financial transactions, restrictions on export credits or investment); flight bans; and restrictions on admission. Where ‘targeted’ restrictive measures – occasionally referred to as ‘smart’ sanctions – are implemented, clear criteria must be established to determine individuals and entities to be listed or de-listed.

FIGURE 8: MAP OF EU SANCTIONS IN 2014





Defence spending in the EU

2014 has posed acute challenges to European defence, with a serious crisis over Ukraine to the East and a grave deterioration of the security environment in the EU's southern neighbourhood, in Syria, Iraq and Libya. Have these challenges already been reflected in the defence calculations of European states?

This section brings together and processes data on EU member states' defence expenditure collected from the European Defence Agency (EDA), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). All data was converted into euros using year-specific exchange rates which can be found in the Statistical Data Warehouse of the European Central Bank.¹ EUISS figures have then been calculated by taking the average across databases. To minimise the margins of error, estimated data was not used for calculations. Military expenditure in constant 2005 euros is based on year-specific consumer price indexes (taking 2005 as a base)² and 2005 market average exchange rates to deflate values. Data on per capita spending was calculated using the military expenditure in euros and yearly population statistics provided by the World Bank.³ Because data on defence expenditure in 2013 had not been released by EDA at the time of writing, 2013 figures are based on NATO, IISS and SIPRI databases. For the same reason, 2014 figures draw upon data provided by the IISS and SIPRI only.

In order to facilitate trend analysis, the *Yearbook 2015* includes an index – the EUISS defence spending index – which makes it possible to track the percentage changes in the military expenditure of European countries from 2007 to 2014.⁴

1. European Central Bank, *Statistical Data Warehouse*, 2015. Available at: <https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018779>.

2. Eurostat, *Harmonised indices of consumer prices*, 2015. Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=prc_hicp_aind&lang=en.

3. The World Bank, *Population, total*, 2015. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL/countries>. For 2014, data on per capita spending was calculated using 2013 population statistics as population statistics for 2014 have not been available until the time of writing.


4. The EUISS index is based on defence spending in constant 2005 prices to take account of the effect of inflation.

TABLE 1: EUISS DEFENCE SPENDING INDEX

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
EUISS defence spending index (% of 2007)	100.0	99.6	98.9	95.3	92.1	88.8	87.9	86.4


With a total amount of €200.3 billion spent by all 28 EU member states in 2014, military expenditure has continued to fall at an annual rate of 1.8%, compared to 2013 and by a total of 13.6 percent since 2007 in real terms. 2014 defence expenditures in all EU countries correspond to 1.44% of total GDP and €396 per person. Despite budgetary cuts in recent years, the UK remains the EU’s biggest defence spender with a budget of €45.8 billion in 2014, followed by France (€43.1 bn.) and Germany (€32.4 bn.). But this is just the tip of the iceberg. The graphs in Figure 1, 2 and 3 illustrate these trends.

FIGURE 1: EVOLUTION OF EU MILITARY EXPENDITURE (2007-2014, CONSTANT 2005 BILLION EUROS)




Sources for data: EDA, IISS, NATO, SIPRI.

FIGURE 2: EU STATES' MILITARY EXPENDITURE (2007-2014, CONSTANT 2005 BILLION EUROS)



Sources for data: EDA, IISS, NATO, SIPRI.


FIGURE 3: EU STATES' MILITARY EXPENDITURE (2007/2014, CONSTANT 2005 BILLION EUROS)



Sources for data: EDA, IISS, NATO, SIPRI.

With the help of the EUISS defence expenditure index it is possible to identify the pressures and challenges with which European states have been confronted in the period between 2007 and 2014 and how these have impacted on defence budgets. The graph clearly depicts the divergences in threat perceptions in Europe and the challenges with which European states have been struggling over the last eight years.

While the repercussions of the global financial crisis are reflected in the cuts to defence budgets of many Northern, Western and Southern European states, concerns about Russia's behaviour in the East – mostly predating the crisis over Ukraine – have led Eastern European countries in particular to channel resources into the defence sector. By way of contrast, the worsening security situation in the Middle East and North Africa might have spurred Southern European states to invest similarly in their militaries, but in actual fact, austerity appears to have dictated cuts in defence spending there.

FIGURE 4: COMPARATIVE REGIONAL DEFENCE SPENDING IN THE EU (2007-2014, AS % OF 2007)

Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia

Northern Europe: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, United Kingdom

Southern Europe: Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands

Sources for data: EDA, IISS, NATO, SIPRI.

EU MEMBER STATE DEFENCE EXPENDITURE, 2007-2014

Countries/ Indicators	2007				2008				2009			
	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)
Austria	2,458	2,365	0.94	296	2,429	2,264	0.86	291	2,271	2,108	0.83	271
Belgium	3,741	3,591	1.12	352	4,155	3,816	1.18	388	4,046	3,716	1.22	375
Bulgaria	713	617	2.62	95	798	617	2.27	106	663	500	1.94	89
Croatia	665	622	1.52	150	814	708	1.68	184	757	654	1.67	171
Cyprus	266	255	2.03	251	325	298	1.90	302	339	310	2.00	311
Czech Republic	1,938	1,719	1.51	188	2,104	1,577	1.40	203	2,180	1,721	1.57	209
Denmark	3,014	2,911	1.32	679	3,197	2,982	1.37	721	3,120	2,876	1.40	705
Estonia	275	246	1.82	205	310	252	1.91	232	270	218	1.95	202
Finland	2,365	2,299	1.31	447	2,467	2,308	1.32	464	2,689	2,475	1.57	504
France	44,494	42,969	2.36	695	45,348	42,452	2.32	704	41,407	38,723	2.20	640
Germany	31,000	29,779	1.29	377	32,321	30,206	1.29	394	34,638	32,311	1.43	423
Greece	6,030	5,667	2.64	540	6,799	6,131	2.87	608	7,061	6,282	3.02	631
Hungary	1,251	1,129	1.29	124	1,280	1,090	1.21	127	1,064	971	1.17	106
Ireland	984	932	0.51	224	1,053	967	0.59	234	1,006	939	0.61	222
Italy	23,927	22,941	1.56	409	23,612	21,863	1.50	401	23,341	21,453	1.52	395
Latvia	333	285	1.77	151	377	281	1.83	173	235	171	1.41	110
Lithuania	327	298	1.16	101	366	300	1.12	115	289	228	1.09	92
Luxembourg	208	197	0.59	433	154	140	0.41	315	168	152	0.45	337

Countries/ Indicators	2007					2008					2009					
	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)
Malta	34	33	0.65	84	36	34	0.61	89	43	39	0.73	104	43	39	0.73	104
Netherlands	8,324	8,061	1.50	508	8,441	7,998	1.41	513	8,727	8,189	1.51	528	8,727	8,189	1.51	528
Poland	5,909	5,349	1.89	155	6,302	5,080	1.75	165	5,435	5,192	1.73	142	5,435	5,192	1.73	142
Portugal	2,620	2,483	1.57	249	2,722	2,512	1.60	258	2,897	2,698	1.73	274	2,897	2,698	1.73	274
Romania	1,984	1,634	1.54	95	2,052	1,729	1.49	100	1,613	1,482	1.39	79	1,613	1,482	1.39	79
Slovakia	869	928	1.51	162	982	934	1.52	183	969	869	1.52	180	969	869	1.52	180
Slovenia	507	476	1.51	251	567	505	1.51	280	573	506	1.62	281	573	506	1.62	281
Spain	12,357	11,602	1.18	273	12,842	11,579	1.19	279	12,197	11,024	1.18	263	12,197	11,024	1.18	263
Sweden	4,564	4,407	1.42	499	4,102	3,984	1.27	445	3,651	3,842	1.24	393	3,651	3,842	1.24	393
United Kingdom	48,940	46,780	2.44	798	43,893	47,109	2.40	710	41,490	48,789	2.61	666	41,490	48,789	2.61	666
EU Average	7,503	7,163	1.52	314	7,495	7,133	1.49	321	7,255	7,087	1.51	311	7,255	7,087	1.51	311
EU Total	210,095	200,572	1.63	421	209,846	199,715	1.62	419	203,134	198,439	1.66	404	203,134	198,439	1.66	404

Sources for data: EDA, IISS, NATO, SIPRI.

Countries/ Indicators	2010					2011					2012				
	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Per capita (€)
Austria	2,297	2,097	0.82	274	274	2,452	2,162	0.81	292	292	2,491	2,141	0.80	295	295
Belgium	3,955	3,550	1.11	362	362	3,967	3,445	1.09	359	359	4,058	3,434	1.10	365	365
Bulgaria	640	469	1.77	87	87	558	395	1.42	76	76	579	400	1.43	79	79
Croatia	746	633	1.60	169	169	706	599	1.42	165	165	684	567	1.54	160	160
Cyprus	366	327	2.10	331	331	356	307	1.96	319	319	332	278	1.86	294	294
Czech Republic	1,980	1,479	1.35	189	189	1,779	1,264	1.14	169	169	1,668	1,171	1.10	159	159
Denmark	3,400	3,066	1.42	770	770	3,258	2,862	1.39	761	761	3,441	2,950	1.40	806	806
Estonia	250	197	1.74	188	188	280	210	1.73	211	211	340	245	2.00	257	257
Finland	2,661	2,409	1.47	496	496	2,600	2,278	1.44	483	483	2,820	2,395	1.47	521	521
France	41,107	37,785	2.11	632	632	40,440	36,341	2.01	619	619	41,009	36,052	2.02	624	624
Germany	34,161	31,513	1.39	418	418	34,410	30,972	1.30	421	421	34,182	30,116	1.31	425	425
Greece	5,724	4,864	2.54	513	513	4,572	3,767	2.37	411	411	4,022	3,281	2.27	363	363
Hungary	1,020	874	1.07	102	102	1028	859	1.04	103	103	1,029	843	1.05	104	104
Ireland	946	898	0.56	207	207	836	784	0.55	183	183	898	826	0.53	196	196
Italy	21,745	19,661	1.50	367	367	23,153	20,345	1.47	390	390	22,014	18,735	1.38	370	370
Latvia	193	143	1.18	92	92	208	147	1.15	101	101	199	136	0.93	98	98
Lithuania	271	211	0.91	88	88	250	187	0.81	83	83	256	185	0.78	86	86
Luxembourg	196	174	0.49	387	387	190	162	0.45	366	366	180	149	0.42	340	340

Countries/ Indicators	2010					2011					2012				
	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP
Malta	44	39	0.71	106	40	35	0.62	96	39	33	0.58	93	33	0.58	93
Netherlands	8,469	7,874	1.42	510	8,213	7,451	1.39	492	8,068	7,118	1.32	482	7,118	1.32	482
Poland	6,424	5,518	1.83	168	6,577	5,610	1.79	171	6,792	5,675	1.78	176	5,675	1.78	176
Portugal	2,822	2,593	1.71	267	2,856	2,534	1.59	271	2,501	2,158	1.52	238	2,158	1.52	238
Romania	1,647	1,418	1.30	81	1,712	1,401	1.27	85	1,700	1,416	1.29	85	1,416	1.29	85
Slovakia	855	762	1.30	159	764	655	1.10	142	791	653	1.07	146	653	1.07	146
Slovenia	575	498	1.61	281	478	405	1.31	233	416	343	1.18	202	343	1.18	202
Spain	11,124	9,853	1.08	239	10,069	8,654	0.99	215	10,821	9,080	1.10	231	9,080	1.10	231
Sweden	4,316	4,003	1.25	460	4,392	3,804	1.15	465	4,726	3,910	1.17	497	3,910	1.17	497
United Kingdom	44,102	48,321	2.59	703	44,486	47,209	2.49	703	45,486	43,852	2.38	714	43,852	2.38	714
EU Average	7,216	6,829	1.42	309	7,157	6,594	1.33	299	7,198	6,362	1.31	300	6,362	1.31	300
EU Total	202,037	191,225	1.58	401	200,393	184,644	1.52	397	201,540	178,140	1.5	400	178,140	1.5	400

Sources for data: EDA, IISS, NATO, SIPRI.

Countries/ Indicators	2013				2014			
	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)
Austria	2,431	2,046	0.78	287	2,452	2,034	0.79	289
Belgium	3,961	3,313	0.99	354	3,816	3,174	0.99	341
Bulgaria	603	416	1.49	83	584	409	1.46	80
Croatia	667	545	1.51	157	561	460	1.24	132
Cyprus	333	278	2.01	292	319	267	2.01	280
Czech Republic	1,601	1,146	1.05	152	1,523	1,151	1.01	145
Denmark	3,348	2,863	1.36	787	3,442	2,933	1.38	809
Estonia	361	252	2.00	273	384	266	2.03	290
Finland	2,861	2,377	1.47	526	2,750	2,257	1.38	506
France	41,937	36,505	2.04	635	43,074	37,267	2.05	652
Germany	35,020	30,373	1.27	434	32,400	27,883	1.20	402
Greece	4,360	3,587	2.41	395	4,160	3,470	2.33	377
Hungary	912	754	0.88	92	758	651	0.72	77
Ireland	901	825	0.52	196	898	820	0.52	195
Italy	21,170	17,790	1.34	354	20,598	17,266	1.33	344
Latvia	218	149	0.96	108	226	154	1.30	112
Lithuania	267	191	0.79	90	303	216	0.85	102
Luxembourg	188	153	0.41	345	189	153	0.41	348

Countries/ Indicators	2013				2014			
	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)	Million €	Constant 2005 million €	% of GDP	Per capita (€)
Malta	43	36	0.62	101	45	37	0.62	106
Netherlands	7,785	6,697	1.29	463	7,746	6,643	1.25	461
Poland	6,889	5,727	1.78	179	7,782	6,444	1.91	202
Portugal	2,731	2,347	1.66	261	1,940	1,670	1.19	185
Romania	1,941	1,552	1.33	97	2,014	1,597	1.40	101
Slovakia	742	603	1.00	137	765	623	1.02	141
Slovenia	376	304	1.07	183	353	284	0.98	171
Spain	9,276	7,666	0.95	199	10,348	8,568	0.99	222
Sweden	4,903	4,013	1.17	511	5,072	4,357	1.19	529
United Kingdom	44,522	43,850	2.33	695	45,776	42,160	2.34	714
EU Average	7,155	6,298	1.30	300	7,153	6,186	1.28	297
EU Total	200,344	176,356	1.48	396	200,277	173,215	1.44	396

Sources for data: EDA, IISS, NATO, SIPRI.



EU member states' voting record at the UN Security Council

The following is the voting record of the EU Member State members of the UN Security Council in 2014. Only non-unanimous votes are listed. 2014 non-permanent UN Security Council members were: Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Republic of Korea and Rwanda.


Document	EU Voting				Total voting				
	GB	FR	LU	LT	Y	N	A	Adoption	Veto
Draft resolution (S/2014/189) On the situation in Ukraine <i>15 March 2014</i>									
	Y	Y	Y	Y	13	1 (RU)	1 (CN)	N	RU
Draft resolution (S/2014/348) On the situation of human rights violations in Syria <i>22 May 2014</i>									
	Y	Y	Y	Y	13	2 (RU & CN)	0	N	RU & CN
S/RES/2182 (2014) On the reaffirmation of the arms embargo on Somalia <i>24 October 2014</i>									
	Y	Y	Y	Y	13	0	2 (JO & RU)	Y	-
S/RES/2183 (2014) On the situation in Bosnia & Herzegovina <i>11 November 2014</i>									
	Y	Y	Y	Y	14	0	1 (RU)	Y	-
S/RES/2193 (2014) On the International Tribunal in former Yugoslavia <i>18 December 2014</i>									
	Y	Y	Y	Y	14	0	1 (RU)	Y	-
Draft resolution S/2014/916 On the Israeli-Palestinian situation <i>30 December 2014</i>									
	A	Y	Y	A	8	2 (US & AU)	5 (UK, LT, KR, RW & NG)	N	-


EEAS organisational chart

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

Graphic presentation

Source: EEAS website, December 2014







Timeline 2014

International security

EU/CSDP

	Date	Title	Summary
January	4-5	<i>ISIS in control of key cities</i>	The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seizes control of Fallujah and Ramadi. John Kerry says the US will support Iraq's fight against ISIS.
	7	<i>Chemical weapons removed from Syria</i>	The first batch of Syria's chemical arsenal is loaded onto a Danish ship and removed from the country.
	12	<i>International inspection of nuclear facilities in Iran</i>	Iran agrees to open its nuclear facilities to daily international inspections, starting on 20 January.
	12	<i>Implementation of the Geneva Action Plan</i>	HR/VP Ashton announces that the P5+1 and Iran have reached a common understanding on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action.
	16	<i>Ukrainian parliament's approval of anti-protest laws</i>	Mass protests in Ukraine throughout January 2014. Parliament rushes through measures designed to quell demonstrations. Protests turn violent, with at least five people killed.
	22	<i>UN-led negotiations on Syria in Geneva</i>	Round of negotiations brokered by the UN between the Syrian government, members of the opposition, the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia begins in Geneva.
	28	<i>Resignation of Ukrainian PM</i>	Ukraine's Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, resigns. Parliament repeals anti-protest laws in move designed to defuse the political crisis engulfing the country.
	30	<i>EU and Chile FPA</i>	EU and Chile sign a Framework Participation Agreement. The FPA provides a legal basis for Chile's participation in EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations.
February	11	<i>First high-level talks between China and Taiwan in 65 Years</i>	High-ranking officials from China and Taiwan meet in Nanjing, China. It is the first time since the 1949 split that ministerial-level talks are held.
	17	<i>UNHRC's critical report on North Korea</i>	The UN Human Rights Council warns North Korean leader that he may be held accountable for orchestrating widespread crimes against civilians.
	20	<i>Violent clashes in Ukraine</i>	Riot police and protesters clash as demonstrators attempt to reclaim Maidan Square in Kiev. More than 100 people are killed, most of them civilians.

	Date	Title	Summary
	21	<i>Tentative truce deal between Ukrainian president and opposition</i>	Clashes end in a truce. The opposition and President Yanukovich reach a deal brokered by EU representatives. The president agrees to hold elections by the end of the year and revert to the 2004 constitution.
	22-23	<i>Yanukovich flight from Ukraine</i>	Yanukovich flees Ukraine - an interim government takes power. The next day, Parliament appoints former speaker Turchynov as interim President.
	28	<i>Russian-backed takeover in Crimea</i>	Pro-Russian gunmen without insignia, some of them Russian special forces, occupy Crimea's parliament and other key buildings.
March	1-3	<i>Russian troops officially in Crimea</i>	Russian president Putin officially dispatches troops to Crimea, citing the need to protect Russians from 'extremist ultranationalists'.
	3	<i>Council conclusions on Ukraine</i>	The EU strongly condemns the clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity as a result of aggression by the Russian armed forces.
	6	<i>New EU approach to global maritime security</i>	Joint communication presents a vision of the Union's maritime security interests and threats and proposes the areas in which cooperation between various maritime players can be enhanced.
	6	<i>US sanctions on Russia</i>	The US imposes sanctions on officials, advisers, and other individuals who have been involved in the undermining of democracy in Crimea.
	8	<i>Malaysian Airliner disappearance</i>	A Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 - with 239 people on board - disappears on a flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing, sparking a massive search effort.
	11	<i>Establishment of ENI</i>	Regulation 232/201 establishes the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) as one of the instruments providing direct support for the European Union's external policies.
	16	<i>Crimea to join Russia</i>	Crimeans vote to leave Ukraine and join Russia in a snap referendum deemed illegitimate by the international community. Two days later, Putin signs a bill absorbing Crimea into Russia
	17	<i>EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea</i>	The EU releases a Strategic Framework, allowing it to work with its partners in the Gulf of Guinea in a more coherent way.
	26	<i>Tensions in the Korean peninsula</i>	North Korea test fires two medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Japan, South Korea, and China. The moves prompt an angry response from South Korea.

	Date	Title	Summary
	27	<i>UNGA Resolution - Crimea annexation illegal</i>	The UN General Assembly passes a resolution declaring Russia's annexation of Crimea to be illegal and describes the referendum as 'having no legal validity'.
	27	<i>ENP package for Syria</i>	The EU endeavours to provide direct support to the Syrian population, especially through its large-scale humanitarian and development aid.
April	1	<i>Lifting of Japan's decades-old arms export ban</i>	The Japanese government approves a measure lifting a self-imposed ban on weapons exports that had been in place since 1967.
	5	<i>High voter turnout in Afghanistan</i>	Presidential elections in Afghanistan went ahead with high voter turnout and lack of violence. About 60% of registered voters turn out to vote for presidential and provincial councils elections despite threats from the Taliban.
	7	<i>Occupation of government buildings in Eastern Ukraine</i>	Pro-Russian protesters occupy government buildings in Donetsk, Lugansk and Kharkiv. The Ukrainian authorities re-establish control in Kharkiv the next day.
	14	<i>Mass kidnapping in Nigeria</i>	Islamist militant group Boko Haram kidnaps about 280 girls from a school in Chibok. The government's inept attempts to rescue them spark international outrage.
	14	<i>Council conclusions on Syria</i>	The EU reiterates that there can only be a political solution to the conflict in Syria and underscores the importance of reinvigorating the Geneva Process.
	15	<i>EUTM Mali extension</i>	EU training mission mandate in Mali is extended until 18 May 2016.
May	2-7	<i>Escalation of fighting in Eastern Ukraine</i>	The Ukrainian government launches a second offensive to recapture the rebel-held city of Sloviansk. Over 40 people die in a fire in Odessa.
	11	<i>Referendums in Eastern Ukraine</i>	Unrecognised referendums on self-rule are held in Donetsk and Lugansk. Pro-Russian forces claim that 89% of voters in Donetsk voted in favour of self-rule, 96% in Lugansk.
	12	<i>Opposition victory in India elections</i>	In the largest vote ever cast, India's opposition party, Bharatiya Janata, beats the incumbent Indian National Congress Party, taking about 60% of the seats in parliament. Narendra Modi is set to become prime minister.
	17	<i>Clashes in Mali</i>	MNLA rebels attack Malian Prime Minister Moussa Mara and his team upon their arrival in the northern town of Kidal. In response, 1,500 Malian troops are dispatched to Kidal to fight the rebels.

	Date	Title	Summary
	21	<i>\$400 billion gas deal between Russia and China</i>	China signs a \$400 billion gas deal with Russia, allowing Moscow to expand the market for its major export and binding Russia more closely to Beijing as it faces international sanctions over its actions in Ukraine.
	20-22	<i>Military coup in Thailand</i>	Thailand's military seizes power in a bloodless <i>coup</i> , dissolving the government, suspending the constitution and dispersing groups of protesters.
	23	<i>EU and Republic of Korea FPA</i>	The agreement facilitates the involvement of South Korea in CSDP missions and operations.
	25	<i>Poroshenko Ukraine's new President</i>	Petro Poroshenko becomes President of Ukraine after securing an absolute majority of 55% in the first round of voting. No votes are cast in the city of Donetsk.
	27	<i>Obama to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan by 2016</i>	President Barack Obama says he will keep nearly 10,000 troops in Afghanistan in 2015, but will then withdraw virtually all of them by the end of 2016.
	28-29	<i>Sisi elected as Egypt's new President</i>	Egypt's former military chief Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi wins a landslide victory in a presidential election in which voting was extended for a third day due to low turnout.
June	2	<i>New Palestinian unity government with Hamas</i>	The Palestinian government announces a new 'government of national unity'. The reconciliation agreement brings an end to separate governing arrangements in Gaza and the West Bank.
	2	<i>Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation</i>	The EU implements the UN decision to designate Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation, condemning their unacceptable violent crimes and committing to support Nigeria in the fight against terrorism.
	3	<i>Disputed presidential election in Syria</i>	In Syria's presidential elections, Bashar al-Assad is re-elected for a third, seven-year term – securing about 89% of votes cast. President Obama and many other Western leaders denounce the election as illegitimate.
	11	<i>ISIS in control of Mosul</i>	ISIS takes control of Mosul, in northern Iraq, dealing the government an enormous and unexpected blow.
	20	<i>Implementation of report on the EU Internal Security Strategy</i>	The strategy aims to identify challenges to the EU's internal security in the context of today's security challenges across borders and identifies common principles and guidelines.
	24	<i>A New Deal for European Defence</i>	The EU agrees on a new deal for European Defence so as to promote a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector.

	Date	Title	Summary
	26	<i>US to train and equip Syrian moderate rebels</i>	President Obama ratchets up US efforts to strengthen more moderate Syrian rebels, proposing a \$500 million plan to train and arm them.
	27	<i>Ukraine's Association Agreement with EU</i>	Despite Russian objections, Ukraine's new president signs an Association Agreement with the EU, sealing the process that triggered the political turmoil of the previous seven months.
	30	<i>Unofficial referendum in Hong Kong</i>	A pro-democracy group in Hong Kong called Occupy Central holds an unofficial referendum on how the island's chief executive will be elected in 2017.
July	1	<i>Establishment of ISIS caliphate</i>	ISIS changes its name to the Islamic State (IS) and declares the territory in Iraq under its control a caliphate. Iraqi forces, under US guidance, prepare to hold Baghdad and the surrounding area.
	2-9	<i>Murders of Israeli and Palestinian teenagers</i>	Kidnappings and killings trigger tensions between Israelis and Palestinians, including riots in East Jerusalem and an exchange of rocket fire in Southern Israel and Gaza.
	10	<i>EU declaration on South Sudan</i>	The EU condemns the appalling human rights violations and crimes against humanity that have taken place in South Sudan since the start of the conflict in December 2013.
	15	<i>Juncker appointed Commission President</i>	The European Parliament votes Jean Claude Juncker in as new President of the European Commission by 422 votes to 250.
	16-29	<i>New US and EU sanctions against Russia</i>	President Obama announces new sanctions against Russia due to heightened confrontation along the Ukrainian border. The EU introduces restrictive measures against capital markets, the defence sector and the oil industry.
	17	<i>Passenger jet crash in Eastern Ukraine</i>	A Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777, en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, is shot down in eastern Ukraine near the Russian border, killing all 298 passengers and crew members.
	22	<i>EU mission to advise on civilian security sector reform in Ukraine</i>	The European Council establishes the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM), a civilian mission under the EU's CSDP.
	22	<i>EUCAP Sahel Niger extension</i>	The mandate of EUCAP Sahel Niger is extended until 16 July 2016

	Date	Title	Summary
	29	<i>Nuclear treaty violation</i>	The US accuses Russia of violating the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, an agreement banning medium-range missiles.
August	5	<i>EU and Colombia FPA</i>	The agreement provides a legal basis for the participation of Colombia in EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations.
	8	<i>US airstrikes on ISIS</i>	President Obama announces that he has authorised limited airstrikes on ISIS as well as the dropping of humanitarian supplies.
	10-11	<i>Israel-Hamas ceasefire</i>	A temporary 72-hour ceasefire mediated by Egypt begins. Israel withdraws its forces from the Gaza Strip. Both Hamas and Israel agree to peace talks mediated by Egypt.
	14	<i>Resignation of Iraqi PM</i>	Nouri al-Maliki resigns as Iraqi Prime Minister, ending a political deadlock as the country battles a Sunni insurgency.
	15	<i>Council conclusions on the Ebola crisis</i>	The European Union committed €11.9 million through ECHO and provided additional bilateral support to the West African countries hit by Ebola.
	26	<i>Israel-Hamas ceasefire</i>	Israel and Hamas agree long-term truce after seven weeks of fighting that led to the death of more than 2,200 people in Gaza.
	27	<i>Statement on the Gaza ceasefire</i>	The EU welcomes the ceasefire agreement in Gaza that brings a provisional end to the suffering and loss of life, particularly among civilians.
	30	<i>China against democratic elections in Hong Kong</i>	The Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress rule that from 2017 onwards, a small 'nominating committee' will put forward only 2-3 candidates for the position of Hong Kong Chief Executive. The decision sparks protests that will continue to grow and intensify in the following weeks.
	30	<i>Appointment of Donald Tusk and Federica Mogherini to key EU posts</i>	The European Council appoints Donald Tusk as President of the European Council, and Federica Mogherini as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
September	1	<i>Influx of refugees fleeing IS into Turkey</i>	About 130,000 mostly Kurdish refugees from north-central Syria flood into Turkey as IS militants seize large swathes of territory and attack the population.
	2	<i>Houthi coup in Yemen</i>	After gaining wide support from both Shia and Sunnis, the Houthis enter the Yemeni capital. Fighting breaks out between the rebels and security forces in Sana'a days later – continuing until the Houthis take control of the capital.

	Date	Title	Summary
	5	<i>Ceasefire in Ukraine</i>	The Ukrainian government and pro-Russian separatists agree a ceasefire in the presence of officials from Russia and the OSCE.
	10	<i>US airstrikes in Syria</i>	President Obama authorises airstrikes inside Syria for the first time, along with expanded strikes in Iraq as part of a 'steady, relentless effort' to root out ISIS.
	16	<i>Deployment of US troops to fight Ebola in West Africa</i>	President Barack Obama declares that the Ebola epidemic in West Africa could threaten security around the world and orders 3,000 US troops to the region in an emergency aid effort to contain the crisis.
	17	<i>EU response to the Ebola crisis</i>	The EU Commissioner for international cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response lays out EU strategy to respond to the Ebola crisis.
	21	<i>Ashraf Ghani as Afghan president</i>	Ashraf Ghani is appointed Afghan President after signing a power-sharing agreement with his former opponent Abdullah Abdullah.
	22	<i>US and Arab airstrikes against IS</i>	The United States and five Arab nations launch coordinated airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria.
	25	<i>Turkey in coalition against IS</i>	Turkey joins its NATO allies and fellow Sunni Muslim countries in a coalition against the Islamic State after concerted pressure from US and Arab officials.
	25	<i>EUSEC RD Congo extension</i>	The Council extends the mandate of the EU mission to provide advice and assistance for Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) until 30 June 2015.
	29	<i>EU statement on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement</i>	The Council and the Commission welcome the ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.
	30	<i>US-Afghanistan security pact</i>	US and Afghan officials sign a long-delayed security pact to keep nearly 10,000 American forces in Afghanistan beyond the planned final withdrawal.
October	2	<i>Hong Kong leader's refusal to step down</i>	Hong Kong's embattled leader, Leung Chun-Ying, rejects demands by pro-democracy protesters that he step down, instead proposing talks to defuse a week of massive demonstrations.
	10	<i>Council conclusions on migratory flows</i>	The informal meeting of EU Ministers agrees to better manage migration flows by acting in concert with third countries, reinforcing external borders and taking more action at member-state level.

	Date	Title	Summary
	14	<i>US airstrikes on Kobani</i>	The US launches airstrikes on Kobani (Syria) in an effort to prevent ISIS from taking over the strategically-located Kurdish town.
	20	<i>Council conclusions on ISIL-Da'esh crisis in Syria and Iraq</i>	The EU expresses serious concern about the humanitarian and security situation in Syria and Iraq unreservedly condemns the attacks, atrocities, killings and human rights abuses perpetrated by ISIS.
	22	<i>New European Commission</i>	The European Parliament approves the new college of 27 Commissioners whose mandate starts on 1 November.
	25	<i>EU deal to cap greenhouse emissions</i>	The EU reaches a deal to cap its greenhouse gas emissions in an effort to increase pressure on the rest of the world to reach an accord on climate protection in 2015.
	31	<i>Blaise Compaoré's resignation in Burkina Faso</i>	The president of Burkina Faso steps down after protesters storm parliament and set the building ablaze, ending the 27-year rule of one of Africa's longest serving leaders.
November	7	<i>Expansion of US mission in Iraq</i>	President Obama authorises a broad expansion of the US military mission in Iraq that boosts the number of American troops to around 3,100
	7	<i>EU CAR extension</i>	The Council extends the EU military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) until 15 March 2015.
	18	<i>Council conclusions on CSDP</i>	The Council reiterates the urgent need to enable the EU and its Member States to assume increased responsibilities to act as a security provider, at the international level and in particular in its neighbourhood.
	18	<i>EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework</i>	The Council adopts the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework to support the development of Member States' cyber defence capabilities related to CSDP.
	21	<i>EU counter-piracy operation until end of 2016</i>	The Council of the European Union extends the EU's counter-piracy Operation <i>Atalanta</i> by two more years, until December 2016.
	24	<i>Postponement of deadline for P5+1 agreement</i>	A year-long effort to seal a nuclear deal with Iran risks fizzling out, prompting the P5+1 to agree to a seven-month postponement of the initial deadline.
December	2	<i>Early elections in Israel</i>	Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu fires two senior Cabinet ministers and calls for early elections, to be held in March 2015.
	4	<i>Council decision on sanctions against Russia</i>	The EU adopts clarifications on its sanctions against Russia, amending the definition of various terms used in Regulation 833/2014.

Date	Title	Summary
5	<i>Catherine Ashton as Special Advisor for Iran talks</i>	EU HR/VP Mogherini asks Catherine Ashton to stay on as chief negotiator of the P5+1 in nuclear talks with Iran.
9	<i>US Senate investigation on use of torture</i>	The US Senate Intelligence Committee releases a long-awaited report on CIA torture, which reveals that detainees were treated more brutally than previously thought. Their torture did not yield reliable intelligence, the Committee found.
9	<i>33rd EU-China Dialogue on Human Rights</i>	The Dialogue allows the EU and China to exchange views on human rights, with particular focus on the rights of minorities and migrants in China.
14	<i>End of Hong Kong protests</i>	In a move that signals the end of the protests in Hong Kong, police clear tents from the main protest area, ten weeks after the protests started.
16	<i>EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) - Action Plan</i>	This Action Plan puts the European Union Maritime Security Strategy into practice. It is based upon the four principles of cross-sectoral approach, functional integrity, respect for rules and principles, and maritime multilateralism.
20	<i>US-Cuba talks to normalise relations</i>	President Barack Obama announces that he will begin working with Cuba on resuming full diplomatic relations between the two countries for the first time since 1961.
30	<i>Palestinian State resolution at UN Security Council</i>	A draft resolution calling on Israel and Palestine to reach a negotiated solution to their conflict within one year fails to pass the UN Security Council.



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Fact Sheet

Q&A's for a European Union Maritime Security Strategy

Q: Why is the Commission and the High Representative proposing only elements for a strategy?

A: One of the objectives of this process is to ensure that the Member States are fully involved in the development of this strategy. A European Union maritime security strategy cannot be developed without the involvement of Member States since many operational activities are carried out by national authorities. The Commission and the High Representative are therefore looking forward to working closely with Member States in order to deliver a full-fledged strategy. We are confident that the strategy once adopted will represent the views and interests of all stakeholders.

Q: How have Member States been involved so far?

A: The Member States already have provided substantial input through events organised at EU level and through various written contributions. Additionally, the Commission and the European External Action Service organised a stakeholder consultation in June 2013, where Member States expressed their support to the general approach. The intention is that the Joint Communication will serve as a basis for further work on shaping the strategy together with the Member States in the EU Council under the leadership of the Hellenic Presidency.

Q: What would be the purpose of such a strategy?

A: The purpose of an EU Maritime Security Strategy would be to provide a common framework for relevant authorities at national and European levels to develop further their specific policies. The aim of such a strategy would be to protect the EU's strategic maritime interests and identify options to do so. Such a framework would provide the context and ensure coherence amongst different sector specific maritime policies and strategies. Most importantly it would significantly strengthen the link between internal and external security aspects of the maritime policy of the EU and civil and military cooperation.

Q: What are the main aims?

A: The main aims of an EU Maritime Security Strategy should be: (1) to identify and articulate the main strategic maritime interests of the EU; (2) to identify and articulate the maritime threats, challenges and risks to the strategic maritime interests of the EU; and (3) to organise the response, i.e. provide the common policy objectives,

common principles and areas of common support as the backbone of the joint strategic framework in order to create coherence for the diverse and wide array of sector-specific maritime policies and strategies.

Q: Does the EU only have maritime interests or does it also have a maritime responsibility?

A: It is crucial to identify the strategic maritime interests of the European Union. The global maritime domain is of vital importance to the EU and it is multi-layered. It is a crucial domain for free commerce and trade. In addition, seas and oceans are interrelated eco-systems; it is a source of resources; open seas and coastal areas are zones for tourism etc. The EU is a global actor therefore it does not only have interests, it also has to take adequate responsibility. This global responsibility has to be transformed into concrete and specific actions and to promote the respect for international law, human rights and democracy, and rules-based good governance at sea.

Q: What does the term “cross-sectoral” mean?

A: The term ‘cross-sectoral’ refers to actions or cooperation between different marine or maritime functions. They are still largely organised in isolation of each other and often along national lines. Modern maritime risks and threats are multifaceted and can have implications for all of these sectors involving different policies and instruments. The responses therefore should be adequately integrated and cross-sectoral in their nature. It means finding a common maritime security interest among different functions and aspects concerned.

Q: What are the sectors addressed?

A: Some of the most evident sectors are maritime safety, maritime transport, marine environment protection, fisheries control, customs, border control, law enforcement, defence, research and development and others. A ‘joined up’ approach to maritime policy, making these sectors work better together, can make the security policy more coherent, effective and cost efficient.

Q: What is the added value of this strategy – what will change compared to the current situation?

A: The added value of a shared strategic framework is that it provides the necessary basis to ensure coherent actions and policy development. It also facilitates the coordination of all efforts and ensures that different policies are ‘joined up’. The ambition is that the EU can become more resilient in addressing threats and risks in the maritime domain and as such it would be more capable at safeguarding its values, strategic maritime interests and promoting multilateral cooperation and maritime governance. In essence, the result of the strategy would be that maritime security activities would be much more coordinated than today. Different policy frameworks have resulted in the European Security Strategy (ESS - 2003) and the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP - 2007), which have been developing separately. Also sector-specific legislation is already in place like the maritime transport security legislation - Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security and Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port security, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) improving the situational awareness and reaction capability of Member States and of the EU Border Agency Frontex at the external borders - Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013), SafeSeaNet, a Union maritime traffic monitoring and information system for EU waters, managed by EU Maritime Transport agency EMSA, or the 3rd Maritime Safety Package.

Q: How will the actions, identified in this strategy, be put in practice?

This depends to a large extent on the opinion of the Member States since many of them would fall under their competence, but already existing examples with joint deployment plans and enhanced information exchange systems can eventually lead to the use of common platforms for surveillance operations. This aspect will however need to be discussed in detail with Member States.

Q: Will such a strategy promote deployment of more naval missions similar to EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA?

A: The use of all possible tools and instruments should be considered when addressing a maritime insecurity situation. Each case requires a full evaluation of the situation in order to identify the best action. In the case of the piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, which gravely endanger shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden, the deployment of international naval forces was deemed necessary as local capacities to ensure maritime security were not available.

Q: Why is such an initiative taken now?

A: Already on 26 April 2010 the Council invited the High Representative, together with the Commission and Member States ‘to undertake work with a view to preparing options for the possible elaboration of a Security Strategy for the global maritime domain’. More recently in December, 2013, the European Council called for “an EU Maritime Security Strategy by June 2014, on the basis of a Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative, taking into account the opinions of the Member States”. This is the direct response to these requests.

Q: What are the next steps?

A: Based on the elements proposed by the Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative, an EU Maritime Security Strategy should be elaborated within the appropriate EU Council bodies and be adopted not later than in June 2014.

COUNCIL DECISION 2014/415/EU**on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause**

24 June 2014

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the first sentence of Article 222(3) thereof,

Having regard to the joint proposal of the European Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

1. This Decision concerns the implementation by the Union of Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) ('the solidarity clause'). It does not concern the implementation by Member States of the solidarity clause pursuant to Article 222(2) TFEU. According to Declaration (No 37) on Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a Member State can choose the most appropriate means to comply with its own solidarity obligation towards another Member State.
2. Pursuant to Article 222(1) TFEU, the Union and the Member States are to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. Coherence and complementarity of Union and Member States' action should be sought, to the benefit of any Member State invoking the solidarity clause and to avoid duplication of efforts. Given that Member States are to coordinate between themselves in the Council in order to comply with their own solidarity obligations pursuant to Article 222(2) TFEU, it is appropriate to have arrangements for coordination in the Council in respect of the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause.
3. Arrangements for coordination in the Council should rely on the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) Arrangements, approved by the Council on 25 June 2013, which state that the IPCR is also to support the arrangements for the implementation of the solidarity clause. It is appropriate that the Council adapts the IPCR arrangements, in particular in the case of a review.
4. The implementation of the solidarity clause by the Union should rely on existing instruments to the extent possible, should increase effectiveness by enhancing coordination and avoiding duplication, should function on the basis of no additional resources, should provide a simple and clear interface at Union level to Member States, and should respect the competences conferred upon each Union institution and service.
5. The solidarity clause calls for the Union to mobilise all the instruments at its disposal. Relevant instruments include the European Union Internal Security Strategy, the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism established by Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and the Council¹ ('the Union Mechanism'), Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council² and the structures developed in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
6. The scope of the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause should be clearly defined.
7. As regards the fight against terrorism, the strategic framework for Union action is the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Various instruments are in place, such as instruments strengthening the protection of critical infrastructures in energy and transport.³ Actions have also been taken following the Commission's Communication entitled 'The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy:

1. Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 924).

2. Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC (OJ L 293, 5.11.2013, p. 1).

3. As identified in Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (OJ L 345, 23.12.2008, p. 75).

main achievements and future challenges', for instance actions enhancing the cooperation between law enforcement authorities, reinforcing the prevention of radicalisation, in particular through the setting up of the Radicalisation Awareness Network, and limiting the access of terrorists to funds as well as to explosives⁴ and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials, as well as actions enhancing the security of explosives.

8. An invocation mechanism and a phasing-out mechanism for the arrangements under this Decision should be defined at Union level, based on a high-level political request from the Member State concerned and supported by a single entry point at Union level.
9. Response arrangements at Union level should improve effectiveness through strengthened coordination, building on existing instruments.
10. The Union Mechanism aims to strengthen cooperation between the Member States and the Union and to facilitate coordination in the field of civil protection. Decision No 1313/2013/EU established the Emergency Response Co ordination Centre (the 'ERCC') that is to ensure 24/7 operational capacity and serve the Member States and the Commission in pursuit of the objectives of the Union Mechanism.
11. The European External Action Service (EEAS) has at its disposal structures with intelligence and military expertise, as well as the network of Delegations that may also contribute in the response to threats or disasters in the terri tory of Member States or to crises having an external dimension. Depending on the crisis, other structures and Union agencies in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the CSDP should provide, as appropriate, contributions in line with relevant provisions of Union law.
12. Where necessary and practicable in view of urgency, the response arrangements at Union level should be complemented by the adoption of legal acts or the amendment of existing acts in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties.
13. This Decision will have no defence implications. In the event that a crisis requires CFSP or CSDP action, a decision should be taken by the Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties.
14. This Decision is without prejudice to Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union.
15. The Commission Communication entitled 'EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe' set the objective of increasing the Union's resilience to crises and disasters through a number of actions, including by making full use of the solidarity clause. As recalled by the Council in its Conclusions of 24 and 25 February 2011, increasing Europe's resilience to crises and disasters is crucial in further strengthening freedom, security and justice in the Union.
16. The European Council is to regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action. Upon request from the European Council, reports on specified threats should be produced.
17. In accordance with point (a) of Article 346(1) TFEU, no Member State is to be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security.

4. Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors (OJ L 39, 9.2.2013, p. 1).

18. On 22 November 2012, the European Parliament adopted resolution 2012/2223, entitled 'EU's mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and operational dimensions'.
19. This Decision respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and it should be applied in accordance with those rights and principles.
20. Since the objective of this Decision, namely implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

General objective and subject matter

1. This Decision lays down rules and procedures for the implementation by the Union of Article 222 TFEU ('the solidarity clause').
2. In order to ensure coherence and complementarity of Union and Member State action, coordination at political level of the response to the invocation of the solidarity clause shall be carried out by the Council, using the IPCR arrangements. Support to the operation of the IPCR arrangements shall be provided by the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), the Commission and the EEAS.
3. Arrangements at Union level shall be based upon existing mechanisms in the Council, the Commission, the EEAS and Union agencies to provide information and support. Where relevant, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the EEAS shall contribute by taking initiatives and providing relevant information and support within the HR's area of competence.
4. Relevant Union instruments and the IPCR arrangements shall follow their own procedures and may be active before the invocation and after the phasing out of the response under this Decision.
5. The arrangements pursuant to this Decision shall improve efficiency through enhanced coordination between Union and Member State responses.

Article 2

Scope

1. In the event of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, irrespective of whether it originates inside or outside the territory of the Member States, this Decision shall apply:
 - a. within the territory of Member States to which the Treaties apply, meaning land area, internal waters, territorial sea and airspace;
 - b. when affecting infrastructure (such as off-shore oil and gas installations) situated in the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf of a Member State.

When having recourse to the arrangements under this Decision, and notably when mobilising the instruments at its disposal, the Union shall be bound by international law and shall not encroach upon the rights of non-Member States.

2. This Decision has no defence implications.

Article 3

Definitions

For the purposes of this Decision, the following definitions apply:

- a. 'disaster' means any situation which has or may have a severe impact on people, the environment or property, including cultural heritage;
- b. 'terrorist attack' means a terrorist offence as defined in Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA⁵;
- c. 'crisis' means a disaster or terrorist attack of such a wide-ranging impact or political significance that it requires timely policy coordination and response at Union political level;
- d. 'response' means any action taken in the event of a disaster or a terrorist attack to address its immediate adverse consequences.

Article 4

Invocation of the solidarity clause

1. In the event of a disaster or terrorist attack, the affected Member State may invoke the solidarity clause if, after having exploited the possibilities offered by existing means and tools at national and Union level, it considers that the crisis clearly overwhelms the response capabilities available to it.
2. The political authorities of the affected Member State shall address their invocation to the Presidency of the Council. The invocation shall also be addressed to the President of the European Commission through the ERCC.

Article 5

Response arrangements at Union level

1. Once the solidarity clause has been invoked, the Council shall ensure the political and strategic direction of the Union response to the invocation of the solidarity clause, taking full account of the Commission's and the HR's competences. To that end, the Presidency of the Council shall activate the IPCR arrangements immediately if not already in use, and thus inform all Member States of the solidarity clause invocation.
2. At the same time, and in accordance with Article 1(3), the Commission and the HR shall:
 - a. identify all relevant Union instruments that can best contribute to the response to the crisis, including sector-specific, operational, policy or financial instruments and structures and take all necessary measures provided under those instruments;
 - b. identify military capabilities that can best contribute to the response to the crisis with the support of the EU Military Staff;
 - c. identify and propose the use of instruments and resources falling within the remit of Union agencies that can best contribute to the response to the crisis;

5. Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (OJ L 164, 22.6.2002, p. 3).

- d. advise the Council on whether existing instruments are sufficient means to assist the affected Member State following the invocation of the solidarity clause;
 - e. produce regular integrated situational awareness and analysis reports to inform and support the coordination and decision-making at political level in the Council, in accordance with Article 6 of this Decision.
3. Where appropriate, and in accordance with Article 1(3), the Commission and the HR shall submit proposals to the Council, in particular concerning:
 - a. decisions on exceptional measures not foreseen by existing instruments;
 - b. requests for military capabilities going beyond the existing arrangements on civil protection; or
 - c. measures in support of a swift response by Member States.
 4. Making use of the IPCR arrangements, the Presidency of the Council shall ensure coherence of the handling in the Council and of the overall response at Union political level, including as concerns the development and update of proposals for action, while respecting the right of initiative of the Commission and HR within their areas of competence. In doing so, the Presidency shall be supported and advised by the GSC, the Commission and the EEAS, and, in the event of terrorist attacks, by the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator. Depending on the crisis, structures and Union agencies in the field of CFSP/CSDP shall provide, as appropriate, contributions in line with the relevant provisions of Union law.
 5. The Presidency of the Council will inform the President of the European Council and the President of the European Parliament of the invocation of the solidarity clause and of any major developments.
 6. Upon invocation of the solidarity clause, the ERCC shall act as the central 24/7 contact point at Union level with Member States' competent authorities and other stakeholders, without prejudice to existing responsibilities within the Commission and the HR and to existing information networks. The ERCC will facilitate the production of Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA) reports, in collaboration with the EU Situation Room and other Union crisis centres, in accordance with Article 6 of this Decision.

Article 6

Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis reports

ISAA reports shall be tailored to the needs of the Union political level as defined by the Presidency of the Council, and shall allow for a strategic overview of the situation within the Council, in accordance with the IPCR arrangements. Such reports shall bring together validated contributions voluntarily made available by Member States, the Commission, the EEAS and by the relevant Union agencies, as well as by relevant international organisations. In the event of an invocation regarding a terrorist attack, intelligence assessments and briefings shall be handled separately through existing channels.

Article 7

Phasing out

The phasing out of the response under this Decision shall follow the same procedure as that provided for in Article 4(2). The Member State having invoked the solidarity clause shall indicate as soon as it considers that there is no longer a need for the invocation to remain active.

*Article 8***Threat assessment at Union level**

1. In order to regularly assess the threats facing the Union, the European Council may request the Commission, the HR and Union agencies, where relevant, to produce reports on specified threats.
2. Unless otherwise stipulated by the European Council, any such reports shall be based solely on available assessments of threats compiled by relevant Union institutions, bodies and agencies under existing arrangements, and on information provided voluntarily by the Member States, while avoiding duplication of efforts. The EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator shall be associated with the preparation of such reports where relevant. In accordance with point (a) of Article 346(1) TFEU, no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security.

*Article 9***Review**

1. The arrangements under this Decision shall be reviewed periodically according to identified needs, and in any event within 12 months following the termination of the invocation to ensure that relevant lessons are identified and addressed. This review shall be carried out in the Council on the basis of a joint report prepared by the Commission and the HR.
2. Where appropriate, this Decision may be revised. In such cases, and in accordance with Article 222(3) TFEU, the Council shall be assisted by the Political and Security Committee and the Standing Committee on Operational Co operation on Internal Security.
3. Where appropriate, the Council may adapt the IPCR arrangements, in particular to address needs identified by the Council in the context of a review or following a revision of this Decision.

*Article 10***Financial Implications**

Any financial resources necessary for the implementation of this Decision shall be mobilised within the agreed annual expenditure limits and in accordance with the scope of existing Union instruments, while respecting the yearly multi annual financial framework ceilings.

*Article 11***Entry into force**

This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 June 2014.

For the Council
The President
E. VENIZELOS

European Union Maritime Security Strategy

Council of the European Union

Brussels, 24 June 2014 (OR. en), 11205/14

I. Context

Sea matters.

The Sea is a valuable source of growth and prosperity for the European Union and its citizens. The EU depends on open, protected and secure seas and oceans for economic development, free trade, transport, energy security, tourism and good status of the marine environment.

The major part of both the EU's external and internal trade is transported by sea. The EU is the third largest importer and the fifth global producer of fisheries and aquaculture. More than 70% of the external borders of the Union are maritime and hundreds of millions of passengers pass through its ports each year. Europe's energy security largely depends on maritime transport and infrastructures. The important increase of the EU Member States' fleets and the adequate port infrastructures (e.g. LNG facilities) contributes to a well-functioning energy market and security of supply and hence the well-being of European citizens and the European economy as a whole.

The EU and its Member States have, thus, strategic interests, across the global maritime domain, in identifying and addressing security challenges linked to the sea and sea borders management. European citizens expect effective and cost-efficient responses to the protection of the maritime domain, including borders, ports and offshore installations, in order to secure sea borne trade, address potential threats from unlawful and illicit activities at sea, as well as to make optimal use of the sea's potential for growth and jobs, whilst safeguarding the marine environment.

The European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) covers both the internal and external aspects of the Union's maritime security. It serves as a comprehensive framework, contributing to a stable and secure global maritime domain, in accordance with the European Security Strategy (ESS), while ensuring coherence with EU policies, in particular the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), and the Internal Security Strategy (ISS).

The Strategy has been adopted through a comprehensive and coordinated process whose major milestones are the Council Conclusions of 26 April 2010, the Council Conclusions on integration of Maritime Surveillance of 23 May 2011, the Limassol Declaration of 7 October 2012, the European Council Conclusions of December 2013 and the Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative of 6 March 2014.

II. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

A shared unity of purpose and effort by all involved is necessary to achieve coherence between sector-specific, EU and national policies and to enable all relevant authorities to operate effectively together. By strengthening cooperation between different sectors, Union bodies and national authorities, the EU and its Member States can

achieve more, act more quickly and save resources, thus enhancing the EU's response to risks and threats in the maritime domain.

Based on the EU's founding values of human rights, freedom and democracy, the purpose of this Strategy is to secure the maritime security interests of the EU and its Member States against a plethora of risks and threats in the global maritime domain. This is achieved in a cross-sectoral, comprehensive, coherent and cost-efficient way, in conformity with existing treaties, national and EU legislation and international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other relevant conventions and instruments.

Maritime security is understood as a state of affairs of the global maritime domain, in which international law and national law are enforced, freedom of navigation is guaranteed and citizens, infrastructure, transport, the environment and marine resources are protected.

This Strategy provides the political and strategic framework so as to effectively and comprehensively address maritime security challenges through the employment of all relevant instruments at international, EU and national level. It facilitates improved cross-sectoral cooperation within, between and across civilian and military authorities and actors. It contributes to the full use of the growth potential in the maritime domain, in line with existing legislation, the principle of subsidiarity and the supported/supporting relationship. It also aims to foster mutual support between Member States and to allow for joint security contingency planning, risk management, conflict prevention and crisis response and management.

The Strategy covers the global maritime domain. The network of shipping lanes between continents is of particular importance, as well as some maritime areas because of their strategic value or potential risk for crisis or instability. Therefore, the EU should seek to strengthen and support its regional responses to maritime security. The principles enshrined and the objectives identified in this Strategy should be embedded in the implementation of existing and future regional EU strategies, such as those for the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.

This Strategy takes particular regard of each of the European sea and subsea basins, namely the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the North Sea, as well as of the Arctic waters, the Atlantic Ocean and the outermost regions.

III. PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

The Strategy is based on the following guiding principles:

- a. Cross-sectoral approach:* all partners from civilian and military authorities and actors (law enforcement, border control, customs and fisheries inspection, environmental authorities, maritime administration, research and innovation, navies or other maritime forces, coast guards, intelligence agencies), as well as EU agencies, to industry (shipping, security, communication, capability support) need to cooperate better, respecting each other's internal organisation;
- b. Functional integrity:* the Strategy does not affect the respective competences of the Union and its Member States in the areas covered. It is also without prejudice to the competences, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Member States over maritime zones in accordance with relevant international law, including UNCLOS. The mandates, responsibilities and interests of Member States need to be fully taken into account, building upon existing policies and instruments and making best use of existing capabilities at national and European level, while avoiding to create new structures, legislation, additional administrative burden, as well as the requirement for additional funding;

- c. **Respect for rules and principles:** respect for international law, human rights and democracy and full compliance with UNCLOS, the applicable bilateral treaties and the values enshrined therein are the cornerstones of this Strategy and key principles for rules-based good governance at sea. The EU and its Member States support the settlement of maritime disputes arising from the interpretation and application of UNCLOS through competent international courts and tribunals provided therein, which play an important role in implementing the rule of law at sea;
- d. **Maritime multilateralism:** while respecting the institutional framework and the decision-making autonomy of the EU, cooperation with all relevant international partners and organisations, in particular the United Nations and NATO, and coordination with existing international and regional fora in the maritime domain are essential.

With a view to ensuring a comprehensive, cross-sectoral, cross-border, coherent and cost-efficient approach to maritime security, this Strategy aims to:

- a. Bring together both internal and external aspects of the Union's maritime security and promote a broad approach in dealing with maritime security challenges and maritime interests;
- b. Promote rules-based good governance at sea, in waters under the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Member States and on the high seas;
- c. Establish a better and lasting coordination of projects and activities of all relevant actors on European, regional and national level and make best use of relevant EU macro-regional strategies, when applicable;
- d. Promote the international level playing field and competitiveness of Member States;
- e. Enhance the growth and jobs potential of the seas as set out in the EU's growth strategy - Europe 2020;
- f. Contribute to security at sea and help secure the Union's maritime external borders;
- g. Promote regional security in each maritime basin at the external borders of the EU, in a manner consistent with each region's particularities;
- h. Promote coordination and the development of further synergies with and amongst Member States, including at regional level, and cooperation with regional and international partners and organisations;
- i. Enhance solidarity among Member States and foster mutual support when dealing with maritime security challenges;
- j. Promote enhanced common situational awareness and better sharing of information, operational concepts, *modi operandi* and experience, taking into account not only the need to know but also the need to share, thus anticipating threats, following a comprehensive approach;
- k. Enhance the role of the EU as a global actor and security provider, taking on its responsibilities in conflict prevention and crisis response and management in the areas of interest, at sea and from the sea, and achieving stability and peace through comprehensive and long-term EU action.

IV. MARITIME SECURITY INTERESTS

The strategic maritime security interests of the EU and its Member States are:

- a. The security of the EU, its Member States and their citizens;

- b. The preservation of peace in line with the Charter of the United Nations, the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes in accordance with international law, the prevention of conflicts and the strengthening of international security, including through EU engagement with international partners, without prejudice to national competences. This promotes international maritime cooperation and the rule of law and facilitates maritime trade and sustainable growth and development;
- c. The protection against maritime security risks and threats, including the protection of critical maritime infrastructure, such as specific areas in ports and port facilities, off-shore installations, energy supply by the sea, underwater pipelines, seabed cables, as well as the promotion of scientific research and innovation projects;
- d. The preservation of freedom of navigation, the protection of the global EU supply chain and of maritime trade, the right of innocent and transit passage of ships and the security of their crew and passengers;
- e. The protection of economic interests, including the safeguarding of maritime energy resources, the sustainable exploitation of natural and marine resources in the different maritime zones and the high seas, the control of illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing, the security of Member States' fishing fleets and the delimitation of maritime zones, such as the exclusive economic zone, which presents a potential for growth and jobs;
- f. The promotion and development of common and validated maritime situational awareness;
- g. The effective management of the Union's maritime external borders and maritime areas of EU interest in order to prevent and counter cross-border illegal activities;
- h. The protection of the environment and the management of the impact of climate change in maritime areas and coastal regions, as well as the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity to avoid future security risks.

V. MARITIME SECURITY RISKS AND THREATS

Maritime security threats are multifaceted, pose a potential risk to European citizens and can be detrimental to the EU's and its Member States' strategic interests. The following risks and threats have been identified:

- a. Threats or use of force against Member States' rights and jurisdiction over their maritime zones;
- b. Threats to the security of European citizens and to economic interests at sea following acts of external aggression including those related to maritime disputes, threats to Member States' sovereign rights or armed conflicts;
- c. Cross-border and organized crime, including maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking of human beings and smuggling of migrants, organised criminal networks facilitating illegal migration, trafficking of arms and narcotics, smuggling of goods and contraband;
- d. Terrorism and other intentional unlawful acts at sea and in ports against ships, cargo, crew and passengers, ports and port facilities and critical maritime and energy infrastructure, including cyber-attacks;
- e. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats;

- f. Threats to freedom of navigation, such as the denial of access to the sea and straits and the obstruction of sea lanes;
- g. Environmental risks, including unsustainable and unauthorized exploitation of natural and marine resources, threats to biodiversity, IUU fishing, environmental degradation due to illegal or accidental discharge, chemical, biological and nuclear pollution, in particular sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnance;
- h. Potential security impact of natural or man-made disasters, extreme events and climate change on the maritime transport system and in particular on maritime infrastructure;
- i. Illegal and unregulated archaeological research and pillage of archaeological objects.

VI. STRENGTHENING THE EU RESPONSE

Building on the aforementioned objectives and principles and taking into account existing achievements, the following five main areas of implementation to strengthen the EU response have been identified.

1. External action

The Union actively contributes to strengthening security of the maritime domain by preventing and responding to maritime risks and threats and by stabilisation through its unique ability to combine, in a coherent and consistent manner, a wide array of policies and tools, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Union stresses the importance of its assuming increased responsibilities as a global security provider, at the international level and in particular in its neighbourhood, thereby also enhancing its own security and its role as a strategic global actor. The Union can thereby capitalise on the best practices of internal and external policies related to maritime security aspects in order to promote better maritime governance.

The strength of the EU lies in the range of instruments at its disposal, including political dialogue with international, regional and bilateral partners, engagement in multilateral fora, development cooperation, human rights and justice, support for regional maritime capacity building and civilian and military CSDP actions. The EU Maritime Security Operations (MSO) Concept already provides options on how maritime forces can contribute to deterring, preventing and countering unlawful activities. The Union's engagement with international partners contributes to the promotion of rules-based governance at sea.

Several factors, such as illegal activities of non-state actors, cross-border crime, international terrorism or piracy, exploit the weaknesses of fragmented local, regional and global maritime governance systems. Using all EU instruments within the comprehensive approach enables the EU to effectively address maritime security threats at and from the sea, tackle the root causes and restore good governance. A tailored EU response could draw, *inter alia*, on political and economic EU activities, as well as development cooperation, together with Security Sector Reform, regional maritime capacity building and maritime EU missions and operations.

Maritime aspects of the Union's security should be taken into account when assessing changes in the global security environment and should be reflected in the future report on the challenges and opportunities for the Union as tasked by the European Council in December 2013.

Member States are organised differently in safeguarding national and the EU's strategic maritime security interests and protecting against maritime security risks and threats. Some Member States use civilian authorities for surveillance and law enforcement, such as Coast Guards; others use Navies or other maritime forces; others

share responsibility between civilian and military administrations. Cooperation at sea between all actors involved has a positive spill-over in other policy areas.

Member States' Armed Forces should play a strategic role at sea and from the sea and provide global reach, flexibility and access that enable the EU and its Member States to contribute to the full spectrum of maritime responsibilities. Their sustained presence needs to support freedom of navigation and contributes to good governance by deterring, preventing and countering unlawful and illicit activities within the global maritime domain. A key factor, in this regard, is the respect of the relevant international law, including the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state on the high seas, as well as the functional immunity of the personnel performing official duties at sea.

Different civil cooperation fora on law enforcement, border security, customs, fisheries and environmental issues are concrete examples of the interface between internal and external maritime security and have an important role in tackling maritime security threats, both at global and regional levels.

The EU should act autonomously and with international partners. Special attention should be given to the development of partnerships with international organisations. The Union's capacity to cooperate with the UN, NATO, regional partners like the African Union or ASEAN, as well as multilateral civil cooperation platforms, has a direct impact on its ability to safeguard its interests and to strengthen regional and international maritime security. In the context of crisis management, EU and NATO engagement in the maritime domain should remain complementary and coordinated, in accordance with the agreed framework of the partnership between the two organisations.

The objective is to promote better rules-based maritime governance and make effective use of the EU instruments at hand. In order to achieve that, actions need to focus on:

- a. Working towards a coordinated approach on maritime security issues in international fora, regional bodies and third countries;
- b. Enhancing the visibility of the EU in the global maritime domain;
- c. Strengthening the coherence between all EU civilian and military instruments and policies, the coordination between EU Services, including its agencies, and Member States involved, both at sea and on land, applying a pooling and sharing approach for the available resources, where appropriate, while respecting Member States' internal organisation and EU and national policies and legislation;
- d. Reinforcing the preparation for future maritime security contingencies and mainstreaming maritime security into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agenda, in close cooperation with all relevant EU actors, in line with the EU's comprehensive approach;
- e. The conduct of maritime security capacity building activities with third countries and regional organisations, in order to enhance their capacities in the fields of 1) maritime governance and rule of law, including criminal justice and maritime law enforcement; 2) port and maritime transport security to international agreed standards; 3) capabilities to manage their own borders; and 4) combating IUU fishing. Thereby existing international, EU and national export control regulations should be fully respected;
- f. Promoting the dispute settlement mechanisms according to the UNCLOS, including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in the political dialogues of the EU with third countries and regional organisations.

2. Maritime awareness, surveillance and information sharing

Access to timely and accurate information and intelligence is crucial for the establishment of a common maritime awareness picture which in turn leads to better operations and a more efficient use of scarce resources. Integration of different data sources in the maritime domain on the basis of existing national and international law is a key task, resulting in a better understanding of what is happening at sea. The more information is aggregated and integrated, the more complete is the maritime picture created and more value is delivered to the operational end-users, in a cost efficient way.

The objective is to ensure that maritime surveillance information collected by one maritime civilian or military authority and considered necessary for the operational activities of other authorities can be shared and subject to multiuse rather than collected and produced several times. The ultimate aim is to arrive at a common validated maritime awareness picture and to contribute to a more coordinated use of available space systems and remote sensing technologies and their derived applications and services. In order to achieve this objective, actions need to focus on:

- a. Further improving cross-sectoral cooperation and interoperability at national and EU level as regards integrated maritime surveillance within the framework of the respective Member State and EU authorities and responsibilities;
- b. Strengthening cross-border cooperation and information exchange to optimize the surveillance of the EU maritime area and its maritime borders;
- c. A consistent approach in supporting maritime surveillance in the EU and the global maritime domain and the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations;
- d. The development of the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE).

3. Capability development

In the field of capabilities, increased support to the development of dual-use technologies and cooperation in standardisation and certification are key enablers for European maritime capabilities, enhancing civil-military interoperability and industrial competitiveness, bearing in mind that military capabilities are owned and operated by Member States.

The objective is to develop necessary sustainable, interoperable and cost-effective capabilities through further engagement of public and private actors, including social partners, and building on existing achievements. In this respect, actions need to focus on:

- a. Promoting pooling and sharing initiatives and projects, as well as training and education, pursued by Member States including through EDA and other relevant civilian and military actors; good coordination and mutual reinforcement with NATO in order to ensure complementarity and increase coherence should continue;
- b. Identifying capability areas and technologies that could benefit from additional investment, improving harmonisation for better interoperability, standardisation and certification;
- c. The development of dual-use and multipurpose capabilities and the exploration of options for their better use;

- d. Making best use of and creating synergies between information, capabilities and systems managed by civilian and military authorities up to multipurpose and multinational missions;
- e. Promoting greater sharing of best practices, risk analysis and threat information, as well as training and education, amongst all relevant civilian and military fora such as the European Coast Guard Functions Forum and the Chiefs of European Navies, taking into account the maritime operational plans in force between Member States and the regional agreements in the EU.

4. Risk management, protection of critical maritime infrastructure and crisis response

The main objective remains to enhance capacity for conflict prevention and crisis response, prevention of conflicts and incidents, risk mitigation and the protection of the EU's marine environmental status, the security of the Union's external borders, as well as its critical maritime infrastructure. This objective depends on a high degree of preparation, anticipation and responsiveness. A set of interlocking actions is already in place, but the EU and its Member States can improve their responsiveness and resilience.

The EU and its Member States have significant capabilities in disaster relief and crisis response. In situations of maritime crises, such as natural and man-made disasters, the EU and its Member States will use all related instruments and capabilities on a global scale.

Unsustainable exploitation of marine and/or undersea resources is increasing the pressure on marine ecosystems and can lead to security risks. Maritime risk management and blue growth, based on environmentally sound management of marine ecosystems, should take this aspect into account.

Actions to achieve the above objectives need to focus on:

- a. Achieving a common risk analysis in order to develop a shared maritime security risk management and, where applicable, complement established international and EU maritime security risk analysis requirements;
- b. Enhancing cross-sectoral as well as cross border cooperation for maritime crisis response and planning on maritime security contingencies in relation to defined security threats, also taking into account the Council Decision on the arrangements for the implementation of the Solidarity Clause;
- c. Assessing the resilience of maritime transport infrastructure to natural and man-made disasters, including climate change, and take appropriate adaptive actions and share best practices in order to mitigate related risks;
- d. Promoting a mutual understanding to increase interoperability amongst maritime security actors.

5. Maritime security research and innovation, education and training

Innovative technologies and processes are contributing to the improved efficiency, sustainability and effectiveness of operations. Maritime security research would benefit from a clear vision of cross-sectoral needs and dual-use capabilities.

Research and knowledge development innovation, as well as education and training contribute to achieving the goals of this Strategy. The results of the EU Research Programmes should be better used in policy development and to achieve market uptake, exploiting also synergies with the programmes of Member States and the EU funding instruments, such as the European Structural and Investment Funds, and supporting the Blue Growth agenda.

The objective is to promote research and the development of innovative technologies that contribute to the improved efficiency and effectiveness of operations and information sharing, through coordinated and enhanced research and knowledge development. In order to achieve this objective, actions need to focus on:

- a. Bringing together available maritime security-related training opportunities in common Maritime Training Modules;
- b. Establishing a civil-military agenda for maritime security research including the development of dual-use and multipurpose capabilities;
- c. Establishing new and further developing existing networks for knowledge and competence development for civilian and military educational institutes, centres and academies;
- d. Creating a network of global research and development partners;
- e. Whereas research and innovation activities, such as under Horizon 2020, focus on civil applications, interaction with activities of EDA will be actively pursued in the field of maritime security;
- f. Promoting public-private partnerships;
- g. Promoting the conduct of inter-agency, joined-up exercises.

VII. FOLLOW-UP

The Council, Member States, Commission and High Representative have developed this Strategy in a joined-up manner. This has been an efficient way of working that should continue, including all relevant stakeholders and actors both at EU and national level.

This Strategy should be regularly reviewed in the Friends of the Presidency Group, which may request input, where appropriate, from other relevant Council working bodies, in order to assess progress and allow for revision thereof.

The Strategy should be complemented, by the end of 2014, by a rolling Action Plan with various work strands that delivers cross-sectoral actions in a comprehensive and coordinated manner, mainstreaming maritime security into EU policies. A progress assessment should also be included in the Action Plan. Regular reporting should be provided by the High Representative and the Commission on the basis of contributions of Member States.

The purpose of the Strategy and the Action Plan will be actively communicated to the public, both at the EU and national levels.

Special meeting of the European Council (30 August 2014)

Conclusions

Brussels, 30 August 2014, EUCO 163/14

I. THE NEXT INSTITUTIONAL CYCLE

1. In light of the consultations conducted by the President of the European Council, the European Council, in accordance with the Treaties, adopted the following decisions today:

2. The European Council elected Donald Tusk as President of the European Council for the period from 1 December 2014 to 31 May 2017.⁶ It requested the Secretary-General of the Council to assist the elected President of the European Council in the transition period.

3. The European Council appointed, with the agreement of the President-elect of the Commission, Federica Mogherini as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the period from the end of the current term of office of the Commission until 31 October 2019.⁷

4. The European Council invited the Council to adopt without delay, by common accord with the President-elect of the Commission, the list of other persons whom it will propose for appointment as members of the Commission.

5. The new Commission will be appointed by the European Council following a vote of consent by the European Parliament on the President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the other members of the Commission as a body.

6. The European Council welcomed the decision of the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union whose currency is the euro to appoint Donald Tusk as President of the Euro Summit for the period from 1 December 2014 to 31 May 2017.⁸

II. ECONOMIC ISSUES

7. Despite significant improvements in financial market conditions and the structural efforts made by Member States, the economic and employment situation in Europe raises significant concerns. In recent weeks economic data have confirmed that the recovery, particularly in the euro area, is weak, inflation exceptionally low and unemployment unacceptably high. In this context, the European Council recalls its conclusions of 27 June 2014 on the European Semester as well as its agreement on a Strategic Agenda with a strong focus on jobs, growth and competitiveness. The European Council calls for rapid progress on implementing these orientations. To this end, it asks the Council to assess the socio-economic situation and to start working on these issues without delay. The European Council also welcomes the intention of the Italian government to hold a conference in October at the level of Heads of State or Government on employment, especially youth employment, following those held in Berlin and Paris. In the autumn, the European Council will also address the economic situation and a dedicated Euro Summit will be convened.

6. European Council Decision electing the President of the European Council (EUCO 144/14).

7. European Council Decision appointing the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (EUCO 146/14).

8. Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union whose currency is the euro appointing the President of the Euro Summit (doc. 11949/14).

III. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

UKRAINE

8. Recalling the statements of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine of 6 March and 27 May and its conclusions of 21 March, 27 June and 16 July, the European Council remains extremely concerned by the ongoing and increasingly intense fighting in Eastern Ukraine and continues to strongly condemn the illegal annexation of Crimea. It condemns the increasing inflows of fighters and weapons from the territory of the Russian Federation into Eastern Ukraine as well as the aggression by Russian armed forces on Ukrainian soil. It calls upon the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw all its military assets and forces from Ukraine. The European Union reiterates the urgent need for a sustainable political solution based on respect for Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and independence.

9. The European Council underlines the importance of implementing President Poroshenko's peace plan without delay. The first step should consist of a mutually agreed and viable cease-fire, the re-establishment of Ukrainian control over its border, and an immediate halt to the flow of arms, material and military personnel from the Russian Federation into Ukraine, as well as the urgent release of all hostages held by the illegally armed groups as well as of the prisoners detained in the Russian Federation. Moreover, the European Council reiterates its call for immediate, safe and unrestricted access to the MH17 crash site as part of a cease-fire. The European Council expresses once more its support for the valuable efforts of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

10. The European Council welcomes the trilateral talks initiated between the European Union, Ukraine and the Russian Federation on practical issues with regard to the implementation of the Association Agreement/DCFTA and the talks on energy. The European Council calls on all parties to keep up the momentum in order to reach tangible results within the agreed timeframe. The European Council also calls on all parties to support and facilitate a stable and secure transport of energy sources, in particular gas.

11. The European Council calls on all parties to support and facilitate without delay the work of international humanitarian organisations, in accordance with international humanitarian law and principles. The humanitarian impact of the conflict on the civilian population should not be exploited for political or military ends. The European Council calls on all contributors, including the Russian Federation, to support the international relief effort led by the United Nations, in full recognition of the Ukrainian Government's role as a first responder.

12. The European Council remains engaged in the monitoring and assessment of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union and stands ready to take significant further steps, in light of the evolution of the situation on the ground. It requests the Commission to urgently undertake preparatory work, jointly with the EEAS, and present proposals for consideration within a week. It requests the Commission to include in its proposal a provision on the basis of which every person and institution dealing with the separatist groups in the Donbass will be listed.

13. The European Council welcomes the exceptional measures taken by the Commission to stabilise the EU agricultural and food markets in order to alleviate the effects of the Russian import restrictions on certain EU agricultural products. It invites the Commission to monitor the situation and to consider adopting any further measures, as appropriate.

IRAQ/SYRIA

14. The European Council is extremely dismayed by the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in Iraq and in Syria as a result of the occupation of parts of their territory by the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)”. The European Council is appalled by and firmly condemns the indiscriminate killings and human rights violations perpetrated by this and other terrorist organisations, in particular against Christian and other religious and ethnic minorities who should be part of a new, democratic Iraq and the most vulnerable groups. Those responsible for such crimes shall be held to account. The European Council underlines the importance of coordinated action by countries from the region to counter these threats. It urges all Iraqi leaders to form a truly inclusive government as a first political response to the present crisis, and stands ready to support the Government of Iraq in the pursuit of the necessary reforms.

15. Instability in Syria, caused by the Assad regime’s brutal war against its own people, has allowed ISIL to flourish. A lasting solution urgently requires a political transition in Syria.

16. The European Council calls on all sides to the conflict in Syria to respect the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and ensure the safety and freedom of movement of UN troops, including those from EU Member States, and condemns recent attacks on the Force and the detention of some of its members.

17. The European Council believes that the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the Islamist-extremist export of terrorism on which it is based, is a direct threat to the security of the European countries. The European Union is determined to contribute to countering the threat posed by ISIL and other terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, as called for by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2170. In this context, the European Council welcomes the efforts made by the US and other partners and the initiative of holding an international conference on security in Iraq. It supports the decision by individual Member States to provide military material to Iraq, including the Kurdish regional authorities. It requests the Council to consider a more effective use of the existing restrictive measures, in particular to deny ISIL the benefits of illicit oil sales or sales of other resources on international markets. It also remains committed to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected populations.

* * *

18. The European Council strongly believes that determined action is required to stem the flow of foreign fighters. It calls for the accelerated implementation of the package of EU measures in support of Member States efforts, as agreed by the Council since June 2013, in particular to prevent radicalisation and extremism, share information more effectively – including with relevant third countries, dissuade, detect and disrupt suspicious travel and investigate and prosecute foreign fighters. In this context, the European Council calls on the Council and the European Parliament to finalise work on the EU Passenger Name Record proposal before the end of the year.

The European Council also underlines the need for close cooperation with third countries to develop a coherent approach, including to strengthen border and aviation security and counter-terrorism capacity in the region.

The European Council requests the Council to review the effectiveness of the measures and to propose additional action, as required. The European Council will review this matter at its meeting in December.

GAZA

19. The European Council welcomes the cease-fire agreement reached under the auspices of the Egyptian authorities. It urges both parties to fully respect it and to continue negotiations leading to a fundamental improvement of the living conditions for the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip through the lifting of the Gaza closure regime, and to ending the threat to Israel posed by Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza. This should be supported by international monitoring and verification to ensure full implementation of a comprehensive agreement. All terrorist groups in Gaza must disarm.

It is therefore urgent that the Palestinian consensus government exercise its full responsibilities in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip including in the field of security and civil administration.

The European Council remains deeply concerned about the disastrous humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. It calls for immediate and unimpeded humanitarian access in accordance with international law.

20. The European Council reiterates the readiness of the European Union to contribute to a comprehensive and sustainable solution enhancing the security, welfare and prosperity of Palestinians and Israelis alike.

21. Only a final agreement based on the two State solution will bring durable peace and stability. The European Council therefore encourages both parties to re-engage in negotiations to this end. The Gaza strip shall be part of a future State of Palestine.

LIBYA

22. The European Council strongly condemns the escalation of fighting in Libya, especially attacks against residential areas, public institutions, facilities and critical infrastructure.

23. It calls upon all parties in Libya to accept an immediate cease-fire, to put an end to the suffering of the population, and to engage constructively in an inclusive political dialogue. In this regard, it fully supports the efforts of the UN mission in Libya.

24. The European Council also encourages neighbouring countries and countries of the region to support an immediate cessation of hostilities and to refrain from actions which might exacerbate current divisions and undermine Libya's democratic transition.

25. The European Council calls on Libya's interim government and the House of Representatives to establish urgently a truly inclusive government capable of addressing the needs of the Libyan people. It encourages the Constitutional Drafting Assembly to pursue as a matter of urgency its work on a constitutional text that will enshrine and protect the rights of all Libyans.

EBOLA

26. The European Council expresses concern about the crisis caused by the Ebola virus in Africa, and stresses the importance of the international community as a whole providing substantial coordinated support to the countries of the region, to NGOs and to the World Health Organisation (WHO) to help them tackle the disease as swiftly and efficiently as possible. In this regard the European Council welcomes the additional funds provided by the European Union and its Member States and their efforts to provide further financial and human resources to meet in particular the increased demand for experts on the ground. The European Council pays tribute to the efforts of humanitarian and health workers in the front line. It urges all countries to follow the WHO guidelines

and allow continued, if controlled, air links to and from the countries concerned so as to enable support efforts to be effective and to allow their economies to continue functioning. The European Council calls for increased coordination at EU level of the assistance provided by EU Member States and invites the Council to adopt a comprehensive EU response framework to address this crisis.

COUNCIL DECISION 2014/674/CFSP

amending and extending Decision 2010/565/CFSP on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo)

25 September 2014

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28 and Articles 42(4) and 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

1. On 21 September 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/565/CFSP,⁹ last modified by Decision 2013/468/CFSP.¹⁰ Decision 2010/565/CFSP expires on 30 September 2014.
2. On 18 June 2014, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) approved the Modalities for the Transition of EUSEC RD Congo, within the framework of the future EU engagement in support of the security sector reform (SSR) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which entails the extension of EUSEC RD Congo for nine months, until 30 June 2015, to implement its final transition with the aim of handing over its tasks.
3. EUSEC RD Congo will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2010/565/CFSP is amended as follows:

1. Article 2 is replaced by the following:
'*Article 2*

9. Council Decision 2010/565/CFSP of 21 September 2010 on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) (OJ L 248, 22.9.2010, p. 59).

10. Council Decision 2013/468/CFSP of 23 September 2013 amending and extending Decision 2010/565/CFSP on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) (OJ L 252, 24.9.2013, p. 29).

Mission statement

The mission shall aim, in close cooperation and coordination with the other actors in the international community, in particular the United Nations and MONUSCO, and in pursuit of the objectives laid down in Article 1, to provide practical support in the field of SSR, creating conditions to facilitate the implementation in the short and medium term of activities and projects based on the guidelines adopted by the Congolese authorities in the plan for reform of the FARDC as set out in the mission action programme, including:

- a. maintaining support at strategic level while mainstreaming activities relating to the campaign against impunity in the areas of respect for human rights, including sexual violence;
 - b. maintaining support for the consolidation of the administration and the establishment of a system of human resource management, based on the work underway to improve the autonomy of the process;
 - c. improving the operational capacities of the FARDC, by working with the military authorities towards sustainability of the military education system, focusing on schools for officers and non-commissioned officers.’;
2. in Article 3, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
‘1. EUSEC RD Congo shall be structured in accordance with its planning documents.’
 3. in Article 5, paragraph 4 is deleted;
 4. Article 9 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 9

Financial arrangements

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission for the period from 1 October 2010 to 30 September 2011 shall be EUR 12 600 000.

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission for the period from 1 October 2011 to 30 September 2012 shall be EUR 13 600 000.

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission for the period from 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013 shall be EUR 11 000 000.

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission for the period from 1 October 2013 to 30 September 2014 shall be EUR 8 455 000.

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission for the period from 1 October 2014 to 30 June 2015 shall be EUR 4 600 000.

2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the Union. Participation of natural and legal persons in the award of procurement contracts by EUSEC RD Congo shall be open without limitations. Moreover, no rule of origin for the goods purchased by EUSEC RD Congo shall apply. Subject to the Commission’s approval, the mission may conclude technical arrangements with Member States, the host State, participating third States and other international actors regarding the provision of equipment, services and premises to EUSEC RD Congo.

3. EUSEC RD Congo shall be responsible for the implementation of the mission’s budget. For this purpose, EUSEC RD Congo shall sign an agreement with the Commission.

4. Without prejudice to the provisions on the status of EUSEC RD Congo and its personnel, EUSEC RD Congo shall be responsible for any claims and obligations arising from the implementation of the mandate starting from 1 October 2013, with the exception of any claims relating to serious misconduct by the Head of Mission, for which the Head of Mission shall bear the responsibility.
 5. The implementation of the financial arrangements shall be without prejudice to the chain of command as provided for in Articles 5 and 7 and the operational requirements of EUSEC RD Congo, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.
 6. Expenditure shall be eligible as from the date of entry into force of this Decision.'
5. the following Article is inserted:

'Article 9a

Project Cell

1. EUSEC RD Congo shall have a Project Cell for identifying and implementing projects. EUSEC RD Congo shall, as appropriate, facilitate and provide advice on projects implemented by Member States and third States under their responsibility in areas related to EUSEC RD Congo and in support of its objectives.
 2. Subject to paragraph 3, EUSEC RD Congo shall be authorised to seek recourse to financial contributions from the Member States or third States to implement projects identified as supplementing in a consistent manner EUSEC RD Congo's other actions, if the project is:
 - a. provided for in the financial statement relating to this Decision; or
 - b. integrated during the mandate by means of an amendment to the financial statement requested by the Head of Mission.

EUSEC RD Congo shall conclude an arrangement with those States, covering in particular the specific procedures for dealing with any complaint from third parties concerning damage caused as a result of acts or omissions by EUSEC RD Congo in the use of the funds provided by those States. Under no circumstances may the contributing States hold the Union or the HR liable for acts or omissions by EUSEC RD Congo in the use of the funds provided by those States.
 3. Financial contributions from third States to the Project Cell shall be subject to acceptance by the PSC.'
6. Article 13 is amended as follows:
- a. paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

'1. The HR shall be authorised to release to the third States associated with this Decision, as appropriate and in accordance with the needs of the mission, EU classified information and documents up to "CONFIDENTIEL UE/ EU CONFIDENTIAL" level generated for the purposes of the mission, in accordance with Council Decision 2013/488/EU.¹¹
 - b. paragraph 5 is replaced by the following:

'5. The HR may delegate the powers referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4, as well as the ability to conclude the arrangements referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 to persons placed under his/her authority and/or to the Head of Mission.'

11. Council Decision 2013/488/EU of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ L 274, 15.10.2013, p. 1).

7. in Article 17, the second paragraph is replaced by the following: 'It shall apply until 30 June 2015.'

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall apply from 1 October 2014.

Done at Brussels, 25 September 2014.

For the Council

The President

F. GUIDI

European Council appoints the new Commission

PRESS RELEASE

Brussels, 23 October 2014 , EUCO 223/14

The European Council has appointed a new European Commission for the period from 1 November 2014 to 31 October 2019.

The European Parliament gave its consent yesterday. In accordance with today's decision, the following are appointed to the Commission:

as President:

- Jean-Claude JUNCKER (Luxembourg)

as members:

- Vytenis Povilas ANDRIUKAITIS (Lithuania)
- Andrus ANSIP (Estonia)
- Miguel ARIAS CAÑETE (Spain)
- Dimitris AVRAMOPOULOS (Greece)
- Elżbieta BIENKOWSKA (Poland)
- Violeta BULC (Slovenia)
- Corina CREȚU (Romania)
- Valdis DOMBROVSKIS (Latvia)
- Kristalina GEORGIEVA (Bulgaria)
- Johannes HAHN (Austria)
- Jonathan HILL (United Kingdom)
- Phil HOGAN (Ireland)
- Věra JOUROVÁ (Czech Republic)
- Jyrki KATAINEN (Finland)
- Cecilia MALMSTRÖM (Sweden)
- Neven MIMICA (Croatia)
- Carlos MOEDAS (Portugal)

- Pierre MOSCOVICI (France)
- Tibor NAVRACSICS (Hungary)
- Günther OETTINGER (Germany)
- Maroš ŠEFČOVIČ (Slovakia)
- Christos STYLIANIDES (Cyprus)
- Marianne THYSSEN (Belgium)
- Frans TIMMERMANS (The Netherlands)
- Karmenu VELLA (Malta)
- Margrethe VESTAGER (Denmark).
- Federica MOGHERINI (Italy), High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

* * *

The Treaty on the European Union provides that:

“The President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the other members of the Commission shall be subject as a body to a vote of consent by the European Parliament. On the basis of this consent the Commission shall be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority.”

Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy

Foreign Affairs (Defence) Council meeting Brussels,

Brussels, 18 November 2014

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“1. Europe’s security environment is evolving significantly, rapidly and dramatically. Ongoing conflicts and instability in our immediate and wider neighbourhood, such as in Iraq, Libya, the Sahel, Syria and Ukraine, remain a particular cause for great concern. Together with long standing and newly emerging security challenges, these developments may have longer term effects on European security and international peace and stability. They demonstrate also the close links between internal and external security dimensions.

Therefore, in line with the December 2013 European Council Conclusions, the Council reiterates the invitation to the High Representative, in close cooperation with the Commission, to assess the impact of changes in the global environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 2015 on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union, following consultations with the Member States.

2. The Council furthermore reiterates the urgent need of enabling the EU and its Member States to assume increased responsibilities to act as a security provider, at the international level and in particular in the neighbourhood, thereby also enhancing their own security and their global strategic role by responding to these challenges together. The EU and its Member States, through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and other policies and instruments, have a strong role to play through its unique comprehensive approach to

preventing and managing conflicts and their causes. Moreover, the Council stresses that protecting and promoting European interests and values will increasingly require the EU and its Member States combining their efforts, underpinned by the necessary means and sufficient budgetary resources.

The Council reaffirms its commitment to strengthen CSDP, in line with the Conclusions from the European Council of December 2013 and its own Conclusions of November 2013.

3. The Council emphasises the importance of working with its partners, in particular the UN, NATO, OSCE, and African Union, as well as strategic partners and other partner countries, within its neighbourhood and more globally, with due respect to the institutional framework and decision-making autonomy of the EU. It notes that priority should be given to cooperation with partners who share with the EU common values and principles and are able and willing to support EU crisis management efforts.

The Council welcomes relevant outcomes of NATO's Wales Summit in September 2014. It also reaffirms its support to the further implementation of the EU plan of Action for CSDP support to UN peacekeeping and of the Declaration of the EU-Africa Summit of 2014.

4. In line with the European Council Conclusions of December 2013 on security and defence, the Council reiterates the need to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP and the development and maintenance of Member States' capabilities, supported by a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), which also contributes to jobs, growth and innovation across the EU and can enhance Europe's strategic autonomy, strengthening its ability to act with partners. This requires systematic cooperation and coordination within the EU and among its Member States, underlining the importance of addressing the need to sustain sufficient expenditures related to security and defence, and coherent and effective use of EU instruments and policies.

5. Emphasising the contribution of the CSDP missions and operations to international peace and stability, the Council welcomes the deployment, in 2014, of the CSDP military bridging operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), the civilian CSDP mission in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), which today the Council has decided to launch, and the progress made towards launching a civilian mission in Mali (EUCAP SAHEL Mali). The Council welcomes as well the ongoing action by the other nine civilian CSDP missions and four military CSDP operations across three continents.¹² The Council notes with satisfaction that throughout these missions and operations particular attention was given to supporting human rights, as well as to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325, thus promoting core values of the EU.

The Council recognises the need for common approaches with the UN in the Central African Republic in the reform of the security forces, including the armed forces, in order to stabilise the situation in support of the political process. In this regard, it acknowledges the added value of a potential further EU role in the reform of the security sector, in support of UN efforts, while ensuring local buy-in, and calls in this context for the development of a crisis management concept.

6. Today, the Council:

- agreed on next steps regarding the initiative to support capacity building of partner countries and regional organisations in order to enable them to increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves,

12. EUBAM Libya; EUBAM Rafah; EUCAP Nestor; EUCAP SAHEL Niger; EUFOR Althea; EULEX Kosovo; EUMM Georgia; EUNAVFOR Atalanta; EUPOL Afghanistan; EUPOL COPPS; EUSEC RD Congo; EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali.

inviting the High Representative and the Commission to present, in view of the European Council in June 2015, a joint proposal for a policy approach for concrete implementation. This policy should take into account the role and competence of Member States and propose suitable coordination and funding mechanisms, on the basis of shared needs assessments and risk analyses. Stressing the flexible geographical scope of the initiative, it notes that the development of this policy should draw on the identified pilot cases on Mali and Somalia, which should be developed by early 2015, as well as the follow-up on the Conclusions of the European Council of March 2014 regarding the need to strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture;

- adopted the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, which focuses on: supporting the development of Member States' cyber defence capabilities related to CSDP; enhancing the protection of CSDP communication networks used by EU entities; promoting civil-military cooperation and synergies with wider EU cyber policies, relevant EU institutions and agencies as well as with the private sector; improving training, education and exercises opportunities; and enhancing cooperation with relevant international partners;
- adopted a Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation. In view of deepening cooperation in Europe, this Policy Framework will guide the cooperative approaches of Member States, through their national decision-making processes, when developing defence capabilities. In line with the European Council Conclusions, it has been put forward in full coherence with existing NATO planning processes;
- agreed the Progress Catalogue 2014, which provides an assessment of the critical military shortfalls resulting from the Headline Goal process and their impact on CSDP; these shortfalls are integrated into the revised Capability Development Plan agreed by the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, which should support and orientate national capability planning, identify the capabilities required and seize collaborative opportunities.

7. Furthermore, the Council welcomes further progress made in implementing the Conclusions of the European Council, as reported in the High Representative report of July and the Commission roadmap of June, and encourages further work on all outstanding issues in view of the preparation of the European Council in June 2015.

In this context, the Council highlights in particular:

- the implementation of the EU's Comprehensive Approach, as set out in the Council conclusions of May 2014, including through the development of an Action Plan before the end of the first quarter of 2015;
- the adoption of the cross sectorial EU Maritime Security Strategy by the Council in June 2014 and its ongoing translation into concrete actions, mainstreaming maritime security into EU policies and strategies, and, *inter alia*, promoting enhanced common situational awareness and better sharing of information for the EU and its Member States, through an Action Plan to be agreed by the end of 2014;
- the ongoing work on training, rapid response, interoperability and the security and protection of deployed personnel;
- the development of CSDP concrete support to border management in the Sahel-Saharan region as part of the Action Plan implementing the EU Sahel Strategy;

- strengthening the links between external and internal security, notably through a more structured approach to cooperation between the CSDP missions and operations and Freedom/Security/Justice actors, notably the EU Agencies (EUROPOL, FRONTEX and CEPOL) and with INTERPOL as well as strengthening links with the European Gendarmerie Force. This will, *inter alia*, help to address important horizontal issues such as illegal migration, organised crime, terrorism, foreign fighters and cyber security;
- the importance of revisiting the priority areas identified at Feira European Council and fully implementing the Civilian Capability Development Plan and further developing tools to help address identified gaps, including by finalising the Goalkeeper project and establishing a list of generic civilian CSDP tasks;
- the ongoing deliberations looking into the full potential of the use of Article 44 TEU;
- the added value provided by the activated EU Operations Centre, in line with its mandate as revisited, as well as the renewed mandates of the EU Satellite Centre and the European Security and Defence College;
- the need to urgently take work forward on establishing a Shared Services Centre, in order to realise greater efficiencies and rationalise the provision of mission support functions to civilian CSDP missions and improve their early deployment and effective conduct.

8. The Council welcomes the results achieved by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2014, in particular its contribution to fulfilling the taskings from Council in November and the European Council in December 2013.

9. The Council welcomes the progress achieved by Member States with the support of EDA in Pooling & Sharing projects and programmes, notably in the four key projects endorsed by the European Council in December 2013: Air-to-Air Refuelling, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, Governmental Satellite Communications, and Cyber Defence. The Council encourages the Agency to continue to identify opportunities for cooperation on defence capabilities on the basis of the recently revised Capability Development Plan; and to support cooperative projects through enablers and incentives. In this context, it notes the progressing work on non-market distorting fiscal measures and pooled procurement, in close coordination with Member States, ahead of the June 2015 European Council. The Council encourages synergies where possible with EU policies and instruments in support of programmes and incentives.

10. The Council encourages the Agency to continue supporting the engagement of Member States with the Commission on relevant issues. The Council welcomes the Commission's work on the Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research, bringing together Member States, EDA and EEAS, which could lead to a wider research programme in support of CSDP, and calls for further progress. The Council welcomes the Agency's role in supporting participating Member States in addressing the possible implications for defence of other EU policies, including potentially acting as the military interface for the implementation of the Single European Sky (SES) and the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) for the military domain, and the European Space Policy. The Council reiterates the need to maximise dual-use synergies in Research & Technology, in line with the December 2013 European Council conclusions.

11. Underlining the importance of the EDTIB, the Council welcomes the EDA's and Commission's actions to:
(i) improve security of supply, notably through the development by the Commission, working with the Member

States and in cooperation with the High Representative and the EDA, of a roadmap for a comprehensive EU-wide security of supply regime; (ii) support Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the security and defence sector including access to EU funding programmes and cross border markets, including through the establishment of an advisory group; and (iii) improve cost-effectiveness and efficiency in the European security and defence market; and (iv) support the European technological and industrial base, including to enhance its competitiveness in the global market. The Council recalls that these efforts should be inclusive with opportunities for defence industry in the EU, balanced and in full compliance with EU law.

12. The Council underlines that its conclusions concerning the enhancement of military capability development and strengthening defence industry addressed to the EDA constitute the Council guidelines for EDA for its work in 2015, within the context of the Council decision defining the statute, seat and operating rules of EDA (Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP of 12 July 2011).

* * *

13. In May 2015, the Council will adopt conclusions on CSDP in view of enabling the European Council to take stock of progress and provide further guidance in June 2015. To this end, it invites the Commission, the High Representative and the EDA to report on progress and provide their detailed input by April 2015.”

EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework

Council of the European Union

Brussels, 18 November 2014, 15585/14

Context and Objectives

Cyberspace is often described as the fifth domain of military activity, equally critical to European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) implementation as the domains of land, sea, air, and space. The successful implementation of CSDP has been increasingly dependent on the availability of, and access to, a secure cyberspace. Robust and resilient cyber defence capabilities are now required to support CSDP structures and CSDP missions and operations.

The European Council Conclusions on CSDP of December 2013 together with the Council Conclusions on CSDP of November 2013 called for the development of an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, on the basis of a proposal by the High Representative, in cooperation with the European Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA).

The objective of this document is to provide a framework to the European Council and Council conclusions, as well as to the cyber defence aspects of the EU Cybersecurity Strategy.¹³ The document identifies priority areas for CSDP cyber defence and clarifies the roles of the different European actors, whilst fully respecting the respective responsibilities and competences of Union actors and the Member States as well as the institutional

13. Joint communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace”, of 7 February 2013, and the related General Affairs Council conclusions of 25 June 2013.

framework of the EU and its autonomy of decision-making. The implementation process of the EU Cybersecurity strategy has been agreed by the Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber Issues.

A primary focus of this policy framework will be the development of cyber defence capabilities, made available by Member States for the purposes of the CSDP as well as the protection of the European External Action Service (EEAS) communication and information networks relevant to CSDP. In the area of training, emphasis is given to the development of programmes for different audiences in the CSDP chain of command. It is important that the cyber dimension is adequately addressed in exercises in order to improve the EU's ability to react to cyber crises in a CSDP context, to improve strategic decision-making procedures and to strengthen the information infrastructure architecture. Cyberspace is a rapidly developing domain where dual-use capabilities play an essential role; therefore it is necessary to develop civil-military cooperation and synergies with wider EU cyber policies to address the new challenges it presents, while respecting the Member States internal organisation and competences.

This paper outlines principles to facilitate cooperation with the private sector on cyber defence capability development, with a particular focus on strengthening Research & Technology (R&T) and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Moreover, it also ensures coherence between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) cyber defence efforts and proposes areas for cooperation between them.

Finally, the objectives of cyber defence should be better integrated within the Union's crisis management mechanisms. In order to deal with the effects of a cyber crisis, relevant provisions of the Treaty of the EU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU¹⁴ may be applicable, as appropriate.

Priorities for the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework

1. Supporting the development of Member States cyber defence capabilities related to CSDP

In order to ensure the resilience of the networks supporting CSDP implementation, the focus shall be on both the improvement of the protection of EEAS managed CSDP structures' communication networks and on the Member States' development of cyber defence capabilities available for CSDP missions and operations. To this extent, Member States, the EEAS and EDA should work together to deliver effective cyber defence capability.

The development of cyber defence capabilities and technologies should address all aspects of capability development, including doctrine, leadership, organisation, personnel, training, technology, infrastructure, logistics and interoperability.

A continuous assessment of the vulnerabilities of the information infrastructures that support CSDP missions and operations is required, along with a near real-time understanding of the effectiveness of the protection. From an operational point of view, the primary focus of cyber defence activities will be to maintain the functionality of CSDP communication and information networks, unless specified otherwise within the mandate of the operations or missions.

As CSDP military operations rely on a Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) infrastructure provided by the Member States, a certain degree of strategic convergence when planning cyber defence requirements for the information infrastructure is necessary.

14. Articles 222 TFEU and 42(7) TEU, with due consideration of Art. 17 TEU.

Building upon the work of the EDA Cyber Defence Project Team to develop cyber defence capabilities, the EEAS/EDA and Member States will:

- Use the Capability Development Plan and other instruments that facilitate and support cooperation between Member States in order to improve the degree of convergence in the planning of cyber defence requirements of the Member States at the strategic level, notably on monitoring, situational awareness, prevention, detection and protection, information sharing, forensics and malware analysis capability, lessons learned, damage containment, dynamic recovery capabilities, distributed data storage and data back-ups;
- Support current and future cyber defence-related Pooling and Sharing projects for military operations (e.g. in forensics, interoperability development, standard setting);
- Develop a standard set of objectives and requirements defining the minimum level of cybersecurity and trust to be achieved by Member States, drawing on existing EU-wide experience;
- Facilitate exchanges between Member States on national cyber defence doctrines, training programmes and exercises as well as on cyber defence oriented recruitment, retention and reservists programs;
- Improve cooperation between military CERTs of the Member States on a voluntary basis, to improve the prevention and handling of incidents;
- Consider developing cyber defence training in view of EU Battlegroup certification.
- To the extent that the improvement of cyber defence capabilities depends upon civilian network and information security expertise, Member States may request assistance from ENISA.

2. Enhancing the protection of CSDP communication networks used by EU entities

Without prejudice to the role of the CERT-EU as the central EU cyber incident response coordination structure for all Union institutions, bodies and agencies and within the framework of the relevant rules concerning the Union budget, the EEAS shall develop an adequate and autonomous understanding of security and network defence matters and develop its own IT security capacity. It will aim to improve the resilience of the EEAS CSDP networks, with a focus on prevention, detection, incident response, situational awareness, information exchange and early warning mechanisms.

The protection of EEAS communication and information systems and the development of Information Technology (IT) security capacities are led by the EEAS MDR (Managing Directorate for Resources). Additional dedicated resources and support will also be provided by the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). This IT security capability will cover both classified and unclassified systems and will be an integral part of the existing operational entities.

There is also a need to streamline security rules for the information systems provided by different EU institutional actors during the conduct of CSDP operations and missions. In this context, a unified chain of command could be considered with the aim to improve the resilience of networks used for CSDP.

In order to improve the protection of CSDP communication networks, the MDR, EUMS, CMPD and CPCC, in cooperation with INTCEN, will:

- Strengthen IT security capacity within the EEAS, based on existing technical capability and procedures, with a focus on prevention, detection, incident response, situational awareness, information exchange and early warning mechanism. A cooperation strategy with the CERT-EU and existing EU cyber security capabilities shall also be developed or, where available, further enhanced;
- Develop coherent IT security policy and guidelines, also taking into account technical requirements for cyber defence in a CSDP context for structures, missions and operations, bearing in mind existing cooperation frameworks and policies within the EU to achieve convergence in rules, policies and organisation;
- Building upon existing structures, strengthen cyber threat assessment and intelligence capability to identify new cyber risks and provide regular risk assessments based on the strategic threat assessment and near real-time incident information coordinated between relevant EU structures and made accessible at different classification levels;
- Promote real-time cyber threat information sharing between Member States and relevant EU entities. For this purpose, information sharing mechanisms and trust-building measures shall be developed between relevant national and European authorities, through a voluntary approach that builds on existing cooperation;
- Develop and integrate into strategic level planning, a unified cyber defence concept for CSDP military operations* and civilian missions;
- Enhance cyber defence coordination to implement objectives related to the protection of networks used by EU institutional actors supporting CSDP, drawing on existing EU-wide experiences;
- Review regularly resource requirements and other relevant policy decisions based on the changing threat environment, in consultation with the relevant Council working groups and other EU institutions.

* In the case of military operations, the current EU Concept for Cyber Defence for EU-led Military Operations should be updated in the light of this Policy Framework.

3. Promotion of civil-military cooperation and synergies with wider EU cyber policies, relevant EU institutions and agencies as well as with the private sector

Cyberspace is a rapidly developing domain where dual-use capabilities play an essential role and where this framework will improve the synergy between CSDP and other EU horizontal policies (such as space and maritime security policies) and strategies, such as the Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan. Without prejudice to Member States' internal organisation and legislation, civil-military cooperation in the cyber domain will benefit from dual-use cyber capability development, R&T, exchange of best practices, information exchange and early warning mechanisms, incident response risk assessments and awareness raising. Joint activities in the field of training and exercises will enhance cooperation and reduce costs across different policy areas.

EDA, European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA, European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), together with other relevant EU Agencies, as well as the Member States are encouraged, in the CSDP environment, to enhance their cooperation in the following areas:

- Develop common cyber security and defence competence profiles based on international best practices and certification used by EU Institutions, taking also into account private sector certification standards;
- Contribute to develop further and adapt public sector cyber security and defence organisational and technical standards for use in the defence and security sector. Where necessary, build on the ongoing work of ENISA and EDA;
- Develop a working mechanism to exchange best practice on exercises, training and other areas of possible civilian-military synergy;
- Leverage existing EU cybercrime prevention, investigation and forensics capabilities and their enhanced utilisation in the development of cyber defence capabilities.

Improving civilian cyber security is an important factor which contributes to overall network and information security resilience. The proposal for a Directive on Network and Information Security (NIS) is expected to increase preparedness at the national level, and strengthen cooperation at Union level between Member States both at strategic and operational level. This cooperation should involve both national authorities overseeing cybersecurity policies as well as national CERTs and CERT-EU. The public-private NIS platform aims to identify technologically neutral best practices to enhance cybersecurity and develop incentives to adopt secure ICT solutions.

Research and technology in cooperation with the private sector and academia

Operators of infrastructure and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) services for civilian and defence purposes are confronted with similar cyber security challenges, as a result of common technology and operational capability requirements. Common R&T needs and common requirements for systems are anticipated to improve the interoperability of systems in the long run, as well as to reduce the costs of solutions development. Achieving economies of scale is a necessity in order to face the ever increasing number of threats and vulnerabilities. This should in turn facilitate the preservation and growth of a competitive cyber defence industry in Europe.

Cyber defence capability development has an important R&T dimension. Within the framework of the Cyber Defence Research Agenda (CDRA) the EDA has provided a sound basis for the prioritisation of future R&T spending and capability development in both national and European environment.

The development of strong technological capacities in Europe to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities is essential. Industry will remain the primary driver for cyber defence related technology and innovation. So it will be crucial to maintain close cooperation with the private sector, seeking synergy with civilian solutions, services and capabilities wherever possible (in particular in cryptography, embedded systems, malware detection, simulation and visualisation techniques, network and communication systems protection, identification and authentication technology areas). It is also important to foster an assured and competitive European industrial cyber secu-

rity supply chain by supporting the development of a robust European cybersecurity sector including through involvement with Small and Medium sized Entreprises (SMEs).

To facilitate civil-military cooperation in cyber defence capability development and to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in line with the EU approach on cyber industry, the EDA together with the Commission services, as well as the Member States will:

- Seek synergies of R&T efforts in the military sector with civilian Research & Development programmes, such as HORIZON 2020, and consider the cyber security and defence dimension when setting up the Preparatory Action on CSDP related research;
- Share cyber security research agendas between EU institutions and agencies (e.g. Cyber Defence Research Agenda) notably through the European Framework Cooperation, and share resulting roadmaps and actions;
- Support the development of industrial eco-systems and clusters of innovation covering the whole security value chain by drawing on academic knowledge, SMEs innovation and industrial production;
- Support EU policy coherence to ensure that policy and technical aspects of EU cyber protection remain at the forefront of technology innovation and are harmonised across the EU (cyber-threat analysis and assessment capability, “security by design” initiatives, dependency management for technology access etc.);
- Contribute to improve the integration of cybersecurity and cyber defence dimensions in the programmes that have a dual-use security and defence dimension, e.g. SESAR.
- Actively support synergies with the civilian cybersecurity industrial policy development undertaken at national level by the Member States and at European level by the Commission.

4. Improve training, education and exercises opportunities

Training and Education

In order to develop a common cyber defence culture at all levels of CSDP chain of command, including missions and operations, there is a need to improve cyber defence training opportunities. Moreover, during a period of shrinking defence expenditure, it is crucial that education and training budgets are used efficiently while delivering the best possible quality. Pooling and sharing cyber defence education and training at the European level will be of key importance.

The EEAS will set the following CSDP training priorities, together with EDA, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and Member States:

- Based on the EDA Cyber Defence Training-Need-Analysis and the experiences gained in cyber security training of the ESDC, establish CSDP Training and Education for different audiences, including EEAS, personnel from CSDP missions and operations and Member States’ officials;

- Propose the establishment of a cyber defence dialogue on training standards and certification with Member States, EU institutions, third countries and other international organisations, as well as with the private sector;
- Based on the EDA feasibility assessment, explore the possibility and rationale to set up a cyber defence training facility for CSDP;
- Develop further EDA courses to meet the CSDP cyber defence training requirements;
- Follow the established ESDC certification mechanisms for the training programmes in close cooperation with the relevant services in the EU institutions, based on existing standards and knowledge. Consider the possibility of setting up cyber specific modules in the framework of the Military Erasmus initiative;
- Create synergies with the training programmes of other stakeholders such as the ENISA, Europol, European Cybercrime Training and Education Group (ECTEG) and the European Police College (CEPOL);
- Explore the possibility of joint ESDC-NATO Defence College cyberdefence training programmes, open to all EU Member States, in order to foster a shared cyberdefence culture;
- Engage with European private sector training providers, as well as academic institutions, to raise the competencies and skills of personnel engaged in CSDP operations and missions.

Exercises

There is a need to improve cyber defence exercise opportunities for military and civilian CSDP actors. Joint exercises serve as a tool to develop common knowledge and understanding of cyber defence. This will enable national forces to enhance their preparedness to operate within a multinational environment. Conducting common cyber defence exercises will also build interoperability and trust.

The EEAS and the Member States will focus on promoting cyber defence elements in CSDP and other exercises:

- Integrate a cyber defence dimension into existing exercise scenarios' for MILEX and MULTILAYER;
- Develop, as appropriate, a dedicated EU CSDP cyber defence exercise and explore possible coordination with pan-European cyber exercises such as CyberEurope, organised by ENISA;
- Consider the possibility of participating in other multinational cyber defence exercises;
- Once the EU has developed a CSDP cyber defence exercise, involve relevant international partners, such as the OSCE and NATO, in accordance with the EU exercise policy.

5. Enhancing cooperation with relevant international partners

In the framework of international cooperation there is a need to ensure a dialogue with international partners, specifically NATO and other international organisations, in order to contribute to the development of effective cyber defence capabilities. Increased engagement should be sought with the work being done within the framework of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN).

There is a political will in the EU to cooperate further with NATO on cyber defence in developing robust and resilient cyber defence capabilities as required within this Policy Framework. Regular staff-to-staff consultations, cross-briefings, as well as possible meetings between the Politico-Military Group and relevant NATO committees, shall help to avoid unnecessary duplication and ensure coherence and complementarity of efforts, in line with the existing framework of cooperation with NATO.

The EEAS and EDA, together with the Member States, will develop further cyber defence cooperation between the EU and NATO, with due respect to the institutional framework and the EU's decision-making autonomy:

- Exchange of best practice in crisis management as well as military operations and civilian missions;
- Work on coherence in the development of cyber defence capability requirements where they overlap, especially in long-term cyber defence capability development;
- Enhance cooperation on concepts for cyber defence training and education as well as exercises;
- Utilise further the EDA liaison agreement with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence as an initial platform for enhanced collaboration in multinational cyber defence projects, based on appropriate assessments;
- Reinforce cooperation between the CERT-EU and relevant EU cyber defence bodies and the NCIRC (NATO Computer Incident Response Capability) in order to improve situational awareness, information sharing, early warning mechanisms and anticipate threats that could affect both organisations.

With regard to other international organisations and relevant EU international partners, the EEAS and the EDA, together with the Member States, will, as appropriate:

- Follow strategic developments and hold consultations in cyber defence issues with international partners (international organisations and third countries);
- Explore possibilities for cooperation on cyber defence issues, including with third countries participating in CSDP missions and operations;
- Continue to support the development of confidence building measures in cybersecurity, to increase transparency and reduce the risk of misperceptions in State behaviour, by promoting the ongoing establishment of international norms in this field.

Follow-up

A six-monthly progress report, that includes the five areas outlined above, should be presented to the Politico-Military Group and to the Political and Security Committee and other relevant Council working groups, in order to assess the implementation of the policy framework. It is essential that, as the cyber threat develops, new cyber defence requirements are identified, and then included in the Cyber Defence Policy Framework.

European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) - Action Plan

Council of the European Union

Brussels, 16 December 2014 (OR. en), 17002/14

Introduction

This Action Plan puts the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS dated 24 June 2014) into practice. It is based upon the four following principles: cross-sectoral approach, functional integrity, respect for rules and principles, and maritime multilateralism – including the decision-making autonomy of the EU – as defined by the European Union Maritime Security Strategy. These principles are enshrined in every measure detailed in the Action Plan. The Strategy brings together both internal and external aspects of the Union's maritime security and this Action Plan contains actions and sub-actions in each workstrand also to this end.

This is a rolling Action Plan, subject to a progress assessment and possible review. Regular reporting will be provided by the High Representative and the Commission on the basis of contributions of Member States.

The Action Plan respects Member States' and EU internal organisation and competences (regulated by national law) as well as their policies and legislation and builds on initiatives by Member States and relevant EU bodies and agencies. It is implemented by the EU and each Member State, taking into account on-going actions at national, EU and international level, within available resources without creating new structures or changing existing legal procedures.

Sectoral and cross-sectoral stakeholder consultations within Member States and at EU level should be part of the implementation of the Action Plan.

WORKSTRAND 1 : EXTERNAL ACTION

1.1. Work towards a coordinated approach on maritime security issues in international fora and with third countries. (Delivery Horizon:¹⁵ I/M)

- 1.1.1. Develop strategic dialogue with relevant regional and international stakeholders and third countries on maritime security to sustain and further develop the promotion of rules-based governance at sea. [Lead Actors:¹⁶ EEAS]
- 1.1.2. Identify areas of commonality and complementarity between the EU and the UN and its bodies to develop an improved partnership in the field of maritime security, with a view to the development of joint regional maritime capacity-building activities. [MS/EEAS]
- 1.1.3. Identify complementarity between the EU and NATO to ensure better coordination, and develop enhanced cooperative relations on relevant aspects of maritime security between the two organisations, in the context of CSDP.
On that basis, promote concrete EU and NATO complementary initiatives in the field of maritime security operations. This could also include co-ordinated programmes of EU and NATO maritime security exercises and training, in line with the EU exercise policy. [MS/EEAS]
- 1.1.4. Identify areas of commonality between the EU and regional fora, such as the African Union and sub-regional African organisations, the Union for the Mediterranean, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as international organisations such as the IMO, ILO, INTERPOL and UNODC, seeking improved partnerships in the field of maritime security. [MS/COM¹⁷/EEAS]
- 1.1.5. Mainstream maritime security into bilateral meeting agendas with third countries, strategic dialogues, and international *fora*, where appropriate. [MS /COM/EEAS]
- 1.1.6. Encourage bilateral and regional agreements in the area of maritime security, improve coordination of existing ones and promote engagement and support between Member States and third countries, in order to enhance the security and stability of the maritime domain. [MS]
- 1.1.7. Promote the signature and ratification of the Agreement on illicit traffic by sea opened in Strasbourg on January 31, 1995, implementing art. 17 of the United Nations Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, opened for signature in Vienna on December 20, 1988, for the Member States and Third Countries of the Council of Europe. [MS/EEAS]
- 1.1.8. Continue to ensure cooperation between services in charge of maritime transport and services in charge of Customs issues at EU level, as well as ensure consistency with regulations at international level. [MS/COM]

15. I: Immediate (one year); M: Medium (one to three years); L: Long term (three to five years). This footnote applies to all references to "Delivery Horizon".

16. Within their competences and legal mandates. This footnote applies to all references to "Lead Actors".

17. European Commission, including EU regulatory agencies.

1.2. Enhance the visibility of the EU in the global maritime domain. (I/M)

- 1.2.1. Taking into account the EU's comprehensive approach, plan and conduct regular EU maritime security exercises with third countries and international/regional organisations, in the context of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and missions or EU exercises in adjacent sea basins and other areas of interest, in accordance with the EU exercise policy. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 1.2.2. Conduct maritime security-related seminars, workshops and conferences with partner countries and International Organisations to facilitate implementation of regional strategies and initiatives. [COM/EEAS]
- 1.2.3. Conduct a communication campaign to explain the EU approach to maritime security in the global maritime domain at the national, EU and international level. [MS/COM/EEAS]

1.3. In accordance with the European Security Strategy (ESS), strengthen and support EU regional responses in the global maritime domain, notably by making best possible use of existing policies, ensuring coherence with EU policies, in particular the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), the Internal Security Strategy (ISS), and initiatives under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). (M/L)

- 1.3.1. When applicable, reinforce the security dimension of existing EU sea basin strategies and consider its insertion in future strategies. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 1.3.2. Strengthen the cooperation between external and internal security dimensions of EU policies and ensure coherence with EU security strategies in order to prevent, *inter alia*, cross border and organised crime and other illegal activities, such as drug trafficking.
In this context, address smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings more effectively in the maritime domain, by developing security capacity building programs with third countries, with a focus on priority countries and routes. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 1.3.3. Reinforce EU delegations with security experts with a maritime focus in third countries where, along with the EU's strategic interests, maritime security is a concern. This should be done on a case by case basis, taking into account priorities and operational needs. [MS/EEAS]
- 1.3.4. Enhance the interoperability between participants in CSDP operations and missions in the global maritime domain. [MS/EEAS]

1.4. Building on existing EU cooperation, conduct maritime security capacity building activities with third countries and regional organisations in order to enhance their capacities in the fields of:

- 1) Maritime governance and rule of law, including criminal justice and maritime law enforcement;
- 2) port and maritime transport security to international agreed standards;
- 3) capabilities to manage their own borders; and
- 4) to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. (I/M/L)

- 1.4.1. Identify those regional maritime capacity building activities that offer synergies or efficiencies to reinforce existing maritime security capacity building programmes (e.g. Rabat Process). Develop

similar initiatives, where needed, with other third countries and regional organisations. Whilst ensuring local ownership, priority should be given to countries and regions where the lack of maritime security capacity has a direct impact on the security and economic prosperity of the EU and its citizens including on ports/regions with major trade flows to the EU and on countries/regions of transit and origin of migration flows. [MS/COM/EEAS]

- 1.4.2. Explore ways to take stock of and contribute to effective coordination of existing and future capacity building initiatives, drawing on lessons learned from the EU's Comprehensive Approach in the Horn of Africa, the EU Critical Maritime Routes Programme and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and the implementation of the Gulf of Guinea Strategy. Where appropriate, support the coherent implementation of regional maritime security strategies (AU, ECCAS, SADC, etc.), *inter alia*, as elaborated in the context of the Djibouti and Yaoundé Codes of Conduct. Support the establishment of maritime information sharing environment and information fusion centres (e.g. the Regional Maritime Information Sharing Center-ReMISC, and the ISCs in Mombasa and in Dar-es-Salaam) in zones of strategic interest for the EU and its Member States, based on voluntary national and regional contributions and, where appropriate, by promoting cooperation with the industry. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 1.4.3. Once developed, consider the application of the "Train and Equip" approach to the maritime domain, in line with separately agreed policies. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 1.4.4. Encourage regional fisheries management organisations to develop common procedures in case of contact with, or detection of, sea-dumped hazardous materials. [MS/COM]
- 1.4.5. Support third countries in establishing and upgrading capabilities related to maritime security, which could also include aspects of Search and Rescue, in accordance with the International Aeronautical and Maritime SAR (IAMSAR) manual and in line with international obligations within the framework of the IMO. Specific training, exercises and support, in close coordination with any pre-existing bilateral arrangements should be carried out, also through existing instruments, including within the framework of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 1.4.6. Support third countries' national policies and regional and international initiatives in addressing IUU fishing activities in order to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and address the full range of economic, social, governance, capacity building, security and development challenges linked to IUU fishing. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 1.4.7. Highlight the importance to national and regional authorities in third countries of the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), promote port security control functions and, as appropriate, capacity building for maritime security in ports and coastal waters. [MS/COM]

1.5. Review and if necessary reinforce the preparation of the EU and Member States for future maritime contingencies.

Reinforce the preparation for future maritime security contingencies and mainstreaming maritime security into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agenda, in close cooperation with all relevant EU actors, in line with the EU's comprehensive approach. (M/L)

- 1.5.1. On the basis of EU Military Rapid Response, and in line with the EUMSS, evaluate a possible further improvement of the Rapid Response mechanism for a rapid reaction at sea, taking into account the Force Catalogue and capabilities available to Member States.

Within the existing framework, evaluate options to promote an adequate maritime response in areas of instability that could affect the EU and its Member States' strategic interests. [MS/EEAS]

- 1.5.2. Based on the key tenets of the EU Maritime Security Strategy, revise and implement the Maritime Security Operations (MSO) concept. Complement the MSO concept with additional concepts as appropriate to cover the full spectrum of threats identified in the EUMSS. [MS/EEAS]
- 1.5.3. Mainstream maritime security into the Common Foreign and Security Policy agenda, in close cooperation with all relevant EU actors, in line with the EU's comprehensive approach, enhancing measures for conflict prevention and crisis management. [MS/EEAS]
- 1.5.4. Further enhance European maritime capabilities and European interoperability for maritime security operations, taking advantage of existing initiatives, such as EUROMARFOR, the European Amphibious Initiative, and the Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative, whilst also ensuring relevant coordination and complementarity between the EU and NATO.
- Work in this area should be explored also with other partner organisations. [MS/EEAS]

1.6. Promote the dispute settlement mechanisms according to the UNCLOS, including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), in the political dialogues of the EU with third countries and regional organisations. (I/M)

- 1.6.1. In the context of political dialogues of the EU with third countries and regional organisations, promote the concept of peaceful settlement of maritime disputes, the dispute settlement mechanisms provided by UNCLOS, including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice, and the full implementation of any binding decisions rendered by the courts and tribunals established under or referred to by UNCLOS. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 1.6.2. Support the establishment of mechanisms for maritime confidence-building measures (e.g. within the ARF). [MS/EEAS]
- 1.6.3. Support the development of regional codes of conduct, such as the Djibouti and the Yaoundé Codes of Conduct, on the basis of relevant provisions of international law. [MS/COM/EEAS]

1.7. Promote, in both the framework of IMO and CGPCS, the dissemination of the principles of exclusive jurisdiction of the flag-states on the high seas, as well as the functional immunity of personnel performing official duties at sea. (M)

- 1.7.1. Map international and national law, including case-law of Member States, in order to promote a EU common approach towards the mentioned principles. [COM/EEAS]

WORKSTRAND 2 : MARITIME AWARENESS, SURVEILLANCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

2.1. Further implement the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE).

Further improve cross-sectoral cooperation and interoperability at national and EU level as regards integrated maritime surveillance within the framework of the respective Member State and EU authorities and responsibilities.

Establish comprehensive ‘maritime awareness’ on maritime surveillance and maritime security to improve early warning and facilitate a timely response, having regard for regional priorities. (I/M/L)

2.1.1. Continue to implement the CISE as a meta-project by 2020 through enhanced co-operation between civil and military authorities with a view to further enhance a common maritime situational awareness picture and data exchange through the workstrands identified in the Commission communication “Better situational awareness by enhanced cooperation across maritime surveillance authorities: Next steps within the Common Information Sharing Environment for the EU maritime domain”.

To this end, Commission and Member States are invited to analyse and clarify the different sectoral approaches and projects in the field of maritime situational awareness and data exchange, as well as the role/competence of the actors involved. [MS/COM]

2.1.2. Develop measures to ensure the interoperability between sectoral information exchange systems at national and EU level (based upon the principles of collaboration and cooperation and by establishing protocols, authorizations and protections), in line with the European Interoperability Reference Architecture developed under the ISA programme of the Digital Agenda of Europe. [MS/COM]

2.1.3. Provide an overview of existing sources of funding of CISE-related projects. [MS/COM]

2.1.4. Improve cross-sectoral cooperation and interoperability – at national level – as regards integrated maritime surveillance within the framework of the respective authorities and responsibilities of the Member States, in order to arrive to a common maritime awareness picture.¹⁸ [MS]

2.1.5. Invite relevant EU agencies (e.g. EMSA, EFCA, FRONTEX, EDA and EUROPOL) and other European agencies (e.g. ESA) to reinforce inter-agency cooperation and continue supporting Member States in developing a common maritime awareness picture, in accordance with their founding Regulations. [MS/COM]

2.1.6. Promote the development of projects in the field of maritime information such as the Pre-Operational Validation project of CISE (POV CISE), as well as IMDatE in accordance with the clarifications set forth in 2.1.1. [MS/COM]

2.1.7. Improve the sharing of relevant information on sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnances. Cooperation with international partners and organisations, in this area should be explored. [MS]

18. As set forth in section VI (2) of the EUMSS.

2.2. Strengthen the cross-border cooperation and the information exchange to optimise the surveillance of the EU maritime area and its maritime borders. (I/M)

- 2.2.1. Invite participating Member States to ensure that by 2015 all civilian and military relevant authorities with responsibility for maritime border surveillance share information via the EUROSUR national situational pictures and cooperate via the EUROSUR national coordination centres on a regular basis, in order to improve situational awareness and to increase reaction capability at the external borders of the Member States of the Union for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime, and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving of lives of migrants. [MS/COM]
- 2.2.2. Member States are invited to second any needed Liaison Officers to the national coordination centres.¹⁹
Member States are invited to coordinate the patrolling activities of their national authorities responsible for maritime surveillance.
Take advantage of the lessons learned and experiences provided by the current European Patrol Network (EPN) FRONTEX Joint Operations to strengthen the cross-border cooperation. [MS]
- 2.2.3. Promote the best practices of interoperability between the relevant authorities in maritime security in the area of radio and other forms of communication. [MS]

2.3. Ensure adequate coordination between the various EU surveillance initiatives in the EU and the global maritime domain.

Support the conduct of CSDP missions and operations in the global maritime domain with EU maritime surveillance assets. (M)

- 2.3.1. In line with CISE, ensure consistency and strengthen coordination between the existing and planned maritime surveillance initiatives on the basis of existing programs and initiatives by EDA, EFCA, EMSA, EUSC, FRONTEX, and other European agencies (e.g. ESA) as well as the Earth Observation programme (Copernicus), GALILEO / EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service), and other relevant projects and initiatives. [MS/COM/EEAS/EDA]
- 2.3.2. Complement space-based technology with the applications of RPAS as well as ship reporting systems, *in situ* infrastructure (radar stations) and other surveillance tools, to ensure a global maritime awareness picture, also through the elaboration of a civil-military concept detailing specific information and operational requirements. [MS/COM/EEAS/EDA]
- 2.3.3. Further improve the Maritime Surveillance network (MARSUR) in support of CSDP, to support and promote EU and Member States' initiatives in the maritime domain and actions aimed to improve EU Maritime Surveillance and maritime security.
Invite participating Member States to ensure that by 2016 all national military operational information centres share information via MARSUR in order to support CSDP operations and missions. Improve data exchange and interoperability with the EU Critical Maritime Routes Programme, EUROSUR, the Maritime Security (MASE) Programme and other relevant programmes, and explore

19. In accordance with Article 5 of Regulation 1052/13.

- ways to improve information sharing with relevant partners, where appropriate. [MS/COM/EEAS/EDA]
- 2.3.4. Organise a “MSA Week” with the involvement of academia and the industrial sector, when appropriate. [MS/COM/EEAS/EDA]
 - 2.3.5. Promote the development of national maritime security operational coordination centres where civil-military maritime stakeholders share information and foster cooperation between these centres, taking into account section III (b) of the EUMSS and avoiding duplication, including the avoidance of overlap with the coordination centres set up under the EUROSUR Regulation. [MS]
 - 2.3.6. Intensify law enforcement activities coordinated by MAOC(N) to combat illicit trafficking of drugs across the Atlantic Ocean. [MS/COM]
 - 2.3.7. Building upon existing obligations, develop voluntary outreach programmes to encourage members of the fishing and shipping industry and recreational boating community to report suspicious activities. [MS/COM]
 - 2.3.8. Promote cooperative initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative to improve weapons of mass destruction (WMD) interdiction, in coherence with the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) convention. [MS/EEAS]
 - 2.3.9. Identify the relevant aspects of the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) mechanism which could be used to enhance sustainable maritime situational awareness in zones of strategic interest for the EU and consider developing a non-binding common reporting format to ease the transmission of reports and information, and eventually data, to shore-side authorities. [MS/EEAS]
 - 2.3.10. On a voluntary basis and in compliance with the relevant rules, share information at inter-sectoral and cross-border levels contributing to the maritime situational awareness picture with other international organisations and partners and develop common information sharing protocols, where appropriate. [MS/COM/EEAS]

WORKSTRAND 3 : CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

3.1. Identify capability areas and technologies that could benefit from continued and additional investments, improving harmonisation for better interoperability, standardisation and certification in the maritime domain. (I/M/L)

- 3.1.1. Develop technical roadmaps, mapping the process and milestones to achieve a more efficient use of resources. In the military domain, this should build upon the EU Capability Development Plan. [MS/COM/EDA]
- 3.1.2. Building on the CDP priority action “Maritime patrolling and escorting”, harmonise requirements for next generation patrol vessels and systems with the aim to support and develop collaborative programmes and activities in the field of naval logistics. [MS/EDA]
- 3.1.3. In order to enhance fair and EU-wide competition in the internal market, act to overcome fragmentation including, *inter alia*, through ensuring full implementation and application of the two

- defence Directives of 2009,²⁰ explore capabilities presently available and innovative solutions to increase sustainability and cost/efficiency of civilian and military assets and encouraging transparency; while respecting Member States' legitimate national security concerns. [MS/COM/EDA]
- 3.1.4. Explore the creation and best use of synergies between information, capabilities and systems managed by civilian and military authorities up to multipurpose and multinational initiatives, so that, where appropriate, certain tasks currently performed at national level can be carried out in common. [MS/COM/EDA]
 - 3.1.5. Taking into account existing work, identify and actively promote areas where standardisation and certification can improve efficiency and reduce the cost of maritime capabilities by enabling, *inter alia*, cross-national asset maintenance and training of maintenance personnel. [MS/COM/EDA]
 - 3.1.6. Promote and elicit Member States' initiatives in the maritime domain aimed to improve energy efficiency, in line with the 2030 targets highlighted in the climate and energy framework. [MS/COM/EDA]
 - 3.1.7. Promote the establishment of links to foster cooperation in the area of maritime capability development between EU agencies, research centres and centres of excellence of EU Member States, including those NATO-accredited ones that are open to all Member States. [MS/COM/EDA]
 - 3.1.8. In order to ensure the competitiveness of the industry as a whole, evaluate how to promote an enabling framework of civil-military related shipbuilding industry and linked activities. [MS/COM/EDA]
 - 3.1.9. Explore how to harmonize policies of Member States' and promote and maintain a high level of Member States' industrial cooperation as a means to foster maritime security, realising economies of scale and increasing competitiveness. [MS]
 - 3.1.10. Identify specific future strategic technological challenges and build capacities to meet them via innovation, R&D and standardization taking into due account the European Strategic Cluster Partnership, the Enterprise European Network and the promotion of regional networking to integrate industrial and research assets related to maritime security into regional smart specialization strategies. [MS/COM]
 - 3.1.11. Invite Member States to evaluate the quantitative/qualitative adequacy of assets currently available for patrol missions. Identify the optimal level needed to face the expected security threats at sea and, if appropriate, support a pre-commercial prototype procurement scheme, upon Member States request. [MS/COM]
 - 3.1.12. Foster cooperation in the area of maritime polar capabilities, building upon the EDA's work. [MS/EDA]

20. Directive 2009/81/EC (Coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security) and Directive 2009/43/EC (Simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community).

3.2. Explore the possibilities to develop dual-use and multipurpose capabilities and explore options for their use.

In doing so, ensure that such initiatives contribute to the EU capacity to act, and result in unchanged or greater levels of investment by the Member States in capability development and research. (I/M/L)

- 3.2.1. Maximise coordination between EDA programmes and the outcome of EU civil research programmes in areas of dual-use technologies and examine modalities for dual-use capabilities, building upon and expanding the scope of the European Framework Cooperation (EFC), *inter alia* by identifying pilot projects in the area of RPAS, satellite communications, high resolution satellite imagery, tracking of signals and detection of vessels by underwater technologies, information exchange, cyber security and maritime security, in order to support Member States' activities in these areas, bearing in mind that military capabilities are owned and operated by Member States. [MS/COM/EDA]
- 3.2.2. Improve the integration of a cyber security dimension in the maritime domain in terms of capabilities, research and technologies, building on civil-military coordination and synergies with EU cyber policies developed in the framework of the EU Cyber Security Strategy. [MS/COM/EEAS/EDA]
- 3.2.3. Building on the EU Cyber Security Strategy, develop cyber crime prevention and cyber defence capabilities in order to secure the EU capacity building programmes in the field of maritime security, as well as to reinforce cyber incident response capabilities of CSDP structures, missions and operations, in line with the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. [MS/COM/EEAS/EDA]
- 3.2.4. Continue to upgrade and standardize the characteristics of air, naval and other maritime assets optimised for patrol missions in the global maritime domain. [MS/EDA]
- 3.2.5. Explore the added value of EU-owned, developed, coordinated, managed or leased dual-use capabilities in areas of critical capability requirements, whilst noting that all military capabilities remain owned, controlled and operated by Member States. [MS/COM/EEAS/EDA]
- 3.2.6. Enhance mutual knowledge of operational maritime and air assets with a perspective to develop joint operations and interoperability of capabilities. [MS]
- 3.2.7. Explore the potential and cost-effectiveness for multi-purpose/dual-use ships and maritime systems, taking advantage of the benefit of a mission modular approach to the development of future naval/maritime capabilities and the implications for the European naval and maritime industry and the naval defence competitiveness levels in the global domain. [MS/COM/EDA]
- 3.2.8. Explore the potential benefits deriving from a cross-sectoral cooperation in the areas of naval logistic and training vessel. [MS/EDA]
- 3.2.9. Also in line with the CDP priority action "Maritime Patrolling and Escorting", explore the potential to develop sea-based modular systems to increase flexibility and affordability for deployed forces. [MS/EDA]
- 3.2.10. Building on the CDP priority action "Naval Surveillance systems":
 - conduct work on unmanned maritime underwater systems;
 - optimise existing Maritime Patrol Vessels capability in view of mitigating potential future shortfalls in Maritime Patrol Aircraft;
 - explore the possibility of employment of a long endurance maritime RPAS. [MS/EDA]

3.3. Promote greater sharing of best practices, risk analysis and threat information amongst all relevant fora.

Making best use of and creating synergies between information, capabilities and systems managed by civilian and military authorities up to multipurpose and multinational missions.

Promote pooling and sharing initiatives and projects, pursued by Member States including through EDA and other relevant civilian and military actors; good coordination and mutual reinforcement with NATO in order to ensure complementarity and increase coherence should continue (M/L)

- 3.3.1. Promote greater sharing of best practices, risk analysis and threat information, where appropriate in cooperation with social partners acting in the ports and maritime transport sectors and offshore installations where necessary. [MS/COM]
- 3.3.2. Continue monitoring and inspections conducted by the Commission and related to the implementation of European legislation pertaining to maritime transport security by Member States and operators. [COM]
- 3.3.3. Support both at national, sub-regional and European level better exchange of information and of best practices among authorities and between authorities and operators. [MS/COM]
- 3.3.4. Improve coherent application of maritime security and the security of the supply chain, by enhancing practical cooperation and information exchange between competent authorities. Ensure coordination of relevant policies at international level. [MS/COM]
- 3.3.5. Develop, as appropriate, further cooperation between authorities performing coast guard functions in order to strengthen the cross-sectoral approach to maritime security. [MS]
- 3.3.6. Promote and support greater sharing of best practice, risk analysis and threat information amongst all relevant fora such as the European Coast Guard Functions Forum (ECGFF) and the Chiefs of European Navies (CHEN), taking into account the maritime operational plans in force between Member States and the regional agreements in the EU. [MS/COM]
- 3.3.7. Explore pooling and sharing initiatives including in the framework of the EU Emergency Response Capacity. [MS/COM/EDA]

WORKSTRAND 4: RISK MANAGEMENT, PROTECTION OF CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE AND CRISIS RESPONSE

4.1. Conduct common risk analyses in order to establish a shared maritime security risk management, also taking into account the protection of the EU's marine environmental status (M/L)

- 4.1.1. Pursue a shared and comprehensive approach to maritime security risk management, also based upon national risk analyses. Develop the risk management model between Member States and Agencies for maritime security by reviewing the present situation in order to identify needs, possible overlaps and gaps. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 4.1.2. Explore novel information-based risk analysis techniques as well as data sources currently not exploited, to enhance risk assessment and response capacity. [MS/COM/EEAS]

- 4.1.3. Support information-exchange based initiatives to improve the common pre-arrival security risk assessment for the movement of goods through the global supply chain. [MS/COM]
- 4.1.4. Undertake research on enhanced protection of borders, especially with regard to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, advanced sealing technologies (contributing to container security) and trade analysis for strategic goods in support of non-proliferation. [MS/COM]
- 4.1.5. Explore the establishment of links with the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative to develop further information exchange. [MS/EEAS]
- 4.1.6. Share maritime security-related intelligence information based on a joined-up threat and risk assessment on a voluntary basis within the framework of existing legislation, *inter alia* through regular maritime security workshops. [MS/EEAS]
- 4.1.7. Encourage the development of contingency and response plans and implementation of guidelines for securing strategic sea lines of communications, sea-based energy corridors, offshore installations and other critical infrastructures, such as those related to energy security, in the maritime domain. [MS/COM]
- 4.1.8. In line with the EU Cybersecurity Strategy, on-going work on the proposed Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive and the NIS Platform, foster a holistic, risk-based approach to Cybersecurity in the maritime sector to ensure a high level of cyber resilience of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) networks and systems supporting critical maritime infrastructures. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 4.1.9. Building on existing initiatives, such as the CHEMSEA project and others, encourage national authorities to draw up unified response models, notably by establishing a common contingency plan for emergency response to incidents and by creating a database of incidents and reporting systems, such as those related to sea-dumped chemical munitions. Enhance the interoperability to survey and combat against illegal accidental discharge, in particular oil and other chemicals. [MS/COM]
- 4.1.10. Seek to ensure the safe and secure maritime transportation of dangerous goods in the waters bordering EU Member States' territorial waters whilst recalling existing pollution response and combating mechanisms and encouraging cooperation between Member States and third countries. [MS/COM]

4.2. Take initiatives on enhanced cross-sectoral and cross-border cooperation for maritime crisis response and contingency planning in relation to defined security threats, by taking into account the Council Decision on the arrangements for the implementation of the solidarity Clause. (M/L)

- 4.2.1. Develop a process to share, where appropriate, Member States' civil-military contingency and response plans in areas of interest. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 4.2.2. Develop or support the development of EU maritime exercises to enhance readiness and preparedness of Member States and EU capacities to respond to security threats as defined in the EUMSS, including consequences of climate change, taking into account impact, level of vulnerability and adaptation measures in Member States. [MS/COM/EEAS]

- 4.2.3. Optimize EU maritime civil-military Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Response Teams and Member States' military assets, on a voluntary and case-by-case basis, as a contribution to EU-coordinated HA/DR response operations. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 4.2.4. Establish a link with ongoing work on disaster risk management planning under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 4.2.5. Conduct, in accordance with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism,²¹ cross-border maritime exercises to train and enhance Participating States to the mechanism, EU and European Neighbourhood Policy country capacities for disaster management and in responding to security threats, as defined in the EUMSS. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 4.2.6. Evaluate possible contributions from Member States' civil and military assets, such as mine hunter and hydro-oceanographic research vessels, for underwater archaeological research. In this context, address illegal and unregulated archaeological research and pillage of archaeological objects. [MS]
- 4.2.7. Explore on the basis of already existing information and in full respect of the principle of functional integrity, how to draw on/make best use of existing information-sharing tools, also building on cooperation with the EU agencies, through a European cross-sectoral maritime situational awareness outlook at EU strategic level, possibly in the form of a regular bulletin, in order to provide EU institutions and Member States with a sustainable watch of actions. [MS/COM/EEAS]

4.3. Assess the resilience of maritime transport infrastructure to man-made and natural disasters and climate change.

Take appropriate adaptive actions, including the sharing of best practices, in order to mitigate the related security risks. (M/L)

- 4.3.1. Promote the implementation of climate risk and vulnerability assessments and the establishment of adaptation and risk management measures for (critical) maritime infrastructure. [MS/COM]
- 4.3.2. Compile lessons learned from R&D on resilient supply chains for maritime transport logistics to withstand shocks from terrorist attacks or other equivalent acts to critical infrastructures such as hubs, ports, off shore installations, etc. [MS/COM]
- 4.3.3. Support and stimulate the work of European standardisation organisations in identifying and revising European Standards in the areas of energy, transport and buildings, with the aim of building and maintaining a more climate-resilient maritime infrastructure in the EU. [MS/COM]
- 4.3.4. Encourage collaborative activity by Member States and with partners in order to identify critical energy transit routes and promote freedom and security of navigation. [MS/EEAS]
- 4.3.5. Promote the sharing of best practice and lessons learned related to the protection of critical maritime infrastructure and maritime transport, including *inter alia*, through the web-based European Climate Adaptation Platform, taking advantage of a possible EU cross-sectoral maritime situational awareness outlook. [MS/COM/EEAS]

21. The Mechanism currently includes 31 countries: all 28 EU Member States in addition to Iceland, Norway and FYROM (the latter currently renewing its membership). Montenegro and Serbia are in a process of joining the mechanism.

4.4. Promoting a mutual understanding to increase interoperability amongst maritime security actors. (M/L)

- 4.4.1. Explore the possible need to elaborate non-binding guidelines that allow the various stakeholders to respond consistently in similar maritime security situations. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 4.4.2. Elaborate a glossary of all terms used in the field of Maritime Security to promote commonly shared definitions. [COM/EEAS]

WORKSTRAND 5: MARITIME SECURITY RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

5.1. Bring together the available maritime security-related training courses in common Maritime Training Modules.

Establish new and develop further existing networks for knowledge and competence development in the field of maritime security for civilian and military educational institutes, centres and academies. (I/M)

- 5.1.1. Further support specialised high-level maritime security training, including coast guard functions, building on the EU agencies' and Member States' Qualification Frameworks, with a view to developing, establishing, promoting and implementing minimum common training standards, on a voluntary basis. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 5.1.2. Create an inventory of existing networks for knowledge and competence development in the area of maritime security and develop on this basis, also taking into account the contribution of the ESDC, a European Maritime Academy Network (Navy and Marine Academies, Maritime Chairs of Universities and Coast Guard functions). [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 5.1.3. Explore exchanges and academic competitions among civil-military officers from Member States, *inter alia*, through strategic partnerships under Erasmus+. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 5.1.4. Conduct an inventory of existing maritime training material, notably those endorsed at international level, which could be a basis to develop common curricula. [MS/COM/EEAS/EDA]
- 5.1.5. Invite relevant agencies in accordance with their founding Regulations to organise training courses and open these to eligible third countries, if appropriate. [MS/COM]
- 5.1.6. Include emergency response training in the Exercise Policy of the EU under the CFSP and in EU and national exercise calendars. [MS/EEAS]
- 5.1.7. Acknowledge the activity of international academies, such as the Maritime Labour Academy of the International Labour Organisation, the IMO International Maritime Law Institute or the IMO World Maritime University, and provide support to them as appropriate. [MS/COM]
- 5.1.8. Enhance Oceanographic knowledge & information and data sharing and cooperation, also on the basis of European Marine Observation and Data Network (EMODNET).
Improve ocean observation capacities (including real-time observations). Develop through increased cooperation between Member States common initiatives to better monitor the oceans from the surface to the seabed and develop educational and training programmes to improve oceanographic forecasting capacities.

- Improve common competences and initiatives in underwater research. [MS/COM]
- 5.1.9. Develop the capacity to provide Rapid Environmental Assessment support to CSDP missions and operations by fostering cooperation at national and EU level between meteorological and oceanographic institutes, in particular in the field of ocean weather forecasting. [MS/EEAS]
 - 5.1.10. Seek to organize, among civilian and military educational institutes, centres and academies, multi-disciplinary expert workshops to identify solutions to counter known threats as well as emerging ones, without duplication of effort. [MS/COM/EEAS]
 - 5.1.11. Foster cooperation in the area of maritime security research and innovation, education and training, by promoting the establishment of links between EU agencies, research, training and education centres and centres of excellence of EU Member States, including those NATO-accredited ones that are open to all EU Member States. [MS/COM/EEAS/EDA]
 - 5.1.12. Building on the work of the EDA Project Team, continue to develop Naval Training modules, and explore opportunities to expand this approach to related maritime training. [MS/EEAS/EDA]

5.2. Establish a civil-military agenda for research and innovation in support of maritime security including the development of dual-use and multipurpose capabilities in support of Member State capabilities.

Promote public-private partnerships to accelerate technology development.

Create a network of global research and development partners. (M/L)

- 5.2.1. Mobilise EU research and innovation-related activities, in order to promote research into dual-use goods that contribute to improve maritime security and initiatives for capability development including coordination and the use of results stemming from Horizon 2020.²² In doing so, involve research centres, maritime authorities, including EU agencies, in order to better align research activities with user requirements and to overcome the fragmentation of security demand at the EU level among European suppliers. [MS/COM/EDA]
- 5.2.2. Develop proposals to achieve synergies between research activities conducted under Horizon 2020 and EDA R&T programmes, through better coordination, building upon and expanding the scope of the European Framework Cooperation (EFC), and taking into account activities proposed in the 2013 Defence Communication and the 2014 Implementation Roadmap. [COM/EDA]
- 5.2.3. In the context of ongoing consultations, consider the potential for maritime research in the framework of the Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research. [MS/COM/EDA]
- 5.2.4. Consider the establishment of a network of R&D experts to create a clear vision and propose a cross-sectoral agenda for maritime security research. The participating experts will be sourced from end-user authorities, research and industry, and will include representatives of Member States, Commission, EDA and EEAS. This network will:
 - a. Identify capability gaps requiring technological solutions and also promising innovative technologies that will have dual-use or cross-sectoral benefit. These may relate to, among others,

22. Regulation (EU) 1291/2013, in particular art.19.2. This footnote also applies to all the following references to Horizon 2020.

maritime surveillance and situation awareness, information sharing, unmanned systems, environmental and energy aspects and innovative sensors;

- b. Assess recent and current R&D funding programs (FP7, Horizon 2020, EDA R&T programmes) to determine if coordination on identified and/or possible dual-use and cross sectoral gaps are adequately addressed, including standardization, harmonization and interoperability objectives;
- c. Work towards a joint civil-military research agenda for maritime security research based on the above analyses. [MS/COM/EDA]

5.2.5. Explore the access to the national/transnational use of European Structural and Investment Funds, to promote innovation and dual-use R&T and R&D across the maritime technological and industrial base and particularly SMEs, including for start-ups, building also on on-going EDA efforts and in coordination with the Commission. On the basis of existing Regulations, explore how to facilitate access to the mentioned European Funds, including Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+ for actions provided within the present Action Plan, where appropriate. [MS/COM/EDA]

5.2.6. Taking advantage of the full potential of key enabling technologies (KETs), explore R&T and R&D related to systems/subsystems to contribute to a standardized approach. In doing so, take into due consideration the use of KETs, in order to allow efficient allocation and spending of financial resources, cut back operational costs, pool demand and harmonize requirements. [MS/COM/EDA]

5.2.7. Explore innovative sensors applications to improve the early detection and continuous tracking of small vessels, with a focus on (a) advanced technologies to independently verify self-reporting systems and help detect non-reporting ships, and (b) novel platforms to improve the highly-needed continuous surveillance. [MS/COM/EDA]

5.2.8. Seek active involvement of industry stakeholders and social partners to develop an improved understanding of the critical technologies and industrial capabilities required to sustain future maritime capabilities and how better to enable European companies to operate freely in all Member States. [MS/COM]

5.2.9. Address research and innovation challenges related to maritime cyber security in Horizon 2020 and contribute to the work of the NIS Platform to maximize synergies and cross-fertilization between the maritime sector, the ICT industry and other industry sectors, as well as academia. [MS/COM]

5.2.10. Promote public-private partnerships (PPP) on Maritime Surveillance which should involve end-users, industry, academia and research and technology centres to address research, development and innovation tasks. [MS/COM]

5.3. Promoting the conduct of inter-agency, joined-up exercises. (M/L)

5.3.1. Include maritime security aspects in EU exercises in accordance with the EU Exercise Policy, making best use of maritime exercises conducted by Member States, involving civil-military assets aimed at enhancing pan-European cooperation. [MS/EEAS]

5.3.2. Conduct inter-agency, joined-up exercises in the field of humanitarian assistance, disaster-relief, mass casualty rescue and crisis-response. [MS/COM/EEAS]

5.3.3. Develop an EU programme of national interagency maritime security exercises. [MS/COM/EEAS]

- 5.3.4. Promote, on an ongoing basis, EU and Member States' maritime security exercises between internal security and law enforcement authorities involving civilian and military maritime authorities/agencies. [MS/COM/EEAS]
- 5.3.5. Promote exercises and training programmes, without unnecessary duplications, for the disposal of sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnances, improving also the emergency procedures in case of accidental recovery of sea-dumped chemical munitions and unexploded ordnances. [MS/COM/EEAS]

Follow-up

As stated in the EUMSS, the Action Plan aims at delivering cross-sectoral actions in a comprehensive and coordinated manner, mainstreaming maritime security into EU policies, strategies and instruments. Its implementation and review, in accordance with its delivery horizon, should be coordinated by the Friends of the Presidency Group.

The Friends of the Presidency Group should convene at least once each semester, starting from January 2015, to assess the progress of the implementation of the Action Plan and to contribute to the provision of political guidance.

Relevant Council preparatory bodies are invited to support and inform the work of the Friends of the Presidency Group according to their institutional role and fields of expertise. Council Working Parties are requested to assess whether and to what extent implementation of the Action Plan falls within their respective areas of responsibility and provide input to the Friends of the Presidency Group accordingly.

The Commission and the High Representative are invited to jointly assure the follow-up of this Action Plan through existing working bodies and expert groups, either in their current or upgraded composition, taking into account their respective areas of responsibility and competence. Relevant actors at EU and Member State level (both civilian and military) should be invited to attend those meetings. Regular reporting on the activities of the expert groups will be provided to the Friends of the Presidency Group, including on best practice and lessons learned.

ANNEX

List of references

General

- European Union Maritime Security Strategy (24.6.2014) - 11205/14 - link
- JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL - For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy JOIN/2014/09 final - link
- UN Convention On the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) of 10 December 1982 - link
- Declaration of the European Ministers responsible for the Integrated Maritime Policy and the European Commission, on a Marine and Maritime Agenda for growth and jobs the "Limassol Declaration" - link

- COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS - An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union COM/2007/0575 final - link
- COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS - Blue Growth opportunities for marine and maritime sustainable growth - COM/2012/0494 final - link

Ukraine/Russia/Crimea

Council conclusions on Ukraine

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Brussels, 3 March 2014

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“1. The European Union strongly condemns the clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by acts of aggression by the Russian armed forces as well as the authorisation given by the Federation Council of Russia on 1 March for the use of the armed forces on the territory of Ukraine. These actions are in clear breach of the UN Charter and the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, as well as of Russia’s specific commitments to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 1997. These actions are also a clear breach of the Ukrainian constitution which specifically recognises the territorial integrity of the country and states that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea can only organise referenda on local matters but not on the modification of the territorial configuration of Ukraine.

2. The EU calls on Russia to immediately withdraw its armed forces to the areas of their permanent stationing, in accordance with the Agreement on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet stationing on the territory of Ukraine of 1997. Russia should also without delay agree to the request by Ukraine to hold consultations, as foreseen in the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 1997, and to take part in urgent consultations among all signatories and adherents of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994.

3. The EU calls for a peaceful solution to the current crisis and full respect of the principles of and obligations under international law. The EU remains ready to engage in and promote any constructive dialogue with all parties aimed at reaching such a peaceful solution and will continue its engagement in international facilitation efforts, working with the UN, the OSCE, and other international actors, including on proposals for international observation and mediation, and welcomes a possible OSCE fact-finding mission in this regard.

4. The Council recalls the EU’s ambitions and openness to a relationship with Russia based on mutual interest and respect and regrets that these common objectives have now been put in doubt. The EU and those Member States who are participants of G8, have decided for the time being to suspend their participation in activities associated with the preparations for the G8 Summit in Sochi in June, until the environment comes back where the G8 is able to have meaningful discussion. In the absence of de-escalating steps by Russia, the EU shall decide about consequences for bilateral relations between the EU and Russia, for instance suspending bilateral talks with Russia on visa matters as well as on the New Agreement, and will consider further targeted measures. The Council decides to remain permanently seized, in order to be in a position to take rapidly all necessary measures.

5. The European Union commends the measured response demonstrated so far by Ukraine. The European Union stands by the efforts of the new Ukrainian Government to stabilise the situation and pursue the course of reforms. The EU reaffirms the necessity of further constitutional reform in Ukraine and to hold free, fair and transparent Presidential elections with OSCE-ODIHR observation. The EU reaffirms the utmost importance of ensuring inclusiveness at all levels of government by the Ukrainian authorities, including through steps designed to reach out to all Ukrainian regions, population groups and to ensure full protection of national minorities in accordance with Ukraine's international commitments. In this regard, it encourages Ukraine to draw on the expertise of the Council of Europe and the OSCE.

6. The EU is ready to further pursue its efforts with the international community and international financial institutions, especially the IMF, to assist Ukraine. To this end, the EU and its Member States will lend their full support to an international assistance package to address the urgent needs of Ukraine, based on a clear commitment to reforms. The Council welcomes the efforts already undertaken by the Commission, which has dispatched a fact-finding mission to Kyiv in parallel to the IMF mission. The Council also encourages interested third countries to join such an international assistance package. Recalling its conclusions of 20 February 2014, the Council agreed to swiftly work on the adoption of restrictive measures for the freezing and recovery of assets of persons identified as responsible for the misappropriation of State funds, and the freezing of assets of persons responsible for human rights violations.

7. The Council reconfirms its offer of the Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. The Agreement would bring opportunities for sustainable economic development and prosperity to all the regions of Ukraine, including Crimea, as well as to its neighbours. The Agreement does not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine cooperation. The EU reiterates its commitment to enhance people-to-people contacts between the EU and Ukraine, i.a. through the visa liberalisation process, in line with agreed conditions in the framework of the VLAP.

8. The Council calls on High Representative Catherine Ashton to continue her contacts with all parties with a view to contributing to a peaceful resolution of this crisis.”

Council conclusions on Ukraine

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Luxembourg, 14 April 2014

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“1. The European Union condemns actions undertaken by armed individuals in cities of Eastern Ukraine. These attempts at destabilising Ukraine must come to an end. The Council calls on all parties to engage in a dialogue in view of a peaceful solution. The Council decides on expanding the list of those subject to assets freeze and visa ban.

The Council reiterates its strong support for Ukraine's unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and calls upon Russia to do likewise and to repudiate the latest lawless acts in Eastern Ukraine and to contribute to stabilize the situation. It demands Russia to call back its troops from the Ukrainian border and

immediately withdraw the mandate of the Federation Council to use force on Ukrainian soil. Any threat or use of force against Ukraine or any other countries is not acceptable and must stop immediately. The EU calls on all parties to keep utmost restraint and commends the Ukrainian authorities for pursuing their law and order operations in a measured manner and encourages the government in Kyiv to contribute further to reducing tensions.

2. The EU reiterates its strong condemnation of the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and will not recognise it. The EU welcomes the adoption of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly No. 68/262. The Council looks forward to the Commission's evaluation of the legal consequences of the annexation of Crimea and to the related proposals for economic, trade and financial restrictions regarding Crimea.

3. The EU reiterates the importance of Russia's and Ukraine's engagement in a meaningful dialogue, including through the establishment of a multilateral mechanism, with a view to finding a political solution, based on full respect for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including the right of Ukraine to decide on its own constitution and political future. The European Union is ready to participate in such an international mechanism. In this context, the Council welcomes the forthcoming meeting with the participation of the High Representative and Foreign Ministers of Ukraine, Russia and the US, as a possible start of a substantial de-escalation process. The Council expresses the view that possible options in order to stabilise the economic situation in Ukraine could also be discussed at this upcoming meeting. The Council calls on the Russian Federation to demonstrate with supportive measures its readiness to participate in stabilising the Ukrainian economy.

4. The Council supports the work already undertaken by the OSCE Monitoring Mission, which is of utmost importance in monitoring developments in Ukraine and will continue to provide its support to this mission. The Council shares the concerns expressed by representatives of the OSCE and the Council of Europe about current restrictions on their ability to observe the situation in the area of human rights, including of persons belonging to national minorities, in Crimea.

5. The Council is ready to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, support of police and rule of law. In this regard the Council tasks the EEAS to deploy an expert mission to prepare for appropriate assistance complementary with other on-going efforts and elaborate a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA), examining all options, including through a possible CSDP mission, with a view to a decision on further EU action at its next meeting.

6. The Council recalls that any further steps by the Russian Federation to destabilise the situation in Ukraine would lead to additional and far-reaching consequences for relations in a broad range of economic areas between the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand. In this respect, the Council notes that the preparatory work by the Commission and Member States is underway on possible targeted measures, as requested by the European Council in March so that further steps can be taken should events require.

7. The Council encourages Ukraine to continue to move ahead with its course of political reforms, as planned and announced by the Ukrainian Government, including notably the constitutional reform. The EU welcomes the will of the Ukrainian government to implement its commitments to ensure the representative nature and inclusiveness of governmental structures, reflecting regional diversity, to ensure the full protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, to investigate all human rights violations and acts of violence and

to fight extremism. In this context, the Council welcomes the inauguration of the International Advisory Panel of the Council of Europe on 9 April.

The Council welcomes the recent parliamentary resolution calling for the immediate disarmament of all illegal self-defence forces and looks forward to its implementation. The Council strongly supports the holding of free and fair Presidential elections on 25 May. The EU Member States will actively participate in the OSCE observation mission. The EU and its Member States stand ready to assist the Ukrainian government in building trust across the country.

8. The Council reiterates the EU's commitment to sign the remaining provisions of the Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, as soon as possible after the presidential elections on 25 May. The Council adopted today the Regulation on the reduction or elimination of customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine, which will represent a meaningful support measure to Ukraine until 1 November 2014, pending signature and provisional application of the DCFTA.

9. The Council reiterates its commitment to stand by Ukraine and to provide strong financial support to its economic and financial stabilisation, recalling the critical importance of IMF support and welcoming the staff level agreement reached between the IMF and the Ukrainian authorities on 27 March. The Council looks forward to the decision of the IMF Executive Board on a new Stand-By Arrangement. The Council adopted today the Decision on the macro-financial assistance for Ukraine establishing clear conditions for its future disbursement. This will bring the total amount to EUR 1.6 billion.

10. The Council welcomes the creation of the Support Group for Ukraine which will work on the implementation of the "European Agenda for reform". At the same time, the Council recalls the importance for Ukraine to swiftly implement an ambitious set of structural reforms, including the fight against corruption, public finance management and budget transparency. The EU calls on all interested parties to contribute to the further stabilisation and development of Ukraine.

11. The Council confirms the EU's readiness to explore ways to assist Ukraine in securing its energy supply through further diversification, including through the rapid enhancement of reverse flow capacities, enhanced energy efficiency, and effective interconnections with and within the European Union. Such assistance must be combined with Ukraine's efforts to reform and modernise its energy sector, in line with Ukraine's commitments in the Energy Community Treaty.

The Council takes note of the letter of President Putin of 10 April to several EU Member States. The Council asks the European Commission to reply, on the basis of consultations with Member States, to the President of the Russian Federation on behalf of EU and its Member States, in order to agree on consultations with Russia and Ukraine with a view to ensuring security of supply and transit.

The Council expresses deep concern regarding the unilateral increase of gas prices applied to Ukraine and expresses a firm conviction that all differences of views on the price and conditions of gas supplies should be solved through negotiations and available legal mechanisms, with a view to stabilising the economic situation in Ukraine. Energy relations must be based on reciprocity, transparency, fairness, non-discrimination, openness to competition and continued cooperation to ensure a level playing field for the safe and secure supply of energy.

Georgia and the Republic of Moldova

12. Acknowledging the efforts and achievements of the Republic of Moldova in that respect, the Council welcomes the Regulation 259/2014 of 3 April 2014 on the visa-free travel for the citizens of the Republic of Moldova holding biometric passports starting from 28 April 2014.

13. The European Union reaffirms its support for political association and economic integration with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and looks forward to early signature of the Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas no later than June 2014. It recalls that such association and integration is compatible with enhanced relations of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova with all their partners. The European Union is confident that further deepening of EU-Georgia and EU-Republic of Moldova relations will have a positive impact on stability and socio-economic development, for the benefit of all the citizens of the two countries. The EU encourages Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to continue implementing reforms as part of their commitment to further strengthen the political association and economic integration with the EU.”

Statement by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and the President of the European Commission in the name of the European Union on the agreed additional restrictive measures against Russia

Brussels, 29 July 2014, EUCO 158/14, PRESSE 436, PR PCE 140

Today the European Union has agreed a package of significant additional restrictive measures targeting sectoral cooperation and exchanges with the Russian Federation. These decisions will limit access to EU capital markets for Russian State-owned financial institutions, impose an embargo on trade in arms, establish an export ban for dual-use goods for military end users, and curtail Russian access to sensitive technologies particularly in the field of the oil sector.

This package reinforces the recently expanded listing of persons and entities undermining Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty, including the so-called “cronies”, the suspension of EIB and EBRD financing, the restriction of investment and trade with Crimea and Sevastopol and the reassessment of the Russia EU bilateral cooperation with a view to reducing the level of the cooperation.

The package responds to directions given by the European Council of 16 July. It is meant as a strong warning: illegal annexation of territory and deliberate destabilisation of a neighbouring sovereign country cannot be accepted in 21st century Europe. Furthermore, when the violence created spirals out of control and leads to the killing of almost 300 innocent civilians in their flight from the Netherlands to Malaysia, the situation requires urgent and determined response. The European Union will fulfil its obligations to protect and ensure the security of its citizens. And the European Union will stand by its neighbours and partners.

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the European Union has been calling on the Russian leadership to work towards a peaceful resolution. We have done this collectively and bilaterally. We regret to say that despite some mixed messages coming from Moscow, and exchanges in the Normandy and other formats, there has been

scarce delivery on commitments. Our call has been, in practice, left unheeded. Arms and fighters continue flowing into Ukraine from the Russian Federation. Strong Russian State sponsored nationalist propaganda continues supporting the illegal actions of armed separatists. We have witnessed with anger and frustration the delays in providing international access to the site of the air crash, the tampering with the remains of the plane, and the disrespectful handling of the deceased.

The Russian Federation and the European Union have important common interests. We will both benefit from open and frank dialogue, from increased cooperation and exchanges. But we cannot pursue this important positive agenda when Crimea is illegally annexed, when the Russian Federation supports armed revolt in Eastern Ukraine, when the violence unleashed kills innocent civilians.

The package of new restrictive measures agreed today by the European Union constitutes a powerful signal to the leaders of the Russian Federation: destabilising Ukraine, or any other Eastern European neighbouring State, will bring heavy costs to its economy. Russia will find itself increasingly isolated by its own actions. The European Union remains ready to reverse its decisions and reengage with Russia when it starts contributing actively and without ambiguities to finding a solution to the Ukrainian crisis.

For more information on EU restrictive measures in view of the crisis in Ukraine, see background note.

Joint statement of the Council and the Commission on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement¹

Council of the European Union, General Affairs Council meeting

Brussels, 29 September 2014

“The Council and the Commission

1. Welcome the ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which constitutes a single instrument, by the Ukrainian Parliament and the consent given by the European Parliament on 16 September 2014, and look forward to a swift completion of the ratification by all Member States.

2. Refer to the Joint Ministerial Statement of 12 September on the implementation of the EU- Ukraine Association Agreement/DCFTA, and underline the importance for all parties to strictly abide by their commitments therein. This statement is part and parcel of a comprehensive peace process in Ukraine, respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the right of Ukraine to decide on its destiny.

3. Recall that the Association Agreement is a bilateral agreement and any adaptations to it can only be made at the request of one of the parties and with the agreement of the other, according to the mechanisms foreseen in the text and in compliance with international law and with the respective internal procedures of the parties.

1. Joint statement of the Council and the Commission in respect of the Council decision amending decision 2014/668/EU on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their member states, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards Title III (with the exception of the provisions relating to the treatment of third-country nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of the other party) and Titles IV, V, VI and VII thereof, as well as the related annexes and protocols.

4. Encourage Ukraine, following the start of provisional application of the relevant provisions of Titles I-III and V-VII, to continue the process of envisaged reforms and economic modernisation, in accordance with its international commitments and with EU support and monitoring.

5. Reaffirm the importance of adequate preparation for the implementation of Title IV of the Association Agreement, in line with the timeframe specified in the Council Decision, and taking into account Ukraine's international commitments.”

Council conclusions on Ukraine

Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs Council meeting

Luxembourg, 20 October 2014

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“1. Recalling its conclusions of 15 August and the European Council conclusions of 30 August, the Council welcomes the Minsk Protocol of 5 September and the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September, agreed in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group, as a step towards a sustainable political solution of the crisis, which needs to be based on the respect for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Council takes good note of the decreased overall level of violence as a result of the agreed ceasefire but regrets and condemns the continued numerous violations of it. The Council welcomes the releases of hostages so far and calls for all the remaining hostages to be released. It commends Ukraine's efforts to implement its commitments, in particular through the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of the laws on amnesty and on interim local self-governance. The Council reiterates the important role of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in implementing the Minsk Protocol and the Minsk Memorandum and the need to provide the Mission with the resources needed to comply with the tasks. The Council reminds all parties concerned of their responsibility for a safe environment for the OSCE monitors. The EU and Member States stand ready to provide increased financial and in kind support to the OSCE SMM.

2. The Council expects the parties' full engagement and swift implementation of all other commitments under the Minsk documents. The Council underlines the Russian Federation's responsibility in this context, and calls for the withdrawal of illegal armed groups, military equipment, fighters and mercenaries, as well as for the securing of the Ukrainian-Russian border with permanent monitoring under OSCE verification. The Council supports swift expansion and extension of the OSCE Observer Mission to Russian checkpoints to ensure effective and full control of the border by Ukraine and calls on the Russian Federation to do the same.

It also expects the unwavering practical commitment by the parties to the holding of the early local elections in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in full conformity with Ukrainian law and international standards, as foreseen by the Minsk Protocol and by the law on interim self-governance. The Council encourages the Government of Ukraine to invite OSCE/ODIHR to observe these elections and calls on all parties to ensure safe and secure conditions for such an Election Observation Mission, should it take place. The holding of “presidential” and “parliamentary” elections, called by the self-appointed authorities, would run counter to the letter

and the spirit of the Minsk Protocol and disrupt progress towards finding a sustainable political solution in this framework. The EU would not recognise them.

3. The Council reiterates its call upon all States and actors in the region to ensure safe and unrestricted access to the crash site of MH17, to allow resumption of the investigation onsite and complete repatriation of the remains and belongings of the victims still present at the site. Those directly and indirectly responsible for the downing of MH17 should be held accountable and brought to justice as soon as possible.

4. The European Union is concerned by the increasingly serious humanitarian impact of the crisis in eastern Ukraine. The Council calls on all parties to fully respect international law, to protect civilians and humanitarian workers and to ensure unhindered access for humanitarian organisations. The EU is committed to support the population affected by the conflict, as well as the efforts of the Ukrainian government to that end. In this respect, the Council welcomes the efforts by the European Commission and the EU Member States to provide support to the population in need, amounting to EUR 63 million so far. The EU and the Member States remain committed to scale-up their assistance to the crises-affected population through additional funding or through targeted and coordinated in-kind assistance. The Council furthermore recognises the importance of an enhanced coordination within the European Union and with other international donors.

5. The Council looks forward to the holding of early national parliamentary elections on 26 October in full conformity with international standards and welcomes the deployment of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to this effect. Ukrainian officials and voters should be unimpeded in preparing for the elections, and all candidates should be ensured safe and secure conditions to campaign freely, across the whole country. The Council condemns the recent incidents of beating and intimidation of some candidates and underlines the need for proper campaigning conditions for all candidates.

6. The Council supports the Commission's efforts in seeking an interim agreement for the resumption of gas supplies by Russia to Ukraine and recalls the urgency for the sides to reach an agreement on the basis of the Protocol proposed at the latest trilateral meeting. Such an agreement, as well as urgent and long-term measures to improve energy efficiency in Ukraine, are critical for safeguarding the security of supply and transit this winter. The Council encourages the Government of Ukraine to maintain the momentum on energy sector reforms, in line with its commitment under the Energy Community Treaty, in particular to further advance on the restructuring of the natural gas sector.

7. The Council welcomes the recent adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of the laws on prosecution and anti-corruption, and encourages Ukraine to continue the process of envisaged reforms and economic modernisation, including those foreseen in the Association Agenda, in accordance with its international commitments. Constitutional and decentralisation reforms, as well as ensuring rights of persons belonging to national minorities in line with the relevant standards of the Council of Europe, are of particular importance. Based on the mandate given in the properly conducted parliamentary and local elections, an inclusive national dialogue should be resumed, as foreseen in the Minsk Protocol. In coordination with other donors and international financial institutions, the European Union stands ready to support implementation of the comprehensive reform package as well as rebuilding of Ukraine's economy.

8. The Council approves the Operational Plan of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform (EUAM Ukraine) in response to its conclusions of 23 June, which further emphasises the commitment of the EU to support Ukraine and in particular in assisting the Ukrainian authorities in meeting the urgent needs

to effectively address Civilian Security Sector Reform. The Council reiterates the importance of coordination and coherence with other EU efforts, with the OSCE, and with other international actors.

9. The European Union does not recognise the local elections held on 14 September in the illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol. The Council reiterates its call on UN Member states to consider non-recognition measures similar to those pursued by the EU in line with the UNGA Resolution 68/262. In that respect, the Council fully supports the continuation of the missions of the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and expects all parties to provide them with full, free and unrestricted access to the whole territory of Ukraine, including Crimea. The Council condemns the deterioration of the human rights situation on the peninsula, in particular the persecution and intimidation of the Crimean Tatar community, including the cases of kidnapping, torturing and killing of young male Crimean Tatars, the eviction of the Mejlis from its premises in Simferopol and interrogations of its activists.

10. The Council welcomes the ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement by the Ukrainian Parliament and the consent given by the European Parliament, enabling the provisional application of the relevant provisions of the Association Agreement as of 1 November. It calls upon Ukraine to continue the process of envisaged reforms and economic modernisation, including the adequate preparation for the implementation of Title IV of the Association Agreement, in line with the timeframe specified in the Council Decision, taking into account Ukraine's international commitments. The Council also welcomes the Commission proposal for an extension of the autonomous trade preferences for Ukraine in line with the Joint Ministerial Statement of 12 September on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement/DCFTA and looks forward to its swift adoption. It underlines the importance for all parties to strictly abide by their commitments in the Joint Ministerial Statement, which is part and parcel of a comprehensive peace process in Ukraine, respecting Ukraine's territorial integrity and the right of Ukraine to decide on its destiny. It recalls that the Association Agreement is a bilateral agreement and any adaptations to it can only be made at the request of one of the parties and with the agreement of the other."

COUNCIL DECISION amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, and Decision 2014/659/CFSP amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP

4 December 2014, 2014/872/CFSP

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Whereas:

1. On 31 July 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/512/CFSP².

2. Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 13).

2. On 8 September 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/659/CFSP³ in order to impose further restrictive measures.
3. The Council considers it necessary to clarify certain provisions.
4. Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2014/512/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. Article 1 is amended as follows:
 - a. paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:

‘3. It shall be prohibited to directly or indirectly make or be part of any arrangement to make new loans or credit with a maturity exceeding 30 days to any legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1 or 2, after 12 September 2014 except for loans or credit that have a specific and documented objective to provide financing for non-prohibited direct or indirect imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the Union and Russia or any other third State, or for loans that have a specific and documented objective to provide emergency funding to meet the solvency and liquidity criteria for legal persons established in the Union, whose proprietary rights are owned for more than 50 % by an entity referred to in Annex I.’
 - b. the following paragraph is added:

‘4. The prohibition in paragraph 3 shall not apply to drawdown or disbursements made under a contract concluded before 12 September 2014 if:

 - a. all the terms and conditions of such drawdown or disbursements:
 - i. were agreed before 12 September 2014; and
 - ii. have not been modified on or after that date; and
 - b. before 12 September 2014, a contractual maturity date had been fixed for the repayment in full of all funds made available and for the cancellation of all the commitments, rights and obligations under the contract.

The terms and conditions of drawdowns and disbursements referred to in this paragraph include provisions concerning the length of the repayment period for each drawdown or disbursement, the interest rate applied or the interest rate calculation method, and the maximum amount.’
2. In Article 2, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘4. The prohibition in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be without prejudice to the execution of contracts concluded before 1 August 2014 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts, and to the provision of spare parts and services necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the Union.’
3. In Article 3, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:

3. Council Decision 2014/659/CFSP of 8 September 2014 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 271, 12.9.2014, p. 54).

'3. The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be without prejudice to the execution of contracts concluded before 1 August 2014 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.'

4. In Article 3a, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:

'3. The prohibitions in paragraph 1 and 2 shall be without prejudice to the execution of contracts concluded before 12 September 2014 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts, and to the provision of assistance necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the EU.'

5. Article 4 is replaced by the following:

'Article 4

1. The direct or indirect sale, supply, transfer or export of certain equipment suited to the following categories of exploration and production projects in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, by nationals of Member States, or from the territories of Member States, or using vessels or aircraft under the jurisdiction of Member States, shall be subject to prior authorisation by the competent authority of the exporting Member State:
 - a. oil exploration and production in waters deeper than 150 metres;
 - b. oil exploration and production in the offshore area north of the Arctic Circle;
 - c. projects that have the potential to produce oil from resources located in shale formations by way of hydraulic fracturing; it does not apply to exploration and production through shale formations to locate or extract oil from non-shale reservoirs.

The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this paragraph.

2. The provision of:
 - a. technical assistance or other services related to the equipment referred to in paragraph 1;
 - b. financing or financial assistance for any sale, supply, transfer or export of the equipment referred to in paragraph 1 or for the provision of related technical assistance or training;
 shall also be subject to prior authorisation by the competent authority of the exporting Member State.
3. The competent authorities of the Member States shall not grant any authorisation for any sale, supply, transfer or export of the equipment or the provision of the services, as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, if they determine that the sale, supply, transfer or export concerned or the provision of the service concerned is destined for one of the categories of exploration and production referred to in paragraph 1.
4. Paragraph 3 shall be without prejudice to the execution of contracts concluded before 1 August 2014 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.
5. An authorisation may be granted where the sale, supply, transfer or export of the items or the provision of the services, as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, is necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment. In duly justified cases of emergency, the sale, supply, transfer or export or the provision of services, as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, may proceed without

prior authorisation, provided that the exporter notifies the competent authority within five working days after the sale, supply, transfer or export or the provision of services has taken place, providing detail about the relevant justification for the sale, supply, transfer or export or the provision of services without prior authorisation.’

6. In Article 4a, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. The direct or indirect provision of associated services necessary for the following categories of exploration and production projects in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, by nationals of Member States, or from the territories of Member States, or using vessels or aircraft under the jurisdiction of Member States shall be prohibited:

- a. oil exploration and production in waters deeper than 150 metres;
- b. oil exploration and production in the offshore area north of the Arctic Circle;
- c. projects that have the potential to produce oil from resources located in shale formations by way of hydraulic fracturing; it does not apply to exploration and production through shale formations to locate or extract oil from non-shale reservoirs.’

Article 2

Recital 5 of Decision 2014/659/CFSP is replaced by the following:

- ‘5. In this context, it is appropriate to extend the prohibition in relation to certain financial instruments. Additional restrictions on access to the capital market should be imposed in relation to State-owned Russian financial institutions, certain Russian entities in the defence sector, and certain Russian entities whose main business is the sale or transportation of oil. These prohibitions do not affect the financial services not referred to in Article 1.’

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 4 December 2014.

For the Council
The President
S. GOZI

Council conclusions on the Central African Republic

FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Brussels, 20 January 2014

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“1. The European Union (EU) is deeply concerned by the extreme insecurity and instability in the Central African Republic (CAR), particularly since the attacks of 5 December 2013, which caused heavy civilian casualties, massive displacements of populations, several serious human rights violations and a dramatic worsening of the humanitarian situation. It expresses its concern about the risk of the Central African conflict having an effect on the neighbouring countries. In this context, the EU commends the rapid deployment by the African Union (AU) of the International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA) and the support given to it by France’s Operation Sangaris in accordance with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2127 (2013). These joint efforts have brought improved security which, as a prerequisite for the country to return to stability, must be consolidated.

2. The Council, convinced of the importance of supporting African efforts and stepping up EU involvement in the CAR as part of its overall approach, wishes to thank the High Representative for the proposal she has put forward to ensure that the EU plays an active part in helping to stabilise the CAR under the CSDP. The Council reached political agreement on a future CSDP military operation and, to that end, approved the Crisis Management Concept. It asked the competent bodies to prepare the necessary measures in order rapidly to establish this operation, subject to a new Council decision. The operation will provide temporary support, for a period of up to six months, to help to achieve a secure environment in the Bangui area, with a view to handing over to the AU. This objective takes full account of UN Security Council Resolution 2127, and in particular of the possibility of MISCA being transformed into a UN peacekeeping operation.

The military force would thereby contribute, within its area of operations, to international and regional efforts to protect the populations most at risk and would contribute to the free movement of civilians. All these efforts will create the conditions that are required in order to provide humanitarian aid for those who need it. The Council wishes to stress that this operation must be based on a United Nations Security Council resolution which will make it possible for a EUFOR operation in the CAR to be launched without delay in support of the efforts deployed by the international community, in particular the AU, the UN and France, and by the Central African authorities, and it stresses the importance of an accelerated planning process.

3. To that end, the Council has designated the EU OHQ in Larissa as the planning authority. It has requested that operational planning activities continue using accelerated procedures. Lastly, the Council emphasises the importance of close coordination with the partners involved, in particular the Central African authorities,

the UN, the AU and France, to ensure good cooperation and complementarity of the efforts under way to restore stability in the CAR.

4. The EU calls for the continued mobilisation of the international community to assist the CAR, in particular in the context of the Donors Conference for MISCA scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa on 1 February 2014 at the invitation of the AU. It also stresses the important role of the United Nations in the CAR.

5. The EU welcomes the initiative taken by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), aimed at relaunching the political process, in accordance with the framework that resulted from the Libreville Agreement of 11 January 2013, the N'Djamena Declarations of 18 April 2013 and 21 October 2013, the Constitutional Charter of the Transition and UNSC Resolution 2127 (2013). It has noted the resignations of the Head of State of the Transition in the CAR, Michel Djotodia, and of the Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, confirmed by the regional summit held in N'Djamena on 9 and 10 January 2014.

6. The EU invites the ECCAS and the AU to continue to support the political process. It reminds all those involved in the Transition of the need to work together, as well as with the political parties and civil society, in an inclusive manner and in good faith, to bring the Transition process to a conclusion and enable elections to be held by February 2015 at the latest as the first stage in a sustainable political process. The EU stands ready to support the preparation and holding of elections, in conjunction with its international partners, notably the United Nations.

7. The EU is committed to inclusive dialogue, national reconciliation, participatory processes and ensuring that all those who should steer the Transition process are represented. The EU welcomes all the mediation and reconciliation initiatives taken by religious leaders, which are indispensable if the different Central African communities and religions are soon to live peacefully side by side once again. It calls on all stakeholders, and in particular the new transitional authorities, to seek to resolve the root causes of the persistent instability in the CAR.

8. The EU recalls that all state and non-state actors are required to respect human rights and humanitarian law in the CAR. It calls on all parties to the conflict to end the violent attacks against the population and other violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The EU strongly condemns impunity and recalls that all who perpetrate such violations, including the leaders and members of the Lord's Resistance Army and other armed groups, such as for instance the ex-Seleka and anti-balaka groups, will have to answer for their crimes in court. It condemns in particular summary executions, mutilations, enforced disappearances, rape and other forms of sexual violence, the recruitment and use of children by armed groups and armed forces and deliberate attacks against civilians motivated by their religious or ethnic background, which have been highlighted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. It welcomes the fact that the Human Rights Council is to hold a special session on 20 January on the human rights situation in the CAR. The EU again stresses that primary responsibility for protecting civilian populations rests with the CAR transitional authorities. The EU notes that the CAR has ratified the Rome Statute and that acts constituting crimes against humanity and war crimes come under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The EU encourages the rapid establishment of the international commission of inquiry provided for in UNSC Resolution 2127 (2013). In this context, the EU reaffirms its resolute support for the ICC.

9. The EU remains concerned by the seriousness of the humanitarian situation, which is affecting the whole population. It recalls that all the parties must ensure immediate, unfettered and safe access to humanitarian

aid organisations working to help the populations in the CAR, with due regard for international humanitarian law and principles. The EU and its Member States, which together constitute the largest humanitarian donor, will remain on alert to increase the European financial commitment for the humanitarian response to meet the needs of the most vulnerable populations in Bangui, in the rest of the Central African Republic's territory, and in the countries of the sub-region taking in refugees from the Central African Republic. The Council welcomes the resolute action by the European Commission, in particular the high-level meeting being organised jointly by Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva and UN Under-Secretary-General Valerie Amos on 20 January 2014 in Brussels. The EU urgently appeals to members of the international community to make a substantial contribution to the basic needs of the CAR population and to take an approach that closely links the emergency relief effort and development aid, coordinated by humanitarian and development actors and international financial institutions.

10. As the largest contributor to development aid in the CAR, the EU undertakes to examine immediately, in coordination with international financial institutions, all the measures which will make it possible to rebuild the state and prevent worsening conditions for the population as a result of the fall-out from the crisis. The EU pledges to examine straight away the conditions for an engagement in the rule of law area and security sector reform. Moreover, it plans to resume its cooperation projects, as soon as the security situation allows it to contribute fully to the CAR's reconstruction."

Council conclusions on implementation of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel

FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Brussels, 17 March 2014

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

"1. The European Union (EU) remains deeply concerned by the crisis in the Sahel region. It reiterates its determination to support partners in addressing the region's key security and development challenges.

2. The Council welcomes the progress made in implementing the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel and encourages its enhanced implementation in coordination with the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel. The objectives of the EU Strategy in the fields of security, peace-building, conflict prevention, countering radicalisation and development remain valid and the link between security and development will remain at the heart of EU policies and operations in the region. Responding in a dynamic manner to the evolution of the situation in the region is key to ensure the efficacy of the EU comprehensive approach. In this context, the Council invites the EEAS, the EUSR for the Sahel and the Commission to develop a new regional action plan covering the next steps of implementation of the Sahel Strategy.

3. The Council invites the EEAS, the EUSR for the Sahel and the Commission to extend the implementation of the Strategy to Burkina Faso and Chad while intensifying relevant activities in Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Political dialogue on conflict prevention and security issues in the Sahel region will be stepped up also in relevant

West African and neighbouring countries including Senegal, Nigeria and Cameroon as well as countries of the Maghreb.

4. International support to the Sahel region needs to be accompanied by sustained efforts to find a lasting solution to the roots of the ongoing crises in the north of Mali and the wider region. Security and development in the Sahel region is also strongly linked to stability in Libya. In Mali, the EU fully supports the work of the United Nations stabilisation mission MINUSMA to help create conditions conducive to the full restoration of State authority, order and security in the north of Mali. The EU strongly urges all Malian parties to begin credible and inclusive consultations open to all communities and to all non-terrorist armed groups of northern Mali with the aim of achieving broadly founded and lasting peace through a sustainable political solution. The EU will also continue to support the implementation of the plan for the sustainable recovery of Mali.

5. In line with the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, impartiality and humanity, the EU will also continue to provide humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable people, on the basis of needs, especially these coming months to ensure a coordinated and effective response to the current food crisis in the Sahel region and to link relief, rehabilitation, and development wherever conditions allow it. In that perspective, the EU will continue to foster resilience building and relevant coordination efforts by Western Africa regional organisations and partners in the framework of the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR).

6. With regard to development in the Sahel, the EU will continue to support sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development and regional integration, drawing lessons from the past. The Council commends the progress made towards the implementation of an Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and West Africa. The EU will provide specific support to regional infrastructures that bring the periphery closer to the centre, sustainable social services especially health and education, and sustainable agriculture, food and nutrition security. The EU will encourage in particular local and national development policies addressing the specific socioeconomic and human security needs of border areas as a way to improve territorial control and state authority throughout territories. Due attention will be paid to trading, trafficking and migratory flows including return and readmission and the synergies between migration and development. The EU will continue to promote democracy, human rights, decentralisation policies, good governance including an independent and fair justice system at local and regional levels, and it will encourage the fight against corruption as well as counter-radicalisation projects as a means of conflict prevention, building on local and national initiatives where possible. The EU will continue to implement joint programming within the Sahel countries in order to further increase the effectiveness of EU development cooperation.

7. In the field of security, the EU will continue to provide support to national and regional endeavours related to security sector reform and integrated border management and to national efforts in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, including smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings, notably through the ongoing CSDP missions in Libya, Mali and Niger as well as the future civilian mission in Mali. The EU will promote synergies between those missions while integrating lessons learnt from previous missions. The EU welcomes the efforts of the African Union and other regional actors to promote enhanced coordination in the field of intelligence and counter-terrorism as well as optimal allocation of national assets and capacities.

8. The primary responsibility and ownership for peace, security and development is with the governments of the Sahelian region. Regional and international coordination is key to ensure the effectiveness of international efforts in support to local and regional endeavours and the EU will work in close cooperation with regional

organisations and national governments in the Sahel to ensure a broadly rooted implementation of the EU Sahel Strategy. The EU welcomes the decision taken by the Heads of States of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso in Nouakchott on 16 February 2014 to establish a permanent framework for their own regional coordination efforts. The EU also welcomes the conclusions of the international high level meeting on the Sahel held in Brussels on 6 February 2014, in particular the recognition that the international coordination platform for the Sahel should constitute the overall coordination mechanism for all existing strategies in the region, including the UN integrated strategy for the Sahel. The EU reaffirms its will to contribute actively together with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and others to the work of the United Nations and the African Union Commission in support to this platform.”

EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea

FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Brussels, 17 March 2014

“EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

States bordering the Gulf of Guinea coastline face many of the challenges familiar to countries throughout Africa. But the recent increased focus on threats emanating from the lack of control over the coastal waters and the weak control over access and security along the coast itself pose a particular challenge to the states of the region.¹ The consequences include growth in criminal and terrorist activity, which also pose a growing threat to the European Union (EU).

During the Summit of Gulf of Guinea Heads of State in Yaoundé on 24-25 June 2013, member states of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) showed their determination to face these challenges through a common regional approach: the ‘Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships and Illicit Activity in West and Central Africa’, in line with UN Security Council resolutions 2018 and 2039. The EU should support African leadership and the implementation of the Code.

This EU Strategy reviews the overall scale of the threat and the risks posed to the coastal states and the EU. It defines potential actions that the EU, through a comprehensive approach in support of the action of the region itself and in coordination with international partners, can take to help those states and regional organisations tackle the problem.

Scope

The geographic scope of this Strategy covers the 6.000 km coastline from Senegal to Angola including the islands of Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, covering two geographical, political and economic regions: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), both of which are affiliated to the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) and the African Union (AU).

1. Including the many neighbouring landlocked countries whose supplies depend on coastal economic activities.

Threats

The threats take various forms, are often interlinked across borders and can, collectively, lead to contagious criminal activity and linkages with terrorist networks, putting at risk the stability of states and reducing their chances of successful economic development or of reducing poverty, to which the EU is committed. The main threats include:

- a. illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, illicit dumping of waste, and piracy and armed robbery at sea,² including kidnap
- b. trafficking of human beings, narcotics, arms and counterfeit goods, and smuggling of migrants
- c. oil theft (“illegal bunkering”), and criminal acts in ports.

Shared African and European interests

The EU’s overriding objective is to help the states of the region to achieve peace, security and prosperity through the successful and legitimate development of their economies and their institutions, in line with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); building political consensus, enabling and respecting African ownership and synchronising existing programmes in a comprehensive approach to regional development and security. The EU’s commitment to address poverty and support economic development is enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement. Experience in dealing with insecurity elsewhere in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the Great Lakes, suggests that early preventive action, in close coordination with the countries of the region and African regional bodies, is much more cost-effective than a later cure. That experience has also demonstrated the value of integrating all aspects for greater cumulative effect; political, good-governance/anti-corruption, security, institutional, economic, and development.

The EU and the countries of the region have major common economic, developmental, commercial and security interests. The region has a long coast line, and is rich in resources which are crucial both for local employment and consumption, and for trade with Europe. Maritime trade to and from the Gulf of Guinea is largely conducted by the EU. There is an average of 30 EU flagged or owned vessels at any one time in the Gulf of Guinea. The sustainability of all maritime resources, including fisheries, is a key concern for local communities as well as European customers. Secure global shipping lanes are necessary for commerce and trouble-free fishing.

The EU is also committed to supporting the sustainable exploitation of natural resources in the region, including hydrocarbons. Europe imports about half of its energy needs, of which nearly 10% of its oil and 4% of its natural gas come from the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are significant suppliers of crude oil, and Nigeria of natural gas. The region’s proximity to Europe with easy sea access gives it a comparative advantage over the Middle East for our oil needs and Europe remains a primary export market for other regional products, including forestry, agricultural and mineral resources.³ Narcotics and other illegal goods trafficked along the coast and across land borders are increasingly damaging local communities and fuel problems in Europe.

2. International law differentiates between “piracy” – incidents which take place in international waters – and “armed robbery at sea” – incidents which take place in territorial waters.

3. Examples include iron ore (Nigeria, Gabon and Cameroon), diamonds (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone), manganese (Gabon), bauxite (Guinea), cobalt and timber (Cameroon) and cocoa (Ghana, Ivory Coast).

Yet the region is an increasing magnet for European investment, not only in the natural resources but in the consumer goods and services sectors, including mobile telephony. That combines with a growing importance as a potential market for exports as the region's economic growth accelerates. All this makes for a growing mutual interest in a partnership to promote growth and jobs by ensuring security and stability. It is equally in the EU's interests to promote stability in the Gulf of Guinea to protect the EU's own citizens from the threats of drugs, terrorism, piracy and armed robbery, and other forms of crime emanating from the region.

Given the significant shared interests, the EU wants to build on the regional momentum that was created at the Yaoundé Summit of June 2013 and provide appropriate support to regional organisations (ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC) as well as to individual states to help them design effective strategies to tackle the challenges and implement them in a coordinated manner, in accordance with the Code of Conduct.

Response

The EU can mitigate the risks identified above by helping states to strengthen their maritime capabilities, the rule of law and effective governance across the region, including improvements in maritime administration and law enforcement through multiagency cooperation by police, navy, military, coastguard, customs and immigration services.

As maritime boundaries are still not fully delineated and inherently hard to police and entirely permeable, strengthening cooperation between the coastal states and nascent regional coordination mechanisms is an essential starting point. The EU can also support countries in the region to deliver on their international obligations as flag and coastal states.

It is therefore proposed that the EU and its Member States, working in coordination with local and international partners, adopt a comprehensive approach focusing on four specific objectives:

1. Building a common understanding of the scale of the threat in the Gulf of Guinea and the need to address it among the countries in the region and the international community.
2. Helping governments of the region build robust institutions, maritime administrations and multi-agency capabilities to ensure maritime awareness, security and the rule of law along the coast.
3. Supporting prosperous economies in this region in line with national and regional development strategies, to create employment and assist vulnerable communities to build resilience and resist criminal or violent activities.
4. Strengthening cooperation structures between the countries of the region and the regional organisations to take the necessary actions to mitigate the threats at sea and on land.

THE NATURE AND EVOLUTION OF THE THREAT

Over the last decade, West and Central African states have experienced a mix of dynamic economic growth together with a strengthening of governance in some countries and a weakening of it in others. Some of the countries are securely on the path to middle income status, while others still have a way to go to reduce poverty in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Yet, both could be threatened by growing instability and criminal activity in the Gulf of Guinea; and instability or economic disruption there will have a direct impact on the EU itself.

Organised crime in the forms of trafficking of drugs, human beings, arms, rough diamonds, counterfeit medicines, illegal waste,⁴ cybercrime and related money-laundering often take place in the interface between the porous land and sea borders in the Gulf of Guinea. Trafficking routes often overlap with areas of instability and crisis, and with terrorism in the Sahel and northern Nigeria. Trafficking of drugs, particularly cocaine, and arms⁵ has played a significant role in weakening governance institutions in several countries of West Africa, most notably in Guinea Bissau. In some cases this activity has become an extra source of revenue for terrorist groups in the Sahel. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates the value of cocaine shipped from West Africa to Europe in 2011 alone, as USD 1.25 billion, and the bulk of illegal migrants, whether trafficked or not, are bound for Europe. Other illegal trafficking involves cocoa, cotton, timber, cashew nuts, gold and diamonds.⁶

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea is a second threat. Over the last decade, of the 551 attacks and attempted attacks that have been reported, most took place in national jurisdictions, while fewer than 20% took place in international waters, with the largest number occurring off the coasts of Nigeria. In 2013, according to the International Maritime Bureau Piracy reporting Center, of 234 reported incidents worldwide, 30 took place off the coast of Nigeria, including 2 hijackings.⁷ These attacks occur mainly when ships are moored, bound for, or leaving offshore oil platforms, storage vessels and ports. However, latest assessments are that the risk of attack could shift further from the coast. The unpredictable use of violence against crews, including use of guns, and the hijacking of tankers for fuel theft or “petro-piracy”, are worrying trends.

Oil theft or illegal “bunkering” of oil was recently estimated to lose Nigeria around 100,000 barrels a day, which is then re-sold on the black market. Oil is generally stolen from on-shore pipelines and transported in small, difficult to track barges. Tugs ferrying oil workers to rigs have also been targeted by pirates and armed bandits. These activities cost governments revenue, increase commercial security costs and discourage further investment. The security of the petroleum and petrochemical industry is important not just in Nigeria (at the epicentre up to now), but increasingly further afield, off the coast of Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Chad, Liberia and Angola.⁸ Oil spills linked to oil theft often also exacerbate the damage to coastal environments and therefore fishing and agricultural livelihoods.

Illegal fishing: Fishing remains an important industry in many countries in the Gulf of Guinea, supporting about 7% of the working population of Ghana; contributing from 25 to 30% of Senegal’s exports; and 25-40% of government revenue in Guinea Bissau according to the World Bank and Food and Agriculture Organisation.⁹ Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU) in the Gulf of Guinea is costing coastal states around USD 350 million a year, and is posing a serious environmental threat to fish stocks and the potential overall collapse of the fishing industry. Total estimated catches in the Gulf of Guinea coastline are believed to be up to 40%

4. Examples of illegal waste include herbicides and pesticides, oil spill, untreated industrial wastes including nuclear and aerosol contaminants.

5. 5-7 million Small Arms and Light Weapons are estimated by UNODC to be in circulation in the Gulf of Guinea region.

6. Diamonds have contributed to the fuelling of conflict in the region, which led to the establishment of the Kimberley Process (KP) Certificate Scheme to stop conflict diamonds reaching international markets.

7. To be compared with 13 incidents including 2 hijackings off the coast of Somalia recorded in 2013.

8. European Parliament report Aug 2011, PE 433.768: “The Effects of Oil Companies’ Activities on the Environment, Health and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa” focuses on lessons from Angola and Nigeria.

9. World Bank West Africa Regional Fisheries project report 2008; FAO Fishery Country Profiles 2007.

higher than reported. Significant resources, revenue, nutrition¹⁰ and livelihoods are lost as a result. The IUU fishing threat to sustainable fish stock levels not only threatens local trade, markets and jobs but also has wider ramifications for Europe and beyond through increasing migration pressures as the development and prosperity of coastal communities decline.

Unemployment in countries in the Gulf of Guinea is estimated at around 40% with levels of youth unemployment at over 60%. There are insufficient economic opportunities in the formal, legal economy for young people. In addition, food insecurity in the countryside has encouraged migration from rural areas to cities, leading to rapid urban population growth, stretching already struggling social and economic infrastructure and creating tensions amongst urban populations. Such a high level of unemployment encourages young people into criminal activity simply to make a living, so that they become foot-soldiers for pirate and criminal gangs, or leads them into illegal migration in very dangerous conditions.

WHAT HAS BEEN DONE

The responses to these threats in recent years have included a range of initiatives at international, regional and national levels:

- Two **UN Security Council resolutions** on Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea¹¹ initiated by Benin and Togo, set out the need for adopting “a comprehensive approach led by the countries of the region to counter the threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and their underlying causes”; and the need to build on “existing national, regional and extra-regional initiatives to enhance maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea”. Both resolutions focus on promoting the maintenance of peace and stability in general in the Gulf of Guinea region and encourage international partners to enhance the counter-piracy capabilities of regional states and organisations in order to enable them to prevent and counter piracy and armed robbery effectively.
- **Regional Organisations ECOWAS and ECCAS** have adopted policies and launched specific actions, mainly as a result of both increasing international pressure and international support, including for ECOWAS a comprehensive Conflict Prevention Framework in 2008 addressing *inter alia* cross border and maritime security issues, a landmark Praia Plan to address the growing drugs problem, and a Counter Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan. ECOWAS is developing an ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) and a draft version is due to be agreed by Heads of State in 2014. ECCAS has an Integrated Strategy for Maritime Security since 2008 and set up the CRESMAC (Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa).

10. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation fish provides up to 50% of the required animal protein intake for several countries.

11. UNSCR (2011) 2018 and (2012) 2039 emphasised the importance of supporting partner countries and regional organisations, through providing training, advice, equipment and resources where appropriate, so that they can increasingly prevent or manage crises by themselves.

- **The Summit of Gulf of Guinea Heads of State** held in Yaoundé on 24-25 June 2013 has led to:
 - a. The Adoption of a ‘Code of Conduct Concerning the Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illegal Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa’ which will be reviewed in 3 years.¹²
 - b. The Adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC Heads on Maritime Safety and Security in West and Central Africa, setting out the establishment of an experts group to prepare a follow-up action plan for implementation of the Code of Conduct.
 - c. Decision to locate the Intra-regional Coordination Centre (as outlined in the MoU) in Douala, Cameroon. This will be the regions’ mechanism to oversee implementation.
 - d. Since the Yaoundé Summit, ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC are working to set up an inter-regional working group to establish the details of implementation and how this should be funded. Part of this work will be signing agreements between regional States for joint patrols, for example, Benin, Togo and Nigeria have signed a “Zone E” Agreement under the EIMS. In addition, the group will determine the role and structure of the Intraregional Coordination Centre in Douala.
- The **African Union** adopted an African Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) in January 2014.
- **The International Maritime Organisation** (IMO) is conducting an ongoing programme of table top exercises aimed at promoting the development of national maritime security committees pursuant to the Yaounde Code of Conduct. In addition to the ongoing work of its own committees on maritime security the IMO adopted in late 2013 a Resolution on the Gulf of Guinea.¹³
- **Individual countries** in the Gulf of Guinea have begun to increase resources and develop strategies in partnership to address organised crime both offshore and on land such as the joint patrols (Operation Prosperity) by the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Benin.
- **U Member States** have increased their support by implementing or reinforcing bilateral and regional programmes. Their support is already very substantial, notably as regards capacity building of key institutions and services.¹⁴
- **The European Union** is addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing through the implementation of the IUU Regulation and through EU Fishery Partnership Agreements with many

12. The Code is inspired by the IMO Djibouti Code of Conduct for the Western Indian Ocean. Its main features are a particular emphasis on information sharing and coordination, facilitated by a designated national contact point in each State, and a number of regional transnational and trans-regional maritime security coordination centres; and clear engagement by States to declare their exclusive economic zones and enforce their own laws, including on fishing, piracy and armed robbery at sea, environmental protection, waste dumping and mineral resources including oil. The Code is kept under ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC auspices for greater African ownership. The Code is non-binding for now.

13. The Resolution on the prevention and suppression of piracy, armed robbery against ships and illicit maritime activity in the Gulf of Guinea covers all the IMO’s activities in the region and how it intends to strengthen its cooperation with MOWCA – e.g. through establishing a subregional integrated coastguard network in West & Central Africa, and address threats and challenges onshore and offshore in a holistic, comprehensive manner.

14. For example France maintains a permanent naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea with its mission “CORYMBE”, implemented in 2011 the “ASECMAR” project, dedicated to the reinforcement of maritime security administrations in the region.

of the coastal countries of West and Central Africa. These help to regulate fishing, including by EU vessels, and support development and improved governance in the fishing sector.

- The EU continues to support the socio-economic development of the Gulf of Guinea countries, through their bilateral and regional cooperation. The support provided is consistent with the national development policies of the beneficiary countries and integrates the regional dimension. The support includes at the same time state building and reinforcement, economic growth and poverty reduction in all its aspects.
- The EU “Critical Maritime Routes” programme (CRIMGO) is beginning to reinforce regional and international initiatives against piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea.¹⁵ Its main components are: (a) setting-up a regional maritime security and safety training function, (b) starting a regional maritime information-sharing function, (c) improving coast guard work (maritime law enforcement), and (d) developing a joint operational coordination capacity through common exercises or pilot operations. Its continuous review procedures will facilitate any necessary adaptation.
- **Other international partners** such as the United States¹⁶ (US), Brazil, China, India, South Africa, have set up bilateral programmes for policy formulation, coordination and institutional capacity building.
- **The G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Group** (G8++FOGG), of which the EU is a member, has been established to better co-ordinate the maritime capacity building efforts of international partners in the Gulf of Guinea. It focuses on the importance of African ownership; the link between economic development and security; the importance of coordination and exchange of information; and the need for a comprehensive response including governance and justice.

In terms of defining the strategic requirements and necessary policies, much work has therefore been done. Implementation, however, has been severely limited by resource constraints, and the gap with the level of further investment needed to reverse the rising trend of organised crime, remains wide.

THE WAY FORWARD

The Yaoundé Summit signalled a firm commitment from individual states and the regional organisations to work together and with international partners to develop regional maritime security in its widest sense. Follow-up to this Summit is therefore a useful starting point for the EU’s approach. This strategy should also be seen in the context of the future EU Maritime Security Strategy,¹⁷ which promotes a similar cross-sectoral¹⁸ approach to establish opportunities for cooperation. The EU’s approach should be based on three principles:

- partnership with the countries of the Gulf of Guinea and close coordination with their regional organisations and other international organisations active in the region (ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC, Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), plus UN Offices for Central and for West Africa and on Drugs and Crime, (UNOCA, UNOWA and UNODC), and international organi-

15. In Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe and Togo.

16. In particular the US AFRICOM “African Partnership Station” (APS).

17. Expected adoption in June 2014.

18. Between civil society, private, public, including military and law enforcement sectors.

sations including the AU, UN agencies such as International Maritime Organisation (IMO), as well as INTERPOL, World Customs Organisation (WCO) and others);

- a comprehensive approach to the problems, ensuring that security, development and governance issues are integrated into a single strategic framework.
- applying the lessons learnt from our strategies in other regions of Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa.

The EU will take an integrated approach to governance issues and all security risks and challenges on land and sea, addressing all aspects of transnational organised crime in the maritime domain as set out in the Code of Conduct signed in Yaoundé, tackling the underlying causes, and promoting regional peace, security, stability, good governance and development. Supporting border management, the rule of law, reforming legal and security frameworks, ensuring access to justice and human rights, fighting corruption and organised crime including illegal migration, are essential components of the long-term work ahead. Economic governance is also key, such as better management and societal participation in the exploitation of natural resources, including oil, fisheries and others.

Another important element will be to build on existing successful EU actions, learning the lessons of the EU Sahel and Horn of Africa strategies. While there are differences between the situations in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, certain lessons are still relevant: effective combination of naval patrols and merchant industry self-protection measures to repress and deter piracy and armed robbery at sea; importance of information-sharing and cooperation between the International Community and regional governments and the private sector; the key role of political dialogue on security and conflict prevention; the central issue of good governance; the relevance of the comprehensive approach, but also of the need to carefully plan the many instruments; and – from the Sahel Strategy – the mutually reinforcing effect of actions in the fields of development, security, peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

It will also be necessary, as elsewhere, to work at national, regional and international levels with individual or groups of States which have the political will to act - and encouraging others to join - to prioritise and maximise the complementarity of actions for greater effectiveness.

Bearing that in mind, and avoiding any overlap with already existing Member States projects in the region, the EU approach will focus on the following four objectives:

Objective 1 – *Building a common understanding of the scale of the threat in the Gulf of Guinea and the need to address it among the countries in the region and the international community.*

The aim is to develop a sound, factual basis for policy-making and action, promote a sense of ownership among African countries, and encourage the political will to tackle the problems. It will also enable the EU to judge better the cost and benefit of actions proposed.

Cooperation with key stakeholders in countries and regional organisations, including civil society organisations, United Nations agencies, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) and the private sector, will make it possible to define a comprehensive picture of the scale of the threat, identify opportunities and agree priorities.

Possible action:

- improve data collection (many maritime incidents often still go unreported) and information sharing;

- develop analytical tools to better understand the political economy in environments affected by transnational criminal activities. This analysis should help political and development actors identify entry points to mobilise the necessary political will to tackle existing threats;
- identify geographic and thematic priority zones to focus the EU response, including in cooperation with other international actors;
- address the wider drivers of instability according to the level of risk using tools such as the Conflict Early Warning System and Conflict Risk Assessments, political economy analysis, and EU Human Rights strategies;
- ensure alignment of thematic (security, trafficking of drugs and human beings, smuggling of migrants, and counter-terrorism) and geographical policies/strategies;
- maintain close links and organised consultations with the private sector, notably shipping companies, industrial, artisanal fisheries and mining sectors, to ensure their perspectives are taken into account by governments;
- support dialogue with civil society, industry and governments to better understand the local context. In parallel, also support dialogue with international partners active in the region (like the US and China) to better coordinate efforts and avoid duplication.

Objective 2 – *Helping regional governments put in place the institutions and capabilities to ensure security and the rule of law.*

Resilient national and regional institutions able to counter the threats on a sustainable basis are essential for an effective, multiagency fight against organised criminal networks. These institutions need to have the will to counter criminality, the mandate and resources to do so, as well as the technical capability, including in specialist areas. The EU has the experience and resources to help build local capacity, and should encourage the necessary political support through political dialogue.

The institutions include:

- regional Institutions and mechanisms, in particular the Intra-regional Coordination Centre (as outlined in the MoU signed by the ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC Heads on Maritime Safety and Security in West and Central Africa) to which the EU can offer technical assistance and support;
- political institutions (for example parliaments, election management bodies, political parties) that can provide other institutions with a mandate to intervene and an appropriate legal framework to do so;
- security institutions (for example internal security forces, coastguards, port authorities, customs authorities and military – land, sea and air forces, all with associated intelligence gathering functions) that can conduct surveillance operations and where necessary, intervene to protect trade routes, oil installations and disrupt illegal activities such as drug and human trafficking and smuggling of migrants. A suitable legal framework and political accountability need to be in place to ensure clear responsibilities in relation to serious crimes on land or sea. Capacity reinforcement is needed in specific areas where they are weakest (for example countering piracy at sea, or detecting drugs);
- rule of law institutions (for example police, courts and prisons, including specialised tribunals for example in the areas of customs or fishing) that can a) enable suspects to be investigated, tried and suitably punished according to law and with respect for human rights standards; b) facilitate access

to justice and human rights protection (also for victims of human trafficking); to promote judiciary and home affairs reform. Some key dimensions here are the independence and protection of judges and investigating magistrates, forensic capacity to provide evidence in court and reduce the use of illegal interrogation methods;

- economic and environmental management institutions: national authorities need to reduce corruption where it exists, prevent money-laundering through national financial institutions, avoid corrupt or incompetent management of natural resources contracts, and ensure sound environmental management by commercial operations;
- oversight institutions and civil society (for example auditor general, ombudsman, anti-corruption institutions, media, NGOs, think tanks, community groups) that can encourage good governance and rule of law to counter the enabling space for organised criminal networks to operate in.

The EU should seek to engage with the local communities, civil society and media to help citizens hold these institutions accountable.

Possible action:

- to improve the rule of law through strengthening national law enforcement agencies and the judiciary; improving sea and land capacity; supporting enhanced interagency and regional coordination in the fight against drugs and organised crime including security and legal cooperation, data sharing, and cross-border anti-trafficking joint actions;¹⁹ supporting the implementation of the 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy and improving monitoring and reporting of maritime security breaches, including collection of evidence for prosecution. Such support should take account of previous experience. The use of all EU instruments (including CSDP), should be explored as part of a comprehensive approach;
- to improve economic and environmental governance through development or enforcement of legal frameworks for fishing and offshore mineral exploitation, including fish licensing systems; working with international organisations, Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, and other key bodies in ensuring respect for international law and regional norms; working with the private sector – including oil and maritime industry to promote corporate responsibility actions and consultation with civil society and local communities;
- to support closer coordination and increased synergies and coherence between the EU and its Member States and the countries in the region.

Objective 3 – *Supporting the development of prosperous economies in the coastal countries, enabling them to provide basic services, employment opportunities and poverty reduction for their citizens.*

Many States of the Gulf of Guinea are fragile Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with low key development indicators such as life expectancy, health and literacy. Widespread poverty, poor governance and under-development can facilitate the emergence of criminal activities. Generating legitimate and sustainable jobs for young people could help tackle some of the underlying causes feeding insecurity in many Gulf of Guinea countries.

EU development policy, including the EU's Agenda for Change, prioritises assistance to the poorest countries, particularly fragile states. Key issues addressed in the Agenda for Change include good governance, inclusive

19. For example the Intra-Regional Coordination Centre between ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC on Maritime Safety and Security.

and sustainable growth, agriculture, food security, clean energy, and improving resilience to the consequences of climate change. In terms of nutrition, trade, economic development and employment, the importance for the region of improvements to the management of the fisheries sector, notably artisanal coastal fishing, is evident.²⁰

Possible action

- continue and extend the ongoing work to improve regulation and management of key industries in Gulf of Guinea countries including fishing and extractives;
- support the development of secure and modern infrastructures, including ports;
- increase community participation in local economic development and support communities through expansion of access to energy and basic services;
- engage with Gulf of Guinea countries, Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, International Organisations and other key stakeholders to improve regulation and management of fisheries and extractive industries;
- promote a stronger and sustained focus on job creation.

Objective 4 – *Strengthening cooperation structures between the countries of the region to ensure effective action across borders at sea and on land.*

The importance of information sharing and cooperation among a wide range of agencies and actors, public and private,²¹ makes it essential to build strong planning and coordination among them, notably with the key regional organisations; ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC. The broader coordinating role of the African Union has proven its value in the Horn of Africa and is increasingly appreciated by the regional organisations in the Gulf of Guinea. EU cooperation needs to support this integration and coordination of effort.

Possible Action:

- improve planning, coordination and communication amongst regional partners; help regional organisations work more collaboratively in follow-up to the Yaoundé Summit;
- identify where active partners like the US, Russia, Canada, Japan, Australia, China, Brazil, as well as the UN, World Bank, and other multi-lateral organisations/institutions can have a positive impact, including the Gulf of Guinea in our political dialogue with these partners;
- EU Political Dialogues with the States and the Regional Organisations and other regional bodies should regularly assess the security at sea and on land as well as the development situation, trends and needs;
- support ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC and the African Union in their efforts to coordinate internally, with their Member States and with each other, and with external partners, including where possible through the secondment of EU experts/advisers from various professional fields with expertise in security;

20. For the EU there are also considerable potential gains from strengthening local capacities to conserve and manage fish stocks, in the form of improved perspectives for EU fishing fleets and increased security of maritime routes due to better local surveillance.

21. An example of the commitment of the private sector is the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of Guinea. This initiative focuses on the creation of an affordable, sustainable and enduring regional maritime information sharing center and complements regional and national initiatives to counter maritime crime by providing a real-time connection with industry and passing information which will assist with delivering a targeted response.

- harness EU experience of having successfully contributed to the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, to support the coordination and cooperation efforts of ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC.

CONCLUSIONS

Although some promising steps have been taken nationally, regionally and internationally, the scale, variety and shifting nature of criminal activities and the complexity of the underlying problems require much more attention at national, regional and international levels. Actions in the region, within the framework of this Strategy, are consistent with and complementary to national poverty reduction policies and regional initiatives, as well as in synergy with actions implemented through the Fisheries Partnership Agreements and actions implementing the IUU Regulation. It is clear that activity across the different objectives as set out in this framework can be mutually reinforcing and complementary.

It will be important however to coordinate all these different initiatives both in the region and amongst the EU and its Member States as well as the international community. Our level of ambition, albeit broad and encompassing the full range of economic, social, governance, security and development challenges, is the right approach at this stage.

It will be wise to concentrate where the EU can have the most effect. Post-Yaoundé there is an opportunity to lever support to the regional African-led coordinating platforms that are developing. Ultimately, this strategic framework will allow us to better judge and plan the EU's work with its partners in the Gulf of Guinea in a more coherent way. Increasing the EU's focus now on coordinating better will have significant effects on security, investor confidence, prosperity, livelihoods, the environment, and energy supplies."

Council conclusions on implementation of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel

FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Brussels, 17 March 2014

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

"1. The European Union (EU) remains deeply concerned by the crisis in the Sahel region. It reiterates its determination to support partners in addressing the region's key security and development challenges.

2. The Council welcomes the progress made in implementing the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel and encourages its enhanced implementation in coordination with the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel. The objectives of the EU Strategy in the fields of security, peace-building, conflict prevention, countering radicalisation and development remain valid and the link between security and development will remain at the heart of EU policies and operations in the region. Responding in a dynamic manner to the evolution of the situation in the region is key to ensure the efficacy of the EU comprehensive approach. In this

context, the Council invites the EEAS, the EUSR for the Sahel and the Commission to develop a new regional action plan covering the next steps of implementation of the Sahel Strategy.

3. The Council invites the EEAS, the EUSR for the Sahel and the Commission to extend the implementation of the Strategy to Burkina Faso and Chad while intensifying relevant activities in Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Political dialogue on conflict prevention and security issues in the Sahel region will be stepped up also in relevant West African and neighbouring countries including Senegal, Nigeria and Cameroon as well as countries of the Maghreb.

4. International support to the Sahel region needs to be accompanied by sustained efforts to find a lasting solution to the roots of the ongoing crises in the north of Mali and the wider region. Security and development in the Sahel region is also strongly linked to stability in Libya. In Mali, the EU fully supports the work of the United Nations stabilisation mission MINUSMA to help create conditions conducive to the full restoration of State authority, order and security in the north of Mali. The EU strongly urges all Malian parties to begin credible and inclusive consultations open to all communities and to all non-terrorist armed groups of northern Mali with the aim of achieving broadly founded and lasting peace through a sustainable political solution. The EU will also continue to support the implementation of the plan for the sustainable recovery of Mali.

5. In line with the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, impartiality and humanity, the EU will also continue to provide humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable people, on the basis of needs, especially these coming months to ensure a coordinated and effective response to the current food crisis in the Sahel region and to link relief, rehabilitation, and development wherever conditions allow it. In that perspective, the EU will continue to foster resilience building and relevant coordination efforts by Western Africa regional organisations and partners in the framework of the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR).

6. With regard to development in the Sahel, the EU will continue to support sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development and regional integration, drawing lessons from the past. The Council commends the progress made towards the implementation of an Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and West Africa. The EU will provide specific support to regional infrastructures that bring the periphery closer to the centre, sustainable social services especially health and education, and sustainable agriculture, food and nutrition security. The EU will encourage in particular local and national development policies addressing the specific socioeconomic and human security needs of border areas as a way to improve territorial control and state authority throughout territories. Due attention will be paid to trading, trafficking and migratory flows including return and readmission and the synergies between migration and development. The EU will continue to promote democracy, human rights, decentralisation policies, good governance including an independent and fair justice system at local and regional levels, and it will encourage the fight against corruption as well as counter-radicalisation projects as a means of conflict prevention, building on local and national initiatives where possible. The EU will continue to implement joint programming within the Sahel countries in order to further increase the effectiveness of EU development cooperation.

7. In the field of security, the EU will continue to provide support to national and regional endeavours related to security sector reform and integrated border management and to national efforts in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, including smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings, notably through the ongoing CSDP missions in Libya, Mali and Niger as well as the future civilian mission in Mali. The EU will promote synergies between those missions while integrating lessons learnt from previous missions. The EU

welcomes the efforts of the African Union and other regional actors to promote enhanced coordination in the field of intelligence and counter-terrorism as well as optimal allocation of national assets and capacities.

8. The primary responsibility and ownership for peace, security and development is with the governments of the Sahelian region. Regional and international coordination is key to ensure the effectiveness of international efforts in support to local and regional endeavours and the EU will work in close cooperation with regional organisations and national governments in the Sahel to ensure a broadly rooted implementation of the EU Sahel Strategy. The EU welcomes the decision taken by the Heads of States of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso in Nouakchott on 16 February 2014 to establish a permanent framework for their own regional coordination efforts. The EU also welcomes the conclusions of the international high level meeting on the Sahel held in Brussels on 6 February 2014, in particular the recognition that the international coordination platform for the Sahel should constitute the overall coordination mechanism for all existing strategies in the region, including the UN integrated strategy for the Sahel. The EU reaffirms its will to contribute actively together with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and others to the work of the United Nations and the African Union Commission in support to this platform.”

COUNCIL DECISION on the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)

15 April 2014, 2014/219/CFSP

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 28, Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

1. On 21 March 2011, the Council welcomed the European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel region (the ‘EU Sahel Strategy’), underlining that the Union has a long-standing interest in reducing insecurity and improving development in the Sahel region.
2. On 16 July 2012, by Decision 2012/392/CFSP,²² the Council launched the common security and defence policy (CSDP) mission EUCAP Sahel Niger, which assists in training and advising internal security forces in Niger and reinforces regional coordination with Mali and Mauritania in the security field.
3. On 23 July 2012, the Council stated that it was alarmed at the deteriorating situation in Mali and its adverse impact on regional and international peace and stability. In order to continue implementation of the EU Sahel Strategy, the Council invited the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the Commission to make specific proposals with a view to the

22. Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) (OJ L 187, 17.7.2012, p. 48).

swift implementation of all action relating to governance, security, development and conflict settlement envisaged in the EU Sahel Strategy for the north of Mali.

4. On 18 February 2013, by Decision 2013/87/CFSP,²³ the Council launched a military training mission of the Malian armed forces (EUTM Mali) to provide advice and training for the Malian armed forces operating under the control of Mali's legitimate civilian authorities.
5. On 27 May 2013, the Council reiterated its readiness to discuss, particularly in the context of the CSDP, the options for urgent support for the Malian authorities in the area of internal security and justice, including the fight against terrorism and organised crime.
6. On 20 February 2014, the Republic of Mali sent a letter inviting the Union to deploy a Union civilian mission to support the Malian security forces.
7. On 17 March 2014, the Council approved the Crisis Management Concept for a possible CSDP action to support Mali's internal security forces.
8. EUCAP Sahel Mali will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Mission

The Union shall conduct a civilian mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) in support of the Malian internal security forces (ISF) (police, gendarmerie, national guard).

Article 2

Objective and tasks

1. The objective of EUCAP Sahel Mali shall be to allow the Malian authorities to restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace in Mali, and to restore and maintain State authority and legitimacy throughout the territory of Mali by means of an effective redeployment of its administration.
2. With the support of the Malian dynamic in restoring State authority, and in close coordination with other international actors, in particular MINUSMA, EUCAP Sahel Mali shall assist and advise the ISF in the implementation of the security reform set out by the new Government, with a view to:
 - improving their operational efficacy;
 - re-establishing their respective hierarchical chains;
 - reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities with regard to the management and supervision of their missions; and
 - facilitating their redeployment to the north of the country.
3. To achieve its objective, EUCAP Sahel Mali shall operate in accordance with the strategic lines of operation defined in the Crisis Management Concept approved by the Council on 17 March 2014 and set out in the operational planning documents approved by the Council.

23. Council Decision 2013/87/CFSP of 18 February 2013 on the launch of a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) (OJ L 46, 19.2.2013, p. 27).

Article 3

Chain of command and structure

4. EUCAP Sahel Mali shall have a unified chain of command for crisis management operations.
5. EUCAP Sahel Mali shall have its Headquarters in Bamako.

Article 4

Planning and launch of EUCAP Sahel Mali

1. The mission shall be launched by a Council Decision on the date recommended by the Civilian Operation Commander of EUCAP Sahel Mali once it has reached its initial operating capability.
2. The tasks of the core party of EUCAP Mali shall be to prepare the installation of the mission in terms of logistics and infrastructure, open communication with Malian contacts, in particular the government and central authorities, in order to conduct exploratory assessments with them regarding the implementation of the mission objectives, start to outline the framework for cooperation and coordination with international partners, in particular MINUSMA, and provide the input needed to draw up the concept of operations (CONOPS), the operation plan (OPLAN) and the second budgetary impact statement.

Article 5

Civilian Operation Commander

1. The Director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) of EUCAP Sahel Mali shall be the EUCAP Sahel Mali Civilian Operation Commander. The CPCC shall be at the disposal of the Civilian Operation Commander for the planning and conduct of EUCAP Sahel Mali.
2. The Civilian Operation Commander, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and overall authority of the HR, shall exercise command and control of EUCAP Sahel Mali.
3. The Civilian Operation Commander shall ensure, with regard to the conduct of operations, the proper and effective implementation of the Council's decisions as well as the PSC's decisions, including by issuing instructions as required to the Head of Mission and providing him with advice and technical support.
4. The Civilian Operation Commander shall report to the Council through the HR.
5. All seconded staff shall remain under the full command of the national authorities of the seconding State in accordance with national rules, the Union institution concerned, or the European External Action Service (EEAS). Those authorities shall transfer Operational Control of their staff to the Civilian Operation Commander.
6. The Civilian Operation Commander shall have overall responsibility for ensuring that the Union's duty of care is properly discharged.

Article 6

Head of Mission

1. The Head of Mission shall assume responsibility for, and exercise command and control of, EUCAP Sahel Mali at theatre level. The Head of Mission shall be directly responsible to the Civilian Operation Commander and shall act in accordance with the instructions given by him.

2. The Head of Mission shall be the representative of EUCAP Sahel Mali in its action area. The Head of Mission may delegate management tasks in staff and financial matters to staff members of EUCAP Sahel Mali, under his overall responsibility.
3. The Head of Mission shall exercise administrative and logistic responsibility for EUCAP Sahel Mali, including over assets, resources and information placed at the disposal of the mission.
4. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the staff. For seconded staff, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national authority in accordance with national rules, by the Union institution concerned or by the EEAS.
5. The Head of Mission shall ensure appropriate visibility of EUCAP Sahel Mali.

Article 7

Political control and strategic direction

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and the HR, political control and strategic direction of EUCAP Sahel Mali. The Council shall authorise the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 38 TEU. That authorisation shall include, in particular, the powers to appoint a Head of Mission, upon a proposal of the HR, and to review the CONOPS and the OPLAN. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of EUCAP Sahel Mali shall remain vested in the Council.
2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.
3. The PSC shall receive, on a regular basis and as required, reports by the Civilian Operation Commander and the Head of Mission on issues within their areas of responsibility.

Article 8

Staff

1. EUCAP Sahel Mali shall consist primarily of staff seconded by Member States, Union institutions or the EEAS. Each Member State, Union institution, and the EEAS shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it, including travel expenses to and from the place of deployment, salaries, medical coverage and allowances other than applicable daily allowances.
2. The Member State, Union institution, or the EEAS respectively shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment from or concerning the member of staff seconded, and for bringing any action against that person.
3. International and local staff may also be recruited on a contractual basis by EUCAP Sahel Mali if the functions required cannot be provided by personnel seconded by Member States. Exceptionally, in duly justified cases, where no qualified applicants from Member States are available, nationals from participating third States may be recruited on a contractual basis, as appropriate.
4. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local staff shall be laid down in the contracts to be concluded between EUCAP Sahel Mali and the staff members concerned.

Article 9

Status of EUCAP Sahel Mali and its staff

The status of EUCAP Sahel Mali and its staff, including where appropriate the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of EUCAP Sahel Mali, shall be the subject of

an agreement concluded pursuant to Article 37 TEU and in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Article 10

Participation of third States

1. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the Union and its single institutional framework, third States may be invited to contribute to EUCAP Sahel Mali, provided that they bear the cost of the staff seconded by them, including salaries, all risk insurance cover, daily subsistence allowances and travel expenses to and from Mali, and that they contribute to the running costs of EUCAP Sahel Mali, as appropriate.
2. Third States contributing to EUCAP Sahel Mali shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of the day-to-day management of EUCAP Sahel Mali as Member States.
3. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions on acceptance of the proposed contributions and to establish a Committee of Contributors.
4. Detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States shall be covered by agreements concluded in accordance with Article 37 TEU. Where the Union and a third State conclude or have concluded an agreement establishing a framework for the participation of that third State in Union crisis-management operations, the provisions of that agreement shall apply in the context of EUCAP Sahel Mali.

Article 11

Security

1. The Civilian Operation Commander shall direct the Head of Mission's planning of security measures and ensure their proper and effective implementation by EUCAP Sahel Mali in accordance with Article 5.
2. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for the security of EUCAP Sahel Mali and for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements applicable to EUCAP Sahel Mali, in line with the policy of the Union on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V TEU.
3. The Head of Mission shall be assisted by a Mission Security Officer (MSO), who shall report to the Head of Mission and also maintain a close functional relationship with the EEAS.
4. As regards security, EUCAP Sahel Mali staff shall receive mandatory security training, adapted to the risk as it is evaluated in the zone of deployment. They shall also receive regular in-theatre refresher training organised by the MSO.
5. The Head of Mission shall ensure the protection of EU classified information in accordance with Council Decision 2013/488/EU.²⁴

Article 12

Watch-Keeping Capability

The Watch-Keeping Capability shall be activated for EUCAP Sahel Mali.

24. Council Decision 2013/488/EU of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ L 274, 15.10.2013, p. 1).

*Article 13***Legal arrangements**

EUCAP Sahel Mali shall have the capacity to procure services and supplies, to enter into contracts and administrative arrangements, to employ staff, to hold bank accounts, to acquire and dispose of assets and to discharge its liabilities, and to be a party to legal proceedings, as required in order to implement this Decision.

*Article 14***Financial arrangements**

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUCAP Sahel Mali for the first nine months following the entry into force of this Decision shall be EUR 5 500 000. The financial reference amount for the subsequent periods shall be decided by the Council.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the Union. Nationals of third States and host country nationals shall be allowed to tender for contracts. Subject to the Commission's approval, the Mission may conclude technical arrangements with Member States, the host State, participating third States and other international actors regarding the provision of equipment, services and premises to EUCAP Sahel Mali.
3. EUCAP Sahel Mali shall be responsible for the implementation of its budget. For this purpose, EUCAP Sahel Mali shall sign an agreement with the Commission.
4. The financial arrangements shall respect the chain of command as provided for in Articles 3, 5 and 6 and the operational needs of EUCAP Sahel Mali, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.
5. Expenditure shall be eligible from the date when the agreement referred to in paragraph 3 is signed.

*Article 15***Project Cell**

1. EUCAP Sahel Mali shall have a Project Cell for identifying and implementing projects. EUCAP Sahel Mali shall, as appropriate, coordinate, facilitate, and provide advice on projects implemented by Member States and third States under their responsibility in areas related to EUCAP Sahel Mali and in support of its objectives.
2. Subject to paragraph 3, EUCAP Sahel Mali shall be authorised to seek recourse to financial contributions from the Member States or third States to implement projects identified as supplementing in a consistent manner EUCAP Sahel Mali's other actions, if the project is:
 - provided for in the financial statement relating to this Decision; or
 - integrated during the mandate by means of an amendment to the financial statement requested by the Head of Mission.

EUCAP Sahel Mali shall conclude an arrangement with those States, covering in particular the specific procedures for dealing with any complaint from third parties concerning damage caused as a result of acts or omissions by the Head of Mission in the use of the funds provided by those States.

Under no circumstances may the contributing Member States hold the Union or the HR liable for acts or omissions by the Head of Mission in the use of the funds provided by those States.

3. The PCS shall agree on the acceptance of a financial contribution from third States to the Project Cell.

Article 16

Consistency of the Union's response and coordination

1. The HR shall ensure the consistency of the implementation of this Decision with the Union's external action as a whole, including the Union's development programmes.
2. Without prejudice to the chain of command, the Head of Mission shall act in close coordination with the Union's delegation in Mali to ensure the consistency of Union action in Mali. Without interfering in the chain of command, the Head of Delegation in Bamako, in close coordination with the European Union Special Representative for the Sahel (EUSR Sahel) shall give political direction at local level to the EUCAP Sahel Mali Head of Mission. The EUCAP Sahel Mali Head of Mission, the Head of Delegation in Bamako and the EUSR Sahel shall initiate consultations as necessary.
3. Cooperation shall be established between the EUCAP Sahel Mali Head of Mission, the EUTM Mali Mission Commander, the EUCAP Sahel Niger Head of Mission and the EUBAM Libya Head of Mission.
4. In addition, EUCAP Sahel Mali shall coordinate and harmonise its actions in the area of security reform with MINUSMA and other international partners.

Article 17

Release of information

1. The HR shall be authorised, if necessary and as required for EUCAP Sahel Mali, to release EU classified information up to 'RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED' level generated for the purposes of EUCAP Sahel Mali to the third States associated with this Decision, in accordance with Decision 2013/488/EU.
2. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the HR shall also be authorised to release to the host State any EU classified information up to 'RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED' level generated for the purposes of EUCAP Sahel Mali, in accordance with Decision 2013/488/EU. Arrangements between the HR and the competent authorities of the host State shall be drawn up for this purpose.
3. The HR shall be authorised to release to the third States associated with this Decision any EU non-classified documents connected with the deliberations of the Council relating to EUCAP Sahel Mali and covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council's Rules of Procedure²⁵ (1).
4. The HR may delegate such authorisations, as well as the ability to conclude the arrangements referred to in para graph 2, to EEAS officials, to the EU Civilian Operation Commander and/or to the Head of Mission in accordance with section VII of Annex VI to Decision 2013/488/EU.

Article 18

Entry into force and duration

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

25. Council Decision 2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 35).

It shall apply for a period of 24 months starting from the date on which EUCAP Sahel Mali is launched.

Done at Luxembourg, 15 April 2014.

For the Council
The President
 C. ASHTON

COUNCIL DECISION amending Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali)

15 April 2014, 2014/220/CFSP

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 42(4) and 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

1. On 17 January 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/34/CFSP²⁶ on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali).
2. On 18 February 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/87/CFSP²⁷ on the launch of EUTM Mali.
3. On 17 December 2013, the Political and Security Committee recommended that the mandate of EUTM Mali be extended for a period of two years, until 18 May 2016.
4. It is also necessary to lay down the financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUTM Mali for the period from 19 May 2014 to 18 May 2016.
5. Decision 2013/34/CFSP should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2013/34/CFSP is amended as follows:

6. in Article 10, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘2. The financial reference amount for the common costs of EUTM Mali for the period from 19 May 2014 to 18 May 2016 shall be EUR 27 700 000. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 25(1) of Decision 2011/871/CFSP shall be 0 %.’
7. in Article 12, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

26. Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) (OJ L 14, 18.1.2013, p. 19).

27. Council Decision 2013/87/CFSP of 18 February 2013 on the launch of a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali) (OJ L 46, 19.2.2013, p. 27).

'2. The mandate of EUTM Mali shall end on 18 May 2016.'

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 15 April 2014.

For the Council
The President
C. ASHTON

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia

Sixteenth Plenary Session

United Nations Head Quarters, 14 May 2014 Communiqué

Summary

1. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) held its Sixteenth Plenary Session at the UN Headquarters in New York on 14 May 2014 under the Chairmanship of the European Union.

2. The Plenary was dedicated to the memory of Mr. Clément Gorissen and Mr. Simon Davies who, working for UNODC, were killed in a heinous attack in Galkayo on 7 April 2014. Their deaths are a tragedy not only for their families, their friends, their colleagues and the United Nations family, but also for the people of Somalia who so badly need the kind of assistance that they were providing.

3. The CGPCS urges the immediate release of the remaining innocent seafarers currently being held captive in Somalia.

4. The CGPCS officially endorsed a series of measures to streamline and refine the CGPCS structures and working procedures with a view to making the CGPCS more demand-driven, delivery-focused, cost-effective and to increase regional participation and representation through a system of co-chairing arrangements for its Working Groups.

5. WG1 has been renamed the Working Group on Capacity Building. It will concentrate on capacity building and will be co-chaired by the UK and the Indian Ocean Commission. WG2 has been transformed into the 'Legal Forum of the CGPCS', preserving the legal network as a virtual legal forum of legal experts. It will be co-chaired by Mauritius and Portugal. WG3 has been renamed 'Maritime Counter-Piracy and Mitigation Operations'. It will bring, amongst others, industry, navies and seafarers organisations together. This WG will be co-chaired by Japan, Seychelles and the United Arab Emirates. WG5 has been renamed 'Disrupting Pirate Networks Ashore' and will continue to be chaired by Italy and focus on financial flows tracking and arresting piracy kingpins. Law enforcement expertise will be concentrated in a dedicated, autonomous Task Force.

6. The CGPCS welcomes the efforts made by the international counter piracy forces off the Horn of Africa and calls upon all stakeholders, civilian and military, public and private, to remain jointly engaged in the fight against Somali piracy. Progress is real but potentially reversible. The CGPCS remains committed to continuing

its work to eliminate piracy off the coast of Somalia, including by enabling Somalia to build an effective and sustainable response to piracy.

7. The CGPCS was informed by the Federal Government of Somalia that the Federal Government is developing a Maritime Security Strategy, consistent with and to aid the implementation of the broader Maritime Resource and Security Strategy. The CGPCS commends the Federal Government of Somalia for its efforts to assume greater responsibility for eradicating piracy and other maritime crimes and fostering cooperation to bring pirate kingpins to justice, and calls upon it to continue and amplify this effort. Somalia, with the support of regional countries and the international community, now need to consolidate the gains made by the international community and make substantive changes ashore in Somalia through focussed and prioritised efforts over the next two years.

FULL TEXT

1. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) held its Sixteenth Plenary Session at the UN Headquarters in New York on 14 May 2014 under the Chairmanship of the European Union.

2. The Plenary was dedicated to the memory of Mr. Clément Gorissen and Mr. Simon Davies who, working for UNODC, were killed in a heinous attack in Galkayo on 7 April 2014. Clément and Simon were helping the Somali people to tackle the organised crime that is stifling the development of their country. Their deaths are a tragedy not only for their families, their friends, their colleagues and the United Nations family, but also for the people of Somalia who so badly need the kind of assistance that they were providing.

3. The CGPCS officially endorsed the proposals formulated at the CGPCS Strategy Meeting in Paris on 28 January 2014 to make the CGPCS more demand-driven, delivery-focused, cost-effective and to increase regional involvement. As part of this effort, WG meetings will normally be held back-to-back with the Plenary.

4. The operational update done by the SHADE co-chairs has become a permanent feature of the Plenary. WG1 has been renamed the Working Group on Capacity Building and will be co-chaired by the UK and the Indian Ocean Commission. The WG will concentrate on capacity building and meet twice a year. The WG will include panel discussions dedicated to Somalia and the region. This format allows both Somalia and the region to take more ownership of the process.

5. WG2 has been transformed into the 'Legal Forum of the CGPCS'. The legal network will be preserved as a virtual legal forum of legal experts. The Legal Forum is not a WG but will report to the Plenary. The Legal Forum can meet on an ad-hoc basis, if and when required. Portugal and Mauritius will co-chair the Legal Forum of the CGPCS.

6. WG3 has been renamed 'Maritime Counter-Piracy and Mitigation Operations'. This WG will bring, amongst others, the shipping industry, navies and seafarers organisations together. This WG will be co-chaired by Japan, Seychelles and the United Arab Emirates.

7. WG5 has been renamed 'Disrupting Pirate Networks Ashore'. The WG will continue to focus on financial flows tracking and arresting piracy kingpins. The WG will aim to become more technical/operational by incorporating specific expertise within the WG. The law enforcement expertise will be concentrated within a dedicated, autonomous Task Force. Italy remains the chair; a co-chair from the region is invited.

8. The CGPCS expressed its gratitude to the outgoing Working Group chairs Denmark (ex-WG2) and Korea (ex-WG3) and commended them for the sterling work done.

9. The CGPCS welcomed the remarks made by Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Sheikh Issa, National Security Adviser to the President of Somalia; Mr. Jean-Claude de l'Estrac, Secretary General of the Indian Ocean Commission; Mr. Peter Hinchliffe, Secretary General of the International Chamber of Shipping and Mr. Koji Sekimizu, Secretary General of the International Maritime Organization.

10. Stakeholders received a comprehensive briefing from the SHADE co-chairs (EU, NATO and CMF), who reported that pirate activity continues to trend at the lowest levels since 2008. The CGPCS was also informed that the mandate of NATO's multinational naval presence has been extended until 2016. The EU's naval presence may be extended until 2016 pending formal decision by the relevant decision-making bodies. While pirate gangs operating from Somalia have not successfully pirated a merchant vessel since May 10, 2012 they continue to remain a potential threat to mariners in the region.

11. Real progress has been made on containing piracy at sea but the trend is potentially reversible without the continued deterrence and disruption effects of international navies, the self-protection by the shipping industry, and until such time as capacity-building efforts ashore have sufficient effect.

12. WG1 (Working Group on Capacity Building) met ahead of the Plenary. The UK and the IOC, the latter as co-chair designate of the Working Group, reported on their first meeting in the new format, which comprised key regional actors and international donors. There was agreement that Somalia, the region and the international community needed to inject greater urgency into counter-piracy capacity building. There was agreement to prepare a paper on key priorities and capabilities to the end of 2016, which will be presented at the next WG. The National Security Advisor of the Federal Government of Somalia provided an outline of current priorities and committed to update the next WG on progress in developing its Maritime Security Strategy. The Federal Government of Somalia briefed the WG on its National Maritime Coordination Committee, which facilitates coordination within the government between its relevant Ministries and the regions in Somalia, and the Maritime Steering Group which, along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will enable coordination with the international community. The Federal Government of Somalia committed to writing to the co-chairs of the WG to clarify both the working and high level points of contact for the international community on counter-piracy issues within the Federal Government. The WG discussed and endorsed the new terms of reference for the WG with the caveat to include comments made at the meeting.

13. Criminal investigation and prosecution of apprehended pirates continues to be a priority for the CGPCS. The importance of continuing to support national prosecutions and incarceration in the region, including in Somalia when possible, cannot be underestimated, and the CGPCS commended the work of the UNODC Maritime Crime Programme in that regard.

14. Denmark marked the dissolution of WG2 in its existing form with the message that its main mission had been completed successfully. A comprehensive legal toolbox has been provided, models for trial and transfer have been developed, international law has been clarified and legal networks have been established. Denmark has commenced working with Portugal and Mauritius, the co-chairs of the 'Legal Forum of the CGPCS', in order to secure a swift handover.

15. After the successful completion and endorsement by the 15th Plenary of the "Interim Guidelines on Measures Relating to the Welfare of Seafarers and their Families Affected by Piracy off the Coast of Somalia", the Chair of WG3 submitted the Interim Guidelines to the 93rd Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO so that it may become available as a reference framework in dealing with the welfare of seafarers affected by

piracy in other parts of the world. The Guidelines are a document of a declaratory nature without binding force. They could, however, serve as a significant first step toward forming a reference in dealing with seafarer welfare problems. CGPCS Stakeholders are in this regard called upon to consider becoming a co-sponsor of the Interim Guidelines during the deliberations of the MSC.

16. Building on the work of over the past two years, a Law Enforcement Task Force (LETF) was set up with the aim of enhancing international law enforcement cooperation to prosecute pirate leaders and piracy financiers. The Task Force, coordinated by the US Department of Justice, will operate independently and focus on information and evidence sharing and prosecution of kingpins and financiers. The Task Force intends to welcome the participation of nations committed to prosecuting pirate leaders and financiers or holding evidence that will directly contribute to the effort. The LETF will hold its first meeting in the fall of 2014 and will report on progress at the next Plenary Session. Welcoming the initiative, WG5 invited countries to facilitate the participation of prosecutors and investigators involved in combating piracy to the LETF and stands ready to support the LETF including by promoting Somali cooperation in facilitating the arrest and prosecution of pirate kingpins. WG5 heard reports on the World Bank project on Pirate Trails, the INTERPOL Global Maritime Piracy Database, the evolution of REFLECS 3 (formerly RAPPICC) and took note with satisfaction that UNODC will continue its work on enhancing capabilities to counter illicit financial flows in countries of the region. Capacity building to combat illicit financial flows is also necessary.

17. The CGPCS welcomed contributions from Japan, Republic of Korea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Spain to the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia since the fifteenth Plenary in November 2013, bringing the total deposited contributions to the Trust Fund to nearly \$21 million since its inception in January 2010, of which some \$18 million has been committed and disbursed. During the 13 May meeting of the Trust Fund Board, six projects worth \$2.5 million submitted by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) were approved. The Board also decided to allocate another \$130,000 to strengthen personnel and resource management of the on-going Hostage Support Programme. The Board gave in principle approval to a project submitted by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, proposed and supported by the Federal Government of Somalia, to build the knowledge and capacity of Somali legislators and technical officials regarding the rights and duties in the maritime zones set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In addition, the Board decided to replenish the Expedited Facility to avoid any disruption of programming and amended the terms of the Expedited Facility so that this Facility could also be utilised for short notice hostage support, recovery and repatriation expenses.

18. It further urged States and the private sector to ensure that the national commitment of Somalia and regional countries to prosecute and imprison pirates, and to develop their maritime domain is matched by strong support and assistance from the international community, including through generous financial contributions to the Trust Fund. The CGPCS commends the Trust Fund as a remarkably efficient mechanism taking into account that the Trust Fund supported projects take place in a volatile security environment. It recognized that only 19% of the Trust Fund grants have been used for administrative, staff, audit, security, and travel support.

19. The CGPCS welcomed the signature of an agreement between the EU and Tanzania on the transfer of suspected pirates apprehended by EUNAVFOR. The agreement was signed in Brussels on the first of April by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tanzania.

20. The CGPCS agreed that close international coordination and cooperation continue to be crucial to counter piracy effectively. In this framework, it recognized the need to fully respect the relevant international law in international waters.

21. The CGPCS noted the enduring concern of some countries on the scope of the High Risk Area (HRA) and the fact that the *ad hoc* meeting to discuss this issue, as agreed to in previous Plenaries, is yet to be held. Further to the deliberations of the 14th and 15th Plenaries, a recommendation is made to the WG Maritime Counter Piracy and Mitigation Operations to convene the *ad hoc* meeting on the HRA issue just before the next CGPCS meeting.

22. The provision of adequate training is of great importance to found and strengthen the necessary security institutions in Somalia, aiding the Somali authorities, amongst others, to establish and implement a Maritime Police and Coast Guard Law to eradicate piracy. The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operation Training Center (NMIOTC), in close cooperation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), provides valuable support to these efforts with its provision of counter piracy training to the Somali authorities and other key players and stakeholders in the Horn of Africa.

23. On the issue of the PMSCs and PCASP, the Plenary noted the extant development of guidelines and advisories by the IMO and ISO. There is now a need to share these Best Practices, as articulated in the IMO guidelines and ISO: PAS 28007.

24. In Japan, an act on special measures to allow Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on board Japanese-flagged vessels in areas determined on the base of the High Risk Area in the Best Management Practices (BMP) came into effect on 10 December 2013. Japan has been consistent in helping Somalia and its neighbouring countries in acquiring substantial law enforcement and judicial capacities. Japan has contributed US\$ 14.6 million to the Trust Fund of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, and made a new, additional contribution of US\$1 million on 14 March 2014 to the Trust Fund to support states countering Piracy off the coast of Somalia. In March 2014 Japan announced a new package of assistance which amounts to US\$39.69 million, with a view to supporting the peace and nation building of Somalia.

25. The CGPCS Lessons Learned Consortium consisting of Cardiff University, Oceans Beyond Piracy, the EU Institute for Security Studies and the International Peace Institute has been tasked to document the experiences of the CGPCS and its stakeholders and draw lessons from it. The Lessons Learned Consortium is in the process of drafting a series of papers which address specific lessons from the CGPCS, including, *inter alia*, the legitimacy of the CGPCS, ownership, African actors in the CGPCS and the participation of non-state actors and industry. The Lessons Learned Consortium stands ready to support the Working Groups in their on-going and planned work, including strategic and planning issues. All CGPCS participants are urged to contribute and support the work of the Lessons Learned Consortium in order to adequately document the lessons of the CGPCS.

26. The CGPCS is keen to improve the visibility of the core programs, initiatives, projects, missions and operations that the CGPCS stakeholders have undertaken in the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia. To that end the EU Chair initiated the CGPCS Banner Project that showcases the iconic achievements of the CGPCS stakeholders and continued the production of CGPCS Newsletters. The CGPCS website was further developed to make it more user friendly.

27. The CGPCS noted that approximately 50 seafarers are still being held hostage in Somalia. All have been held hostage for more than two years, some for more than four years. The CGPCS calls upon all its stakeholders to redouble their efforts to secure their immediate release.

28. The CGPCS agreed to meet in the last quarter of 2014 for the second CGPCS Counter-Piracy Week, during which all Working Groups will convene to work on cross-cutting thematic issues, and which will culminate in the 17th Plenary, hosted by the United Arab Emirates and chaired by the European Union. The EU Chair will invite the Board of the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to hold its periodic meeting during the event.

COUNCIL DECISION amending Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR)

22 July 2014, 2014/485/CFSP

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28, Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

1. On 16 July 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/389/CFSP.²⁸ That Decision expires on 15 July 2014.
2. On 18 March 2014, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) recommended extending the Mission until 12 December 2016 in accordance with the Strategic Review.
3. EUCAP NESTOR will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2012/389/CFSP is amended as follows:

1. Article 2 is replaced by the following:

'Article 2

Mission Statement

EUCAP NESTOR is to assist countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean in strengthening their maritime security capacity in order to enable them to fight piracy more effec-

28. OJ L 187, 17.7.2012, p. 40.

tively. EUCAP NESTOR will have primary focus on Somalia, and a secondary focus on Djibouti, Seychelles and Tanzania.

2. Article 3 is replaced by the following:

'Article 3

Objectives and tasks

1. In order to achieve the Mission Statement set out in Article 2, EUCAP NESTOR shall:

- (a) enhance the capacity of the States mentioned in Article 2 to exert effective maritime governance over their coastline, internal waters, territorial seas and exclusive economic zones;
- (b) support these States in taking ownership of the fight against piracy in accordance with the rule of law and human rights standards;
- (c) strengthen regional cooperation and coordination of maritime security;
- (d) make a targeted and specific contribution to ongoing international efforts.

2. To achieve the objectives, EUCAP NESTOR shall operate in accordance with the lines of operation and tasks set out in the operational planning documents approved by the Council.

3. EUCAP NESTOR shall not carry out any executive function.

3. Article 4 is amended as follows:

- (a) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘2. EUCAP NESTOR shall be structured in accordance with its planning documents.’;

- (b) paragraph 3 is deleted.

4. Article 6 is amended as follows:

- (a) the following paragraph is inserted:

‘1a. The Head of Mission shall be the representative of EUCAP NESTOR in its action area. The Head of Mission may delegate management tasks in staff and financial matters to staff members of EUCAP NESTOR for whom the Head of Mission has overall responsibility.’

- (b) paragraph 4 is deleted

- (c) paragraph 8 is deleted.

5. In Article 7, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘4. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local staff shall be laid down in the contracts to be concluded between EUCAP NESTOR and the staff member concerned.’

6. In Article 11, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following:

‘5. The Head of Mission shall ensure the protection of EU classified information in accordance with Council Decision 2013/488/EU.²⁹

7. The following Article is inserted:

'Article 12a

Legal arrangements

EUCAP NESTOR shall have the capacity to procure services and supplies, enter into contracts and administrative arrangements, employ staff, hold bank accounts, acquire and dispose of assets,

29. Council Decision of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ L 274, 15.10.2013, p. 1.).

discharge its liabilities and to be a party to legal proceedings, as required in order to implement this Decision.’

8. Article 13 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 13

Financial arrangements

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUCAP NESTOR from 16 July 2012 to 15 November 2013 shall be EUR 22 880 000.

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUCAP NESTOR for the period from 16 November 2013 to 15 October 2014 shall be EUR 11 950 000.

2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the Union. Nationals of third States and host country nationals shall be allowed to tender for contracts. Subject to the Commission’s approval, the EUCAP NESTOR may conclude technical arrangements with Member States, the host State, participating third States and other international actors regarding the provision of equipment, services and premises to EUCAP NESTOR.

3. EUCAP NESTOR shall be responsible for the implementation of its budget. For this purpose, EUCAP NESTOR shall sign an agreement with the Commission.

4. Without prejudice to the existing provisions on the status of EUCAP NESTOR and its personnel, EUCAP NESTOR shall be responsible for any claims and obligations arising from the implementation of the mandate starting from 16 July 2014, with the exception of any claims relating to serious misconduct by the Head of Mission, for which the Head of Mission shall bear responsibility.

5. The implementation of the financial arrangements shall be without prejudice to the chain of command as provided for in Articles 4, 5 and 6 and the operational requirements of EUCAP NESTOR, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.

6. Expenditure shall be eligible as of 16 July 2012.’

9. The following Article is inserted:

‘Article 13a

Project Cell

1. EUCAP NESTOR shall have a Project Cell for identifying and implementing projects. EUCAP NESTOR shall, as appropriate, facilitate and provide advice on projects implemented by Member States and third States under their responsibility in areas related to EUCAP NESTOR and in support of its objectives.

2. EUCAP NESTOR shall be authorised to seek recourse to financial contributions from the Member States or from third States to implement projects identified as supplementing EUCAP NESTOR’s other actions in a consistent manner, if the project is:

- (a) provided for in the financial statement relating to this Decision; or
- (b) integrated during the mandate by means of an amendment to the financial statement requested by the Head of Mission.

EUCAP NESTOR shall conclude an arrangement with those States, covering in particular the specific procedures for dealing with any complaint from third parties concerning damage caused as a

result of acts or omissions by EUCAP NESTOR in the use of the funds provided by those States. Under no circumstances may the contributing States hold the Union or the HR liable for acts or omissions by EUCAP NESTOR in the use of the funds provided by those States.

3. The PSC shall agree on the acceptance of a financial contribution from third States to the Project Cell.'

10. In Article 15, the reference, 'Decision 2011/292/EU' is replaced by 'Decision 2013/488/EU'.

11. In Article 16, the second paragraph is replaced by the following:

'It shall apply until 12 December 2016.'

Article 2

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall apply from 16 July 2014.

Done at Brussels, 22 July 2014.

For the Council

The President

C. ASHTON

COUNCIL DECISION amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger)

22 July 2014, 2014/482/CFSP

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28, Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

1. On 16 July 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/392/CFSP³⁰ which expires on 15 July 2014.
2. On 28 October 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/533/CFSP³¹ providing a financial reference amount for the period until 15 July 2014.
3. On 28 March 2014, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) recommended to extend the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) for a period of two years in accordance with the Strategic Review.

30. Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) (OJ L 187, 17.7.2012, p. 48).

31. Council Decision 2013/533/CFSP of 28 October 2013 amending Decision 2012/392/CFSP on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) (OJ L 288, 30.10.2013, p. 68).

4. On 2 May 2014, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) received a letter from the Nigerien authorities supporting the extension of EUCAP Sahel Niger for two years.
5. EUCAP Sahel Niger will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision 2012/392/CFSP is amended as follows:

1. Articles 2 and 3 are replaced by the following:

'Article 2

Objectives

In the context of the implementation of the European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, EUCAP Sahel Niger shall aim at enabling the Nigerien authorities to define and implement their own national Security Strategy. EUCAP Sahel Niger shall also aim at contributing to the development of an integrated, multidisciplinary, coherent, sustainable, and human-rights-based approach among the various Nigerien security actors in the fight against terrorism and organised crime.

Article 3

Tasks

1. In order to fulfil the objectives set out in Article 2, EUCAP Sahel Niger shall:
 - a. be ready to support the definition and implementation of a Nigerien Security Strategy while continuing advising and assisting in the implementation of the security dimension of the Nigerien Strategy for Security and Development in the North;
 - b. facilitate the coordination of regional and international projects supporting Niger in the fight against terrorism and organised crime;
 - c. strengthen the rule of law through the development of criminal investigation capacities, and in this context develop and implement adequate training programmes;
 - d. support the development of Nigerien Security and Defence Forces' sustainability;
 - e. contribute to the identification, planning and implementation of projects in the security field.
2. EUCAP Sahel Niger shall focus on the activities mentioned in paragraph 1 which contribute to improving the control of the territory of Niger, including in coordination with the Nigerien Armed Forces.
3. EUCAP Sahel Niger shall not carry out any executive function.'
2. Article 4 is amended as follows:
 1. paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:

'3. EUCAP Sahel Niger shall be structured in accordance with its planning documents.'
 2. paragraph 4 is deleted.

3. Article 6 is amended as follows:
 - a. the following paragraph is inserted:

‘1a. The Head of Mission shall represent EUCAP Sahel Niger in its operations area. The Head of Mission may delegate management tasks related to staff and financial matters to staff members of EUCAP Sahel Niger under his/her overall responsibility.’;
 - b. paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:

‘3. The Head of Mission shall issue instructions to all EUCAP Sahel Niger staff, including the Brussels Support Element, for the effective conduct of the EUCAP Sahel Niger in theatre, assuming its coordination and day-to-day management, and following the instructions at the strategic level of the Civilian Operation Commander.’;
 - c. paragraphs 4 and 8 are deleted.
4. In Article 7, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘4. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local staff shall be laid down in the contracts to be concluded between EUCAP Sahel Niger and the staff member concerned.’
5. In Article 11, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following:

‘5. The Head of Mission shall ensure the protection of EU classified information in accordance with Council Decision 2013/488/EU³²

6. The following Article is inserted:

‘Article 12a

Legal arrangements

As required in order to implement this Decision, EUCAP Sahel Niger shall have the capacity to procure services and supplies, enter into contracts and administrative arrangements, employ staff, hold bank accounts, acquire and dispose of assets, discharge its liabilities and be a party to legal proceedings.’.

7. Article 13 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 13

Financial arrangements

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUCAP Sahel Niger for the period from 16 July 2012 to 31 October 2013 shall be EUR 8 700 000.
The financial reference amount to cover the expenditure related to EUCAP Sahel Niger for the period from 1 November 2013 to 15 July 2014 shall be EUR 6 500 000.
The financial reference amount to cover the expenditure related to EUCAP Sahel Niger for the period from 16 July 2014 to 15 July 2015 shall be EUR 9 155 000.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the Union. Nationals of third States and host country nationals shall be allowed to tender for contracts. Subject to the Commission’s approval, EUCAP Sahel Niger may conclude technical arrangements with Member States, the host State, participating third States

32. Council Decision 2013/488/EU of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ L 274, 15.10.2013, p. 1).

and other international actors regarding the provision of equipment, services and premises to EUCAP Sahel Niger.

3. EUCAP Sahel Niger shall be responsible for the implementation of its budget. For that purpose, EUCAP Sahel Niger shall sign an agreement with the Commission.
4. Without prejudice to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Niger on the status of the European Union mission in Niger CSDP (EUCAP Sahel Niger)³³, EUCAP Sahel Niger shall be responsible for any claims and obligations arising from the implementation of its mandate as of 16 July 2014, with the exception of claims relating to serious misconduct by the Head of Mission, for which he/she shall bear responsibility.
5. The implementation of the financial arrangements shall be without prejudice to the chain of command as provided for in Articles 4, 5 and 6 and the operational requirements of EUCAP Sahel Niger, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.
6. Expenditure shall be eligible as of 16 July 2012.
8. The following Article is inserted:

'Article 13a

Project Cell

1. EUCAP Sahel Niger shall have a Project Cell for identifying and implementing projects. EUCAP Sahel Niger shall, as appropriate, facilitate and provide advice on projects implemented by Member States and third States under their responsibility in areas related to EUCAP Sahel Niger and in support of its objectives.
2. EUCAP Sahel Niger shall be authorised to seek recourse to financial contributions from the Member States or third States to implement a project if that project has been identified as supplementing in a consistent manner EUCAP Sahel Niger's other actions and it is:
 - a. provided for in the budgetary impact statement relating to this Decision; or
 - b. integrated in the budgetary impact statement during the mandate of EUCAP Sahel Niger by means of an amendment to the budgetary impact statement requested by the Head of Mission. EUCAP Sahel Niger shall conclude an arrangement with contributing States, covering in particular the specific procedures for dealing with complaints from third parties concerning damage caused as a result of acts or omissions by EUCAP Sahel Niger in the use of the funds provided by those States. Under no circumstances may the contributing States hold the Union or the HR liable for acts or omissions by EUCAP Sahel Niger in the use of the funds provided by those States.
3. The PSC shall agree on the acceptance of financial contributions from third States to the Project Cell.'
9. In Article 15 'Decision 2011/292/EU' is replaced by 'Decision 2013/488/EU'.
10. In Article 16 the second paragraph is replaced by the following:

'It shall apply until 15 July 2016.'

33. OJ L 242, 11.9.2013, p. 2.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
It shall apply from 16 July 2014.

Done at Brussels, 22 July 2014.

For the Council
The President
C. ASHTON

COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Council conclusions on the Ebola crisis in West Africa

Brussels, 15 August 2014

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“1. The European Union is deeply concerned about the outbreak of Ebola virus disease affecting several countries in West Africa among which are Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria. This is the most severe outbreak yet recorded, having taken already more than a thousand lives.

2. The Council expresses the sincere condolences of Member States and European Union citizens to the African governments and peoples affected by the outbreak. It takes note of the recent decision by the WHO to declare the Ebola outbreak a public health emergency of international concern, and pledges the EU’s solidarity and support for the countries concerned, as well as for the health workers and international organisations that are doing their utmost to combat the disease.

3. The European Union has already committed EUR 11.9 million through ECHO and Member States have provided additional bilateral support. The EU and its Member States stand ready to maintain their support to the African authorities of the affected countries in the implementation of emergency mechanisms. The Council calls for a strong follow-up and a coordinated international response which are deemed essential to contain and reverse the spread of the Ebola virus.”

The EU's response to the Ebola crisis

Kristalina GEORGIEVA, EU Commissioner for international cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response, EP Plenary

Strasbourg, 17 September 2014

Thank you for putting this very important issue on this week's plenary agenda. It is timely. Because of the dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground. Because we are now seeing a real step-change in the international response. And because just this Monday, we had a ministerial meeting in Brussels, hosted by the Commission, to take stock of the EU's response to date and see what more we need to do.

Let me make **four points**.

1. This outbreak is quite unlike any Ebola outbreak we have ever seen before. The outbreak has not been contained. In the most affected countries – Guinea Liberia and Sierra Leone – it is spreading in densely populated urban centres as well as in the remote countryside. It is spreading at an exponential rate. As of yesterday, there were (according to WHO) 4963 cases and 2453 deaths. According to the UN's Senior Coordinator for the fight against Ebola, David Nabarro, we are seeing a near-doubling in the number of cases every three weeks. With determined action now, we will be able to curb the spread of the disease. But if we do not, there is a risk that the virus will mutate. And there is a risk that it will travel to other parts of Africa, and to other continents. There is no imminent threat to Europe itself – but particularly if the virus mutates, that may not hold in the future.

So what is needed for an effective response? We actually know what we need. The UN is now putting in place an effective coordination structure, based on operational platforms. And with a single overall coordinator in the person of Dr David Nabarro. Yesterday, the UN released its revised funding requirements for the immediate response – which come to almost US\$ 1 bn. But the fight against Ebola is not just about funding. This is not a classic humanitarian emergency where large numbers of dedicated humanitarian workers are available to be deployed at short notice. Working in the front line against Ebola requires special skills and the ability to deploy in a uniquely challenging environment. I want to pay tribute here to *Medécins Sans Frontières* who have been doing just that since the start of the crisis. But even they are now stretched way beyond their capacity. What is needed now is personnel, equipment, and transport. That takes me to my second point.

2. The Ebola outbreak should be of concern to us not only because of its immediate public health impact. The fall-out from this crisis could be much wider. We are already seeing reductions in growth rates in the region – which had been recovering remarkably well after the terrible civil wars of the 1990s and early 2000s. And beyond the public health impact, there are potential implications for public order – and for political stability. The consequences of renewed political instability for these countries and their ability to control the virus are too appalling to contemplate. All the more so when the region is adjacent to a long belt of countries troubled by recurrent crises and extremism – and with Boko Haram not far away. So we need more than ever to reach out to the affected countries. To isolate the virus – not the region.

3. What is Europe doing – and what more should we do? First, on funding. We were the first to put in significant amounts of humanitarian funding. €11.9 m in total (and much of this redirected from development funds). And with a very substantial effort on the development side, total EU funding for the crisis now stands

at almost €150 m – including funding to strengthen local healthcare capacity in the region; budget support to help cushion the severe macroeconomic impact of the crisis; and support to the deployment of an African Union medical mission to West Africa. We have also deployed, with EU funding, three mobile laboratories to help in testing and identifying the virus.

In addition, EU Member States are coming forward with generous funding. At the ministerial meeting on Monday which I co-chaired with Andris Piebalgs and Tonio Borg, we heard from 12 Member States who have already mobilized funding for the response or are making new funding available – amounting to a total of up to €78 m. Some of these pledges will be formalized in the coming days, but that is a very generous response.

While funding is crucial, it is not enough. So the second pillar of what we need to do is in-kind response. At the meeting on Monday, we heard from the UK about their decision to establish an Ebola treatment centre in Freetown. And from France about its sending of medical personnel and equipment, as well as the important role played by the Pasteur Institute in detection and tracing. Austria is sending significant amounts of equipment. One Member State may help with an air bridge. Another Member State is looking at sending a base camp, and several more Member States are currently looking at sending equipment. We will facilitate as much as possible of this through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, to help with transport and with matching needs and offers.

From the European Commission itself, we are putting an ECHO health expert in each of three most affected countries. And a European expert is being placed in the UN's UNDAC assessment team for the region. In Brussels, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) inaugurated last year is operating as an information hub and has hosted numerous intra-EU coordination meetings since the crisis broke this spring.

And we have to recognize the tremendous effort being mobilized by other countries and regions – I very much welcome the latest surge in US assistance announced by President Obama. As well as the efforts of the African Union, Cuba, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Australia – all of whom have sent teams or are intending to send teams.

But on top of helping the response in the region, we need to have systems in place to enable those responding on the spot to move in and out of the region. We are already engaging through the EU Delegations with governments in the region to encourage them to keep open ports, airports and logistics hubs. The governments of Senegal and Ghana have been particularly helpful in this regard. But we also need to have in place reliable systems of medical evacuation for medical and humanitarian workers in the region. There was strong support at Monday's meeting for a European coordination system for medical evacuation, and the Commission's services are now working flat-out on this.

Finally, the EU can help with research on Ebola. I know the ENVI Committee already had an exchange on this with Tonio Borg in early September. The Commission will rapidly mobilize funding from Horizon 2020 via an emergency procedure – €7 m in the first stage to support clinical trials on vaccines and therapies. And we are coordinating on this with other global research funders. In addition, we are already supporting research on Ebola under the 7th Framework Programme for Research and Development – on developing antiviral drugs; on linking up high-security labs; and on clinical management of patients.

4. This takes me to my final part of my intervention. What are we doing to protect the public in Europe? Let me stress that Ebola poses very little risk to EU citizens because of the mode of transmission and because we have very good healthcare systems. However, we need to remain alert. With Member States in the Health

Security Committee, and with the European Centre for Disease Prevention Control (ECDC), we are working hard to strengthen preparedness in Europe – making sure notably

- that our laboratory system is ready to carry out testing, and that all Member States have access to high-safety laboratories;
- that Member States have suitable treatment facilities and trained staff;
- that we coordinate our prevention messages to the public and to travellers; and
- that we encourage new treatments to be developed and made available as soon as possible.

In short, and to conclude, this exceptional crisis requires an exceptional response. For our part, we are stepping up, together with EU Member States. And we count on the Parliament's support.

COUNCIL DECISION extending Decision 2014/73/CFSP on a European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA)

7 November 2014, 2014/775/CFSP

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

1. On 28 January 2014, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2134 (2014) authorising the European Union to deploy an operation in the Central African Republic (CAR).
2. On 10 February 2014 the Council adopted Decision 2014/73/CFSP³⁴ stating that a European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) should end no later than six months after having reached Full Operational Capability.
3. On 10 September 2014, the Interim President of the CAR sent a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) asking to extend EUFOR RCA.
4. It is necessary to provide for a smooth transition from EUFOR RCA to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), as established by UNSC Resolution 2149 (2014), until MINUSCA can assume full responsibility for security in the Bangui area.
5. On 21 October 2014 the UNSC adopted Resolution 2181 (2014) authorising the extension of EUFOR RCA until 15 March 2015.
6. Decision 2014/73/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

34. Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP of 10 February 2014 on a European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) (OJ L 40, 11.2.2014, p. 59).

Article 1

Decision 2014/73/CFSP is amended as follows:

1. in Article 1(1) the words ‘within four to six months’ are replaced by the words ‘within nine months’.
2. Article 10(2) is replaced by the following:
‘2. The financial reference amount for the common costs of EUFOR RCA for the period until 15 December 2014 shall be EUR 25,9 million. The financial reference amount for the common costs of EUFOR RCA for the period from 16 December 2014 until 15 March 2015 shall be EUR 5,7 million. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 25(1) of Decision 2011/871/CFSP for the period until 15 December 2014 shall be 50 %. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 25(1) of Decision 2011/871/CFSP for the period from 16 December 2014 until 15 March 2015 shall be 0 %.’
3. Article 12(2) is replaced by the following:
‘2. EUFOR RCA shall end on 15 March 2015.’

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 7 November 2014.

For the Council
The President
P. C. PADOAN

COUNCIL DECISION amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast

21 November 2014, 2014/827/CFSP

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

1. On 10 November 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP³⁵, which was last amended by Council Decision 2012/174/CFSP.³⁶

35. Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (OJ L 301, 12.11.2008, p. 33).

36. Council Decision 2012/174/CFSP of 23 March 2012 amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (OJ L 89, 27.3.2012, p. 69).

2. On 22 July 2013, the Council agreed that the EU remains fully committed to fighting piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. It welcomed the good results that its naval operation *Atalanta* has achieved so far. The Council underlined that, despite the great progress witnessed against piracy at sea, the threat remains and progress could be reversed.
3. On 18 November 2013, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2125 (2013) renewing the framework for international actions in the fight against piracy and its root causes.
4. The EU military operation referred to in Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (*Atalanta*) should be extended until 12 December 2016.
5. On 22 July 2013, the Council further agreed that the EU will take forward its integrated approach to improving security and the rule of law in Somalia, on the basis of Somali ownership and responsibility, close coordination with other actors and coherence and synergies between EU instruments, in particular between its Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations.
6. That integrated approach, based on the New Deal Compact for Somalia, should contribute to enhancing maritime capacities in Somalia and the region, tackling the root causes of piracy and reducing the impunity of pirates' networks in other criminal activities at sea, thereby addressing the conditions conducive to the fulfilment of *Atalanta*'s objectives.
7. In this context, a contribution by *Atalanta* with secondary tasks, within existing means and capabilities and upon request, to the EU's integrated approach to Somalia and the relevant activities of the international community would help to address the root causes of piracy and its networks. Those secondary tasks would be conducted to support *Atalanta*'s exit strategy.
8. *Atalanta*'s cooperation with law enforcement authorities should be facilitated in order to contribute to anti-piracy law enforcement while improving the efficiency of its intelligence-led counter-piracy operations.
9. Nothing in this Decision or in Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP prevents the personnel of states participating in *Atalanta* from complying with their obligations under applicable national laws.
10. It is necessary to lay down the financial reference amount intended to cover the common costs of *Atalanta* for the period from 13 December 2014 to 12 December 2016.
11. Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. Article 1(3) is replaced by the following:
'3. In addition, *Atalanta* may contribute, as a non-executive secondary task, within existing means and capabilities and upon request, to the EU's integrated approach to Somalia and the relevant activities of the international community, thereby helping to address the root causes of piracy and its networks.'
2. In Article 2, points (g) to (i) are replaced by the following:

- ‘g. collect, in accordance with applicable law, personal data concerning persons referred to in point (e) related to characteristics likely to assist in their identification, including fingerprints, as well as the following particulars, with the exclusion of other personal data: surname, maiden name, given names and any alias or assumed name; date and place of birth, nationality, sex; place of residence, profession and whereabouts; driving licenses, identification documents and passport data;
- h. for the purpose of circulating data via the International Criminal Police Organisation’s (INTERPOL) channels and checking it against INTERPOL’s databases, and pending the conclusion of an agreement between the Union and INTERPOL, transmit to the National Central Bureau (“NCB”) of INTERPOL of the Member States, in accordance with arrangements to be concluded between the EU Operation Commander and the Head of the appropriate NCBS, the following data:
 - personal data referred to in point (g),
 - data related to the equipment used by persons referred to in point (e).
 The personal data shall not be stored after its transmission to INTERPOL;
- i. transmit the data referred to in point (h) to EUROPOL according to the provisions of an arrangement to be concluded between the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and EUROPOL. The personal data shall not be stored after its transmission to EUROPOL;
- j. contribute, within existing means and capabilities, to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia and support the licensing and registration scheme for artisanal and industrial fishing in waters under Somali jurisdiction developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), when in place, at the exclusion of any enforcement activity;
- k. liaise, in close coordination with the European External Action Service, with Somali entities and private companies operating on their behalf, active off the coast of Somalia in the broader field of maritime security, with a view to better understanding their activities and capacities and de-conflict operations at sea;
- l. assist through logistical support, provision of expertise or training at sea, upon their request and within existing means and capabilities, EUCAP NESTOR, EUTM Somalia, the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, the EU Mission in Somalia with respect to their mandates and the area of operation of Atalanta and contribute to the implementation of relevant EU programmes, in particular the regional Maritime security programme (MASE) under the 10th EDF;
- m. make data relating to fishing activities gathered by EUNAVFOR units off the coast of Somalia available, via the relevant Commission service, to the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, its Member States and the FAO, and once sufficient progress has been made ashore in the area of maritime capacity-building, including security measures for the exchange of information, assist Somali authorities by making available data relating to fishing activities compiled in the course of the operation;

- n. support, in a manner consistent with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and within existing means and capabilities, the activities of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) pursuant to resolutions 2060 (2012), 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013) of the UNSC by monitoring and reporting to the SEMG vessels of interest suspected of supporting the piracy networks.’
3. In Article 14, the following paragraph is added:
- ‘4. The financial reference amount for the common costs of the EU military operation for the period from 13 December 2014 until 12 December 2016 shall be EUR 14 775 000. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 25(1) of Decision 2011/871/CFSP shall be 0 %.’
4. Article 16 (3) is replaced by the following:
- ‘3. The EU military operation shall terminate on 12 December 2016.’

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 21 November 2014.

For the Council
The President
C. CALEDA



Middle East/CSDP

COUNCIL DECISION amending Decision 2013/354/CFSP on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)

9 July 2014, 2014/447/CFSP

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28, Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

1. On 3 July 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/354/CFSP¹ (:) on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) which continued EUPOL COPPS as from 1 July 2013. That Decision expires on 30 June 2014. The financial reference amount covers the period from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2014.
2. EUPOL COPPS should be extended for an additional period of 12 months until 30 June 2015.
3. Decision 2013/354/CFSP should be amended to extend the period covered by the financial reference amount accordingly.
4. EUPOL COPPS will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Council Decision 2013/354/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. Article 2 is replaced by the following:

'Article 2

Mission Statement

EUPOL COPPS shall contribute to the establishment of effective and sustainable policing and wider criminal justice arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the Union's institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector and Criminal Justice Reform.

1. Council Decision 2013/354/CFSP of 3 July 2013 on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) (OJ L 185, 4.7.2013, p. 12).

To that end EUPOL COPPS shall:

- assist the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), in line with the Security Sector Strategy, in the implementation of the PCP Strategic Plan by advising and mentoring, in particular senior officials at District, Headquarters and Ministerial levels,
 - assist, by advising and mentoring including at Ministerial level, the Criminal Justice Institutions and the Palestinian Bar Association in the implementation of the Justice Sector Strategy as well as the different institutional plans linked to it,
 - coordinate, facilitate and provide advice, as appropriate, on assistance and projects implemented by the Union, the Member States and third States related to the PCP and Criminal Justice institutions and identify and implement its own projects, in areas relevant to EUPOL COPPS and in support of its objectives.;
2. in Article 11, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following:
'5. The Head of Mission shall ensure the protection of EU classified information in accordance with Council Decision 2013/488/EU² (*).
3. the following Article is inserted:

'Article 11a

Legal arrangements

EUPOL COPPS shall have the capacity to procure services and supplies, to enter into contracts and administrative arrangements, to employ staff, to hold bank accounts, to acquire and dispose of assets and to discharge its liabilities, and to be a party to legal proceedings, as required in order to implement this Decision.

4. Article 12 is replaced by the following:

'Article 12

Financial arrangements

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUPOL COPPS for the period from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2014 shall be EUR 9 570 000.

2. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUPOL COPPS for the period from 1 July 2014 until 30 June 2015 shall be EUR 9 820 000.

3. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Union. Nationals of third States shall be allowed to tender for contracts. Subject to the Commission's approval, EUPOL COPPS may conclude technical arrangements with Member States, host Parties, participating third States and other international actors regarding the provision of equipment, services and premises to EUPOL COPPS.

4. EUPOL COPPS shall be responsible for the implementation of its budget. For this purpose, EUPOL COPPS shall sign an agreement with the Commission.

5. EUPOL COPPS shall be responsible for any claims and obligations arising from the implementation of the mandate starting from 1 July 2014, with the exception of any claims relating to serious misconduct by the Head of Mission, for which he/she shall bear the responsibility.

2. Council Decision 2013/488/EU of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ L 274, 15.10.2013, p. 1).

6. The implementation of the financial arrangements shall be without prejudice to the chain of command as provided for in Articles 4, 5 and 6 and the operational requirements of EUPOL COPPS, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.

Expenditure shall be eligible as of 9 July 2014.

5. In paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 13, the words ‘Decision 2011/292/EU’ are replaced by the words ‘Decision 2013/488/EU’.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall apply from 1 July 2014.

Done at Brussels, 9 July 2014.

For the Council

The President

S. GOZI

Council conclusions on the ISIL/Da’esh crisis in Syria and Iraq

Foreign Affairs Council meeting

Luxembourg, 20 October 2014

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“1. The EU is seriously concerned about the humanitarian and security situation in Syria and Iraq and condemns unreservedly the attacks, atrocities, killings and abuses of human rights perpetrated by ISIL/Da’esh and other terrorist groups in both countries as well as by the Assad regime in Syria. The EU is determined to contribute to the international endeavour to defeat those terrorist groups. A Syrian-led political transition and inclusive political governance in Iraq are crucial to sustainable peace and stability in the region.

2. The situation in Ayn al Arab/Kobani and in other areas under siege and experiencing fierce fighting against ISIL/Da’esh is a matter of serious concern. The EU appreciates efforts by Turkey to shelter refugees from Kobani and calls on Turkey to open its border for any supply for the people of Kobani.

3. The EU is committed to tackling in a comprehensive and coordinated manner the regional threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism and addressing the underlying instability and violence which has given ISIL/Da’esh and other terrorist groups a foothold. The EU supports efforts by more than sixty States to tackle the threat from ISIL/Da’esh, including military action in accordance with international law. It notes that military action in this context is necessary but not sufficient to defeat ISIL/Da’esh and it is part of a wider effort comprising measures in the political/diplomatic, counter-terrorism and terrorism funding, humanitarian and communication field. The EU calls on all partners to enforce relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including 2170 and 2178 and to step up efforts at national level to deny ISIL/Da’esh the benefits of illicit oil sales and other goods.

Non-inclusive policies in Iraq, and instability in Syria caused by the Assad regime's brutal war against its own people, massive human rights violations and systematic obstruction against democratic reforms, have allowed ISIL/Da'esh to flourish. As a consequence of its policies and actions, the Assad regime cannot be a partner in the fight against ISIL/Da'esh.

4. The EU approved today further sanctions against the Assad regime, designating individuals and entities linked to the regime to be subject to restrictive measures. The Council also agreed today to impose an export ban on jet fuel and relevant additives being exported to Syria as they are being used by the Assad regime's air force, which undertakes indiscriminate air attacks against civilians. The EU will continue its policy of imposing additional measures targeting the regime, as long as repression continues.

5. The EU reiterates its firm commitment to counter the serious problem of foreign fighters who have joined the ranks of ISIL/Da'esh and other terrorist groups. The Council endorses the EU counter terrorism / foreign fighters strategy, which is an integral part of the response to the August 2014 European Council Conclusions and to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178. The Council calls for its well-coordinated implementation as a matter of highest priority. The EU is determined to take immediate and long term action to deny ISIL/Da'esh the benefits of its sources of funding and supply, and to enhance its counter terrorism and security cooperation with countries neighbouring Syria and Iraq in line with the EU counter terrorism/foreign fighters strategy. The EU supports the work undertaken by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in this regard.

6. International efforts to achieve a Syrian-led transition remain a priority in order to maintain the country's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity while preserving its multi-ethnic and multi-religious character. The EU will continue to provide political and practical support to the moderate opposition. There cannot be lasting peace in Syria if the legitimate grievances of all ordinary Syrians, including those belonging to ethnic and religious groups, are not addressed. The EU is determined to support all efforts for a political solution by mutual consent based on the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 and in line with relevant UNSC Resolutions. The EU calls on all parties to engage constructively in negotiations and it expresses its full support to the UN special envoy Staffan de Mistura and his ongoing efforts. The EU recognises that the active engagement of regional and international actors will be required to deliver a viable transition and calls on them to play a constructive role in this regard.

7. The EU is appalled by and firmly condemns the indiscriminate killings, human rights abuses, including systematic sexual and gender-based violence, perpetrated in Syria and Iraq by ISIL/ Da'esh and other terrorist organisations, in particular against Christian and other religious and ethnic groups, women and children.

The EU reiterates also its condemnation of the gross, widespread and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Assad regime.

The EU is seriously concerned about the human rights abuses and sectarian violence that are being committed in Iraq.

8. The EU welcomes the 8th report of the independent international Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic published on 27 August 2014. The EU strongly condemns the actions of ISIL / Da'esh amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes. The EU recalls that all responsible for abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law must be held accountable and that there can be no impunity for them. The EU reiterates its call to the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International

Criminal Court and its call of Iraq to accede to the Rome Statute. The EU welcomes efforts by actors working on the ground to ensure that human rights abuses and violations are being documented and evidence preserved.

9. The EU welcomes the formation of a new Iraqi government on 8 September and its commitment to address current challenges by pursuing inclusive policies which meet the needs and aspirations of all components of Iraqi society. Failure to do so may compromise efforts to combat ISIL/Da'esh, hamper the government's efforts to promote Iraq's national reconciliation, and further intensify sectarian tensions. It welcomes the appointment to the key posts of defence and interior ministers, as well as the other ministerial appointments and the fact that the Kurdish ministers have taken up their posts in the government. It calls on the Iraqi government and the government of the Kurdistan Region to find a lasting solution to their differences.

10. The EU reiterates its firm commitment to Iraq's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. It welcomes the coalition's efforts, including the decision by individual Member States to provide military material and expertise to Iraq, to reduce ISIL/Da'esh's capacity to attack civilian populations, which come in response to an explicit request for support by the Iraqi government. Ultimately, however, the solution to the crisis can only be political. It calls on the government to reach out to all components of Iraqi society and to pursue, without delay, a process of national reconciliation. The EU urges all components of Iraqi society to unite in the fight against ISIL/Daesh and to support a process of national reconciliation.

11. The EU expresses its readiness to closely cooperate with the Government of Iraq in addressing its challenges, and to support it in pursuing the necessary reforms across a broad spectrum of sectors, including the security sector and the judicial system which need to be reinforced along non-sectarian lines, in cooperation with UNAMI and in compliance with Iraq's international obligations, in order to enhance good governance and rule of law.

12. The EU welcomes the various and complementary initiatives taken on Iraq, in particular the conclusions of the Conference on Peace and Security in Iraq held in Paris on 15 September, as well as the UNSC meeting on Iraq held on 19 September. The EU calls on countries in the region and the international community to work together to help Iraq tackle its sectarian tensions and restore peace and stability.

13. The EU is deeply concerned, particularly in view of the approach of winter, by the humanitarian predicament of the millions of Syrians and Iraqis who have been forcibly displaced both internally and to neighbouring countries. The EU and its Member States are leading the international response to the crisis. To date, around €2.9 billion has been mobilised for relief and recovery assistance to those in need in Syria and Iraq as well as to refugees and their host communities. The EU will continue to support the humanitarian relief efforts, including for people in areas that are difficult to reach, provide assistance to support the resilience of refugees and host communities in countries affected by the crisis and calls on the international community to do the same. It will also continue to insist on the importance of abiding by humanitarian principles and international human rights law.

Regarding Syria, the EU condemns the Assad regime's continued intransigence on humanitarian access and the use of administrative procedures to hinder the rapid and sustained delivery of aid. The EU reiterates its call on all parties, in particular the Assad regime to implement in full the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2139 and 2165. The EU will continue to implement those Resolutions to deliver cross-border and cross line assistance. The EU is also deeply concerned that ISIL has significantly affected the presence

and operation of humanitarian agencies and actors in northern Syria, thus compromising their humanitarian function.

Regarding Iraq, the EU calls on the government of Iraq to do more to contribute to the humanitarian relief effort across the country and deliver on its duty of care and protection *vis-à-vis* all Iraqis.

14. In all the neighbouring countries hosting Iraqi and Syrian refugees, the EU will continue to provide assistance to refugees and vulnerable host communities in close coordination with national authorities and development actors, whose efforts contribute to reducing tensions with host communities and to the stabilization of these countries in line with their national plans.

The EU is fully aware of the immense social and security challenges that the current developments in Syria and Iraq pose in particular to Lebanon and Jordan. The EU is determined to seek ways to further enhance its support to both countries to meet those security challenges.

The EU is looking forward to the Berlin Conference on the Syrian Refugee Situation of 28 October 2014.

15. The Council calls on the High Representative/Vice President to develop an EU comprehensive regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da'esh threat.”

Strategic Partnerships

7th EU-Brazil Summit, Brussels, 24 February 2014 Joint Statement

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 24 February 2014, 6930/14

1. We, the leaders of the European Union and the Federative Republic of Brazil, met today in Brussels to reaffirm our close partnership. As we both face global challenges, our partnership represents a valuable opportunity for greater prosperity and security to our 700 million citizens.

2. Today, we focused our discussions on how to use and develop the full potential of our strategic partnership in three key areas of co-operation that are of vital interest to our citizens: first, how to ensure strong, balanced and sustainable economic growth and job creation, including in new emerging fields; second, how to co-operate more effectively on key foreign policy issues, as well as humanitarian cooperation; and third, how to further our partnership on addressing global challenges we face in areas such as sustainable development, climate change, environment, energy, human rights and international cyber policy.

Leveraging our Strategic Partnership

3. We reaffirmed our **shared commitment to the values and principles** of democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the promotion of sustainable development with social inclusion, and the promotion of international peace and security, on which the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership is based.

4. We reviewed the existing bilateral dialogues and reflected on key areas for the partnership in the next years, namely to promote international peace and security; the inclusive growth of our respective economies; to promote science, technology and innovation; and to overcome the challenges in the areas of sustainable development, climate change, environment, energy security and international cyber policy. These aims should be translated into concrete initiatives by the next **EU-Brazil Joint Action Plan 2015-2017**.

5. We also agreed to strengthen our bilateral political dialogue in order to **converge further on the global agenda** and on our positions in international fora. In that context, we reiterated the importance of a strong and effective multilateral UN system, based upon international law.

6. The promotion and protection of all **human rights** of all persons lie at the core of our Strategic Partnership. We reiterated our commitment to defend the universality and indivisibility of human rights, including in the fight against discriminations based on sexual orientation or gender identity. We agreed to streamline our co-operation in Geneva and New York and to strengthen co-operation on issues of mutual concern such as death penalty, torture, civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights for all, access to food, education and health care, rights of women and children, non-discrimination, racism and xenophobia, gender equality, lesbian gay bisexual transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, indigenous peoples, human rights defenders, freedom of

expression and freedom of religion or belief. We also expressed our strong support for the International Criminal Court in its endeavour against impunity for the worst human rights violations. In this context, we look forward to the organisation of the IV Human Rights Dialogue and the III Civil Society Seminar in the first semester of 2014.

Boosting Competitiveness, Growth and Jobs

7. We underlined the potential of our **economic ties** to boost our growth and generate jobs on both sides in the coming years, and to strengthen our economies for the competitive challenges of the future. We agreed to promote trade, investment and innovation, and streamline regulation, including on competition, thus bringing benefits to business, workers, and consumers. We stressed, in particular, the need to foster the internationalisation of EU and Brazilian SMEs to make them more competitive and resilient to adverse domestic market conditions.

8. In this context, we welcomed the progress made by the **Ad-Hoc Working-Group on Economic Themes, focused on Investment and Competitiveness**, an initiative launched at the last Summit, and we reaffirmed the importance of building upon the existing complementarities of our economies, taking advantage of the strengths and areas of excellence. We agreed to work more closely to further promote the supply and value chains that have been developed between our economies. We also welcomed the good progress made towards the adoption of the joint Action Plan that should serve as a roadmap for the next year. A progress report should be submitted to the next Summit.

9. We also stressed the importance of further strengthening **contacts between our business communities**, and in particular between SMEs, with a view to promoting bilateral trade and investment and exchanges in innovation, research and development and thus to increasing the competitiveness of our companies on global markets. In that regard, we look forward to the recommendations of the VII EU-Brazil Business Summit, to be held in Brussels today.

10. We agreed to reinforce our commitment to strengthen our longstanding bilateral relations and to raise the level of communication, cooperation and engagement to solve **sanitary and phytosanitary** issues in line with the principles, regulations, rights and obligations set forth in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization.

11. Regarding technical co-operation, we welcomed the decision to create a technical working group on audits and inspections and acknowledged progress in implementing the Memorandum of Understanding on **animal welfare** signed in 2013.

12. On the **EU-MERCOSUR Bi-regional Association Agreement**, we underlined our determination to achieve an ambitious, comprehensive and balanced Association Agreement between MERCOSUR and the European Union. We took stock of the progress achieved on both sides in the implementation of the Santiago Ministerial mandate and agreed that we are on track to exchange market access offers, as a necessary step in the negotiating process, in due course.

13. We welcomed the outcome of the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2013 and emphasised the importance of building on this success to provide for a new impulse to multilateral negotiations. We confirmed our commitment to a timely and ambitious implementation of the Conference results, including the Trade Facilitation Agreement, and to the establishment of a work programme on the remaining Doha Development

Agenda issues in accordance with the Bali Ministerial Declaration aiming at a successful conclusion of the **World Trade Organization's Doha Development Round**.

14. On **global economic matters**, we reasserted the importance of pursuing further our work in the G20, to stimulate growth and job creation and to maintain momentum on financial regulation, on the IMF reform and on the implementation of the other existing international commitments subscribed in the framework of the G20 and the Financial Stability Board. We also reaffirmed our commitment to resist protectionism and refrain from raising trade and investment barriers or trade distorting subsidies.

15. Competitiveness, innovation and economic growth cannot be achieved without a strong **co-operation on Science and Technology**. We welcomed the progress achieved at the last Joint Steering Committee meeting (Brussels, 26 and 27 June 2013), especially with regard to stepping up research co-operation in key areas such as, inter alia, marine sciences, food security, nutrition, sustainable agriculture and bio-economy, energy, nanotechnologies and information and communication technologies (ICT). We reaffirmed our commitment to make progress in these areas within the agreed working groups and with regard to the planned coordinated call on bio-fuels. We also recognised the progress achieved in the on-going cooperation under the Euratom-Brazil Cooperation Agreement in the field of Fusion Energy Research, in particular related to the Joint European Torus (JET), to be formally endorsed at the coming constitutive meeting of the Coordinating Committee. This well-functioning cooperation should be encouraged by developing a joint understanding and joint objectives for improving the framework conditions for Science and Technology. We also welcomed the dynamic direct scientific cooperation involving research entities on both sides: the continuous exchange of know-how in the area of disaster management with Brazil's CEMADEN (National Centre for Natural Disasters Monitoring and Alerts) as well as the recently published Atlas of Soils of Latin America and the Caribbean feature among highlights in this context.

16. In the domain of **ICT cooperation** we welcomed the enlarged policy cooperation in Cloud Computing. On ICT infrastructure, we welcomed the plans for the future installation of a fibre-optic submarine cable linking Brazil and Europe, which will improve communications between the two continents, facilitate the take-up of broadband, stimulate ICT investments, reduce the interconnectivity costs for our businesses and researchers, enhance the protection of communications and provide better functional characteristics.

17. On **educational co-operation**, we noted the importance all EU Member States attach to the Science without Borders Programme ("Ciência Sem Fronteiras") and their interest in broadening their participation in the future. We also expressed our optimism about the enhancement of bilateral academic mobility under EU flagship programmes such as Erasmus+ and Marie Skłodowska-Curie, starting in 2014. We look forward to the exchanges to be held this week in Brussels during an EU-Brazil Rectors Forum on internationalisation, innovation and entrepreneurship in higher education, when rectors and government officials discussed mobility programmes and innovation in higher education. Taking into consideration all these programmes, exchanges, decisions and good practices on academic mobility, we will continue working on the recognition of academic qualifications and degrees between the EU Member States and Brazil. We are also aware of the important contribution of mobility and migration to the economic and social development of our societies.

18. **Transport and infrastructure** are important enablers of growth. We highlighted our openness to international investment in and co-operation on infrastructure enhancements both within the EU and Brazil. In this context, we support the on-going negotiations on the **EU-Brazil Air Transport Agreement**. We will work together in order to achieve the conclusion of the negotiations as soon as possible.

19. We also welcomed the dialogue on **maritime transport policy**, which has enabled a fruitful exchange of views and information. The increased co-operation in this area helps to generate benefits for the maritime industry and for trade flows between the EU and Brazil in general.

20. Finally, we reaffirmed our intention to start a structured dialogue on **space co-operation**, as laid down in the letter of intent signed in 2011, acknowledging the potential mutual benefits for economic and industrial competitiveness in Brazil and the EU.

Co-operating closer on Foreign Policy

21. We agreed on the importance of promoting the **bi-regional strategic partnership** between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean in order to address priority areas identified in the EU-CELAC Action Plan. The EU and Brazil will continue supporting its implementation and possible future expansion into new areas of activity. In this regard, we reaffirmed the importance of the EU-LAC Foundation and acknowledged the role it can play in deepening and strengthening the bi-regional partnership and reiterated our determination to conclude as soon as possible the negotiations for an international agreement to upgrade the Foundation.

22. We reiterated our firm commitment to the stability, security and development of **Haiti**, the only country in the Americas where there is a UN peacekeeping Mission (MINUSTAH). We called for stronger support of the international community to Haitian efforts towards sustainable development with social inclusion and the strengthening of State institutions, including the Haitian National Police.

23. We agreed on the importance of an effective multilateral system, centred on a strong **United Nations**, as a key factor in the tackling of global challenges. We reaffirmed the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative and effective, while preserving its executive nature, so that it can be more responsive to current global challenges. In this regard, we underscored that, almost 70 years after the creation of the Organization and 10 years after the adoption of the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit, time has come for achieving concrete outcomes.

24. On **international peace and security matters**, we welcomed the first meeting of the bilateral high-level dialogue in 2013 that included peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and instructed the dialogue to explore further complementarities and possible areas of co-operation on security and defence matters including in the context of the United Nations by drawing on each other's vast experiences and best practices.

25. We also reaffirmed our commitment to working together to support and strengthen the **multilateral** treaties, agreements and legal regimes in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to fully implement our international obligations and commitments. We agreed to further pursue our dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation, including on issues such as support to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process, to the Conference on Disarmament, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Finally, we agreed to continue our discussion on other issues of the international agenda, such as the process towards an **International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities**.

26. We are gravely concerned with the continuing and indiscriminate bloodshed among the civilian population in **Syria** and we call for full respect of International Humanitarian Law, the cessation of all violence, the immediate unhindered access by humanitarian staff and assistance to people in need in particular in besieged areas. We believe that the only solution to the conflict is a Syrian-led political transition that meets the legitimate

aspirations of the Syrian people, based on the full implementation of the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué. In this regard, we welcome the efforts conducted by the UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, in bringing government and opposition together to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict. All parties must demonstrate their full commitment to the obligations under UNSC Resolution 2118 (2013). Especially, we urge the speedy implementation of the agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons.

27. We also reviewed our joint efforts to support direct **Israeli-Palestinian negotiations** leading to a two-state solution, based on the 1967 borders, in which both sides live in peace and security. In this regard we would welcome an agreement on all final status issues, fulfilling the legitimate rights of both parties to self-determination. We commended current US efforts to facilitate a deal that ends the conflict once and for all. We also agreed that both parties should avoid actions that jeopardize the negotiations, including Israeli settlements, which are illegal under international law.

28. On **Iran**, we expressed our support for a thorough implementation of the Geneva Joint Plan of Action of 24 November 2013 and agreed to continue our diplomatic efforts with Iran with a view to finding a comprehensive and long-lasting solution to the nuclear issue.

29. We congratulate the authorities and the people of **Tunisia** on the adoption, in late January 2014, of the new Tunisian constitution, which was the result of a broad consensus, achieved through open and democratic negotiations. We reaffirmed our support to the Tunisian transition process.

30. On **Africa**, we expressed our full support to the efforts of the African Union and African sub-regional organizations to provide African solutions to regional problems and to tackle security challenges in that Continent. We recognized that socioeconomic development, poverty eradication, accelerated growth, enhanced state capacity, rule of law and regional coordination are crucial elements to fight the root causes of conflicts and achieve a sustainable peace. We agreed to continue our dialogue on policies for the **Sahel** and **West Africa**, in order to support countries of that region tackling socioeconomic and security challenges

31. On **Mali**, we recognised the efforts made by the Malian leadership to return to full constitutional rule, restore unity, peace and order throughout the territory. We reiterated our support to the national reconciliation process and encouraged efforts to achieve durable peace in the north of Mali with the help of the United Nations. We underline the importance of progress in the negotiations which should be based on political inclusiveness. We support the efforts of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in its task to fully stabilize the country, protect civilians, monitor the human rights situation, create conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, and extend the State authority in the whole country. We also acknowledge the achievements and progress of the EU Training Mission. We emphasised the importance of security and economic and social development, especially in the north, to achieve sustainable peace and stability not only in Mali but for the whole sub-region.

32. We underlined the importance that **Guinea Bissau** restores its constitutional order through free, fair and credible elections as soon as possible in order to enable a legitimate government to create the foundations of a stable and peaceful democracy in Guinea Bissau, which must also encompass a reform of the security sector, the combat of impunity and the promotion of human rights and socio economic development. We underlined the efforts made by the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and the CPLP in support of a return to constitutional democracy and long-term stability in Guinea Bissau. We recognize the importance to strengthen democratic institutions, to promote security sector reform and ensure food security in the post-

electoral period and to have a greater co-ordination between international actors, especially through the Guinea Bissau Configuration of the UN's Peacebuilding Commission.

33. On the **Central African Republic**, we expressed our support to the Central African people and transitional authorities in their efforts to restore peace, promote reconciliation, political transition and future state building, and to organise free, fair and transparent elections before February 2015. We furthermore expressed our deep concern for the grave humanitarian situation and reports on widespread abuse of human rights. We fully support the efforts of MISCA and we look forward to consider the UN Secretary General's report on the steps that would be necessary to deploy a UN Peacekeeping Operation, bearing in mind the views of all relevant parties and organizations.

34. On **South Sudan**, we welcomed the signature of the agreement on cessation of hostilities and the agreement on the status of detainees between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in opposition. We welcomed the launch of the political talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 11 February, under the auspices of the IGAD, intending to lead to a sustainable peace. We underlined the importance that all the involved parties respect both agreements and engage in a peaceful reconciliation process, characterized by moderation, inclusiveness and the prevalence of dialogue. We welcomed the African Union's intention to establish a Commission of Inquiry into violations of human rights, with a view to making recommendations on accountability, reconciliation and hearing.

Tackling Global Challenges Together

35. Concerned by the conclusions of the assessment reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on **Climate Change**, we reiterated our determination to meet the global objective of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C above preindustrial levels. In this context, we re-affirmed our commitment to reach an ambitious, fair, balanced and legally binding outcome of the negotiations leading to the adoption of a protocol, another international legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), applicable to all Parties, to be agreed by 2015 and to be implemented from 2020. We also highlighted the importance of the urgent and sustained implementation of existing obligations under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.

36. Warsaw was an important step forward in the international climate negotiations. We agreed to strengthen our co-operation to ensure that the 2014 Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Lima will advance substantively towards a new global agreement under the Convention. We underlined the urgent need for all Parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined contributions and communicate them well in advance of the Paris conference in 2015 already by the first quarter of 2015 by those Parties ready to do so. Finally, we welcomed the UN Secretary General's prioritisation of climate dialogue in 2014 and acknowledged the climate summit of world leaders in September as an important event to show leaders' determination to tackle the urgent climate challenge.

37. On **sustainable development**, we reaffirmed our commitment to work under the High-Level Political Forum on sustainable development in order to ensure an integrated and balanced approach of the social, environmental and economic dimensions of sustainable development. Recognising the links between poverty eradication and promotion of sustainable development, we underlined the need for a coherent approach. We also reaffirmed the need for close co-operation on issues such as biodiversity conservation, sustainable use and access

to genetic resources and benefit sharing (ABS), disaster risk reduction and resilience, sustainable forest management, sustainable trade in wildlife and wildlife products, sustainable consumption and production and clean technologies, as well as, co-operation on sustainable use and water management, thus contributing to the protection and rational use of natural resources and sustainable development.

38. We agreed that the **post-2015 framework** should be comprehensive and universal in its aspirations and have poverty eradication and sustainable development at its core. We also agreed it should be based on a human rights approach. We reaffirmed our commitment to advancing the intergovernmental process based on the work of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals and the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing for defining the Post-2015 Development Agenda and to achieving an ambitious framework on line with the Outcome Documents of Rio+20 and the Special Event of the MDGs, which underlined the need for a coherent approach which integrates in a balanced manner the three dimensions of sustainable development.

39. **On energy**, we welcomed Brazil's engagement with the International Energy Agency and the opportunity provided by closer engagement through multilateral fora in order to support transparency in the global energy market. We also highlighted the possibilities of expanding bilateral co-operation in research and development in renewable energy, including joint initiatives in energy efficiency and sustainable production of biofuels. We indicated the importance of achieving progress in these fields and reiterated our decision to advance co-operation as agreed in previous EU-Brazil Summits. Renewable energy plays a crucial role in expanding access to energy, promoting local development in a sustainable manner, and helping to reduce poverty. In this regard, we stressed the importance of our support to global efforts to promote the use of renewable energy sources and further development of business relations between EU and Brazilian companies and SMEs active in this sector. Regarding the need to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the transportation sector, we reiterated the importance of developing viable alternatives to fossil fuels.

40. **On development co-operation**, we expressed our willingness to work together to strengthen the effectiveness of international development co-operation. We stressed the importance, in this context, of the major multilateral and intergovernmental meetings to take place in 2014 concerning this subject, including the ECOSOC's Development Co-operation Forum and the First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation and looked forward to make our best efforts to support the successful implementation of the post 2015 development agenda, through an inclusive and multi-shaped global partnership. We expressed our support for Brazil's South-South development co-operation model and recognized the achievements of the trilateral co-operation initiatives developed between EU members and Brazil in benefit of developing countries.

41. With respect to **co-operation in humanitarian aid**, we reiterated our commitment to humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law, with a focus on life saving activities and their relation to resilience and sustainable development. We emphasized the need to engage in humanitarian aid and to cooperate in this field, including through multilateral agencies.

42. We also welcomed our deepening partnership on a wide range of **trans-national security issues** that affect the citizens of the European Union and Brazil. This partnership is founded on our conviction that respect for fundamental rights and freedoms and joint efforts to strengthen security co-operation are mutually reinforcing.

We agreed to work together to tackle new threats to the global networks upon which the security and prosperity of our free societies increasingly depend.

43. Recognising this, as well as the growing cyber challenges, we welcomed the establishment of an **EU-Brazil Dialogue on International Cyber Policy** which will address a number of specific priority areas, including the right to freedom of expression and privacy, and will report progress within a year.

44. We reaffirm our strong belief that **Internet governance** should be inclusive, transparent, and based on a genuine multi-stakeholder model. In that context, we agreed to cooperate towards the success of the Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance to be held in São Paulo on 23-24 April 2014.

45. Finally, we highlighted the importance of a comprehensive approach to the **global drug problem**, within the framework of the principle of common and shared responsibility, and taking into account the dimensions of the prevention of the use of illicit substances, of social development and of promotion and protection of human rights. We welcomed the first meeting of the EU-Brazil Sector Dialogue on Drugs in Brussels in 2013 and look forward to the continuation of that exercise.

EU-US Summit

JOINT STATEMENT

Brussels, 26 March 2014, 140326/02

1. We, the leaders of the European Union and the United States, met today in Brussels to reaffirm our **strong partnership**. We reaffirmed our shared values of democracy, individual freedom, the rule of law and human rights, and a common commitment to open societies and economies. Starting from those values, the European Union and the United States work together every day to address issues of vital interest and importance to our citizens and the world. We strive to create jobs and sustainable growth through sound economic policies. We seek a landmark Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership to build our common prosperity. We undertake joint efforts to build security and stability around the globe and to tackle pressing global challenges like climate change. Today, we took stock of our achievements, set priorities and charted the way ahead for a stronger transatlantic relationship, and rededicated ourselves to building a safer, more prosperous world for future generations.

2. Today in Ukraine, the basic principles of international law and security in the 21st century are being challenged. The EU and the US support the Ukrainian people and their right to choose their own future and remain committed to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of **Ukraine**. We strongly condemn the illegal annexation of Crimea to Russia and will not recognise it. We urge Russia to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Ukraine with a view to finding a political solution. Further steps by Russia to destabilise the situation in Ukraine would lead to additional and far reaching consequences for the EU's and US' relations with Russia in a broad range of economic areas. The EU and the US stand by the Ukrainian government in its efforts to stabilise Ukraine and undertake reforms, including through assistance. We welcome the Ukrainian government's commitment to ensure that governmental structures are inclusive and reflect regional diversity and to provide full protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities.

3. Reinforcing **economic growth** and **job creation** remains central. The EU and the United States have taken important steps to stabilise financial conditions and overcome the crisis. The EU remains committed to building a deep and genuine economic and monetary union, including a banking union on which significant progress has already been made. Determined action by the EU and the United States is vital to support the recovery in the short run and to promote sustainable and balanced growth, to boost competitiveness and to reduce unemployment, especially of young people.

4. We commit to continue our efforts through the **G-20 to promote strong, sustainable and balanced growth across the global economy** by developing comprehensive growth strategies for the Brisbane Summit. We aim at implementing the G-20 commitments to create a more stable financial system. Fiscal sustainability in advanced economies remains critical for a stronger and sustainable recovery. We also welcome the ambitious G-20 agenda to fight tax evasion.

5. Today we reaffirmed our commitment to conclude expeditiously a comprehensive and ambitious **Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)** that will strengthen an economic partnership that already accounts for nearly half of global output and supports three-quarters of a trillion euros in bilateral trade, and almost 3 trillion euros in investment, and 13 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. We commit ourselves to conducting these negotiations with clarity and in a manner that builds support among our publics. The United States and the EU continue to share the same goals spelled out in the February 2013 Final Report of the High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth. These goals include expanding access to each other's markets for goods, services, investment, and procurement; increasing regulatory compatibility while maintaining the high levels of health, safety, labour and environmental protection our citizens expect of us; and formulating joint approaches to rules that address global trade challenges of common concern. A high-standard TTIP agreement will make us more competitive globally, and boost economic and jobs growth, including for small and medium-sized enterprises.

6. Even as we undertake this joint endeavour, we underscore the importance of the **World Trade Organization** and the timely implementation of the outcome of the 9th Ministerial Conference in December 2013, including the Trade Facilitation Agreement. We call on other negotiating partners to contribute to the prompt conclusion of a balanced and commercially significant expansion of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) by offering commitments reflecting the high level of ambition shown by the EU and the US. We also reaffirm our commitment to achieving an ambitious Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), which should further advance services liberalisation and regulatory disciplines.

7. Sustainable economic growth will only be possible if we tackle **climate change**, which is also a risk to global security. We therefore reaffirm our strong determination to work towards the adoption in Paris in 2015 of a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties, to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based regime. The 2015 agreement must be consistent with science and with the goal of limiting the global temperature increase to below 2°C, and should therefore include ambitious mitigation contributions, notably from the world's major economies and other significant emitters. We are implementing our existing pledges and preparing new mitigation contributions for the first quarter of 2015, mindful of the importance of ensuring that mitigation contributions are transparent, quantifiable, verifiable and ambitious. The EU and the United States demonstrate leadership and are intensifying their cooperation, including: phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, phasing down the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons

(HFCs) under the Montreal Protocol, in promoting sustainable energy, energy efficiency and renewable energy, fighting deforestation, and mobilizing private and public finance. We are committed to ambitious domestic action to limit HFC use and emissions.

8. Together with several other WTO members, we have pledged to prepare the launch of WTO negotiations on **liberalising trade in environmental goods**, which will make an important contribution to tackling key environmental challenges as part of our broader agenda to address green growth, climate change and sustainable development. We are convinced this can make a real contribution to both the global trading system and the fight against climate change, and can complement our bilateral trade talks.

9. **Energy** is a key component in the transition to a competitive low-carbon economy and achieving long-term sustainable economic development. The EU-US Energy Council fosters cooperation on energy security, regulatory frameworks that encourage the efficient and sustainable use of energy, and joint research priorities that promote safe and sustainable energy technologies. The situation in Ukraine proves the need to reinforce energy security in Europe and we are considering new collaborative efforts to achieve this goal. We welcome the prospect of US LNG exports in the future since additional global supplies will benefit Europe and other strategic partners. We agree on the importance of redoubling transatlantic efforts to support European energy security to further diversify energy sources and suppliers and to allow for reverse natural gas flows to Ukraine from its EU neighbours. We are working together to foster competitive, transparent, secure and sustainable international energy markets. We remain committed to close cooperation on energy research and innovation in areas including energy efficiency, smart and resilient energy grids and storage, advanced materials including critical materials for safe and sustainable energy supply, nuclear energy and interoperability of standards for electric vehicle and smart grid technologies. This commitment extends to the promotion of related policies that encourage commercial deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies, notably in power generation and transportation. We agree to strengthen knowledge-sharing on carbon capture and storage, and on the sustainable development of unconventional energy resources.

10. We commit to expand cooperation in **research, innovation and new emerging technologies**, and protection of intellectual property rights as strong drivers for increased trade and future economic growth. Our collaboration in the **space domain** also contributes to growth and global security, including on an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. We will combine wherever possible our efforts as we did in the Transatlantic Ocean Research Alliance and through the GPS/Galileo agreement. The Transatlantic Economic Council will continue its work to improve cooperation in emerging sectors, specifically e-mobility, e-health and new activities under the Innovation Action Partnership.

11. We reaffirm our commitment to complete secure **visa-free travel** arrangements between the United States and all EU Member States as soon as possible and consistent with applicable domestic legislation.

12. The transatlantic digital economy is integral to our economic growth, trade and innovation. Cross border data flows are critical to our economic vitality, and to our law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. We affirm the need to promote **data protection, privacy and free speech in the digital era** while ensuring the **security** of our citizens. This is essential for trust in the online environment.

13. We have made considerable progress on a wide range of transnational security issues. We **cooperate against terrorism** in accordance with respect for human rights. Agreements such as the Passenger Name Record and Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme that prevent terrorism while respecting privacy are critical tools in

our transatlantic cooperation. We will strengthen our coordination efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. We will continue looking for appropriate mechanisms to counter the threats posed by fighters departing to Syria and other unstable regions, who return home where they may recruit new fighters, plan and conduct terrorist operations. We also work to address the threats posed by activities of groups contributing to instability in these regions. We welcome our increasingly close cooperation in building the capacity of partner countries to counter terrorism and violent extremism within a framework of rule of law, particularly in the Sahel, Maghreb, Horn of Africa region and Pakistan. We pledge to deepen and broaden this cooperation through the United Nations, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and other relevant channels. We have also decided to expedite and enhance cooperation on threats directly affecting the security of EU and US diplomatic staff and facilities abroad.

14. **Data protection and privacy** are to remain an important part of our dialogue. We recall the steps already taken, including the EU-US ad hoc Working Group, and take note of the European Commission Communication of 27 November 2013 and President Obama's speech and Policy Directive of 17 January 2014. We will take further steps in this regard. We are committed to expedite negotiations of a meaningful and comprehensive data protection umbrella agreement for data exchanges in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including terrorism. We reaffirm our commitment in these negotiations to work to resolve the remaining issues, including judicial redress. By ensuring a high level of protection of personal data for citizens on both sides of the Atlantic, this agreement will facilitate transfers of data in this area. The United States and the EU will also boost effectiveness of the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement – a key channel of cooperation in the digital era. In addition, we are committed to strengthening the Safe Harbour Framework in a comprehensive manner by summer 2014, to ensure data protection and enable trade through increased transparency, effective enforcement and legal certainty when data is transferred for commercial purposes.

15. The Internet has become a key global infrastructure. We share a commitment to a **universal, open, free, secure, and reliable Internet**, based on an inclusive, effective, and transparent multi-stakeholder model of governance. As such, we reaffirm that human rights apply equally online and offline, and we endeavour to strengthen and improve this model while working towards the further globalisation of core Internet institutions with the full involvement of all stakeholders. We look forward to the transition of key Internet domain name functions to the global multi-stakeholder community based on an acceptable proposal that has the community's broad support. We acknowledge the good expert-level cooperation developed in the framework of the EU-US Working Group on Cyber Security and Cybercrime. We commend the political success of our joint initiative to launch a Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online, as the EU prepares to hand over the lead to the United States, and we decide to tackle jointly the issue of transnational child sex offenders. We reiterate our support for the Budapest Convention on cybercrime, and encourage its ratification and implementation. Building on all these achievements and guided by shared values, we have today decided to launch a comprehensive EU-US cyber dialogue to strengthen and further our cooperation including on various cyber-related foreign policy issues.

16. The EU and the United States have significantly strengthened and intensified their **cooperation on foreign and security policy**. We will continue jointly to support the promotion, protection and observance of human rights and the rule of law, democratic transition, inclusive political processes, economic modernisation and social inclusion around the globe.

17. In the **Western Balkans**, and with the aim of enhancing regional stability, the EU facilitated the **Belgrade-Pristina dialogue**, leading to progress in the normalisation of relations, notably thanks to the April 2013 agreement. We share our deep concern at the current political and economic stalemate in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** and stand ready to assist the country in bringing it closer to European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

18. We support the ongoing process of political association and economic integration of interested **Eastern Partnership** countries with the EU, an expression of the partner countries' free choice. The Association Agreements, including their Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, have the potential to support far-reaching political and socio-economic reforms leading to societies strongly rooted in European values and principles and to the creation of an economic area that can contribute to sustainable growth and jobs, thereby enhancing stability in the region. We support the democratic path of the Eastern European partners, the resolution of protracted conflicts and fostering economic modernisation, notably with regard to **Georgia** and the **Republic of Moldova**, which are moving closer to signing their respective Association Agreements with the EU.

19. In the EU's **southern neighbourhood**, we are coordinating closely to assist countries in transition in **North Africa**, including the worrying situation in **Egypt**. We welcome the adoption of a new constitution respectful of human rights and fundamental freedoms in **Tunisia**, following an inclusive national dialogue. As agreed earlier this month in Rome, we also aim to intensify coordinated assistance to **Libya**, a country facing significant challenges to its democratic transition and stability.

20. We have undertaken joint intensive diplomatic efforts through the E3/EU+3 to seek a negotiated solution that resolves the international community's concerns regarding the **Iranian nuclear programme**. The strong and credible efforts of the E3/EU+3 that resulted in agreement last November on a Joint Plan of Action, are widely supported by the international community. Efforts must now focus on producing a comprehensive and final settlement. The E3/EU+3 talks in February in Vienna resulted in an understanding on the key issues that need to be resolved, and in a timetable for negotiations over the next few months. We will continue to make every effort to ensure a successful outcome. We also jointly urge Iran to improve its human rights situation and to work more closely with the United Nations and international community to this end.

21. We fully support ongoing efforts to reach a peace agreement in the **Middle East**. We stand ready to contribute substantially to ensure its implementation and sustainability. The EU has offered an unprecedented package of political, economic and security support to the Palestinians and Israelis in the context of a final status agreement. The current negotiations present a unique opportunity to achieve a two state solution to the conflict; this chance must not be missed. But for the negotiations to succeed, actions that undermine them and diminish the trust between the negotiation partners must be avoided and both sides must take bold decisions to reach a compromise.

22. The Geneva negotiation process is crucial for achieving a genuine political transition in **Syria**. The onus is on the Syrian regime to engage constructively with the process and take part in meaningful negotiations towards political transition as set out in the Geneva Communiqué. Any elections in Syria should only take place within this framework. We will continue promoting efforts to alleviate the suffering of civilians; including the 6.5 million people displaced, more than half of them children, at risk of becoming a lost generation. We commend Syria's neighbours for hosting 2.5 million refugees and recall the need to maintain sufficient assistance. We demand all parties, in particular the Syrian regime, allow unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and medical care country-wide and across borders and including areas under siege, in full compliance with UN Security Council

Resolution 2139. We are concerned that there are delays in the transfer process of chemical weapons out of Syria, and we urge Syria to comply with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 2118 and the decisions of the OPCW Executive Council to verifiably eliminate its chemical weapons program in the shortest time possible. We will also continue, through the UN human rights bodies, to press for an end to and accountability for the grave human rights abuses and serious violations of international humanitarian law in Syria.

23. We stress the importance of the upcoming elections as an historic opportunity to further enhance democratic transition, stabilisation and development in **Afghanistan**, and recall the need to protect human rights gains, in particular for women and girls, and to conclude solid security arrangements, including the Bilateral Security Agreement. Continued progress on the commitments of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework will be needed to maintain high levels of international support after 2014. We also recall the importance of regional cooperation, notably the Heart of Asia initiative and the New Silk Road, as a means to promote security, stability and development in the region, and agreed to discuss this also in the context of our dialogue on Central Asia.

24. We are deepening our cooperation in the **Asia-Pacific** region to support efforts to preserve peace, ensure stability, and promote prosperity. We work together to encourage and support democratic and economic transformation, including in Myanmar/Burma. We support ASEAN and its central role in establishing strong and effective multilateral security structures, and we will continue to play an active and constructive role in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). We underline our support for a regional architecture that is supported by shared rules and norms and that encourages cooperation, addresses shared concerns, and helps resolve disputes peacefully. In this context, we recognise the EU's experience in regional integration and institution building, and welcome greater EU engagement with the region's institutions and fora.

25. Mindful that a maritime regime based on international law has contributed to the region's impressive economic growth, we reaffirm our commitment to the freedom of navigation and lawful uses of the sea. We call on parties to avoid taking unilateral action to change the status quo and increase tensions in the region. In the East China Sea, we support calls for diplomacy and crisis management procedures in order to avoid miscalculations or accidents. In the South China Sea, we urge ASEAN and China to accelerate progress on a meaningful code of conduct. We reiterate our calls on all parties to take confidence building measures and to settle conflicts without threat or use of force and by diplomatic means in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.

26. We call on the **DPRK** to comply fully, unconditionally, and without delay with its denuclearization commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its international obligations, including as set out in relevant UN Security Council Resolutions in order to work towards lasting peace and security. We demand that the DPRK abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner and return to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards. We also remain gravely concerned with the human rights and humanitarian situation in the DPRK. While we welcome the meetings of separated families, which should continue, and inter-Korean high-level meetings, we urge the DPRK to address all the concerns of the international community, including over its systematic, widespread, and grave human rights violations, as recently documented by the UN Commission of Inquiry.

27. We commit to work with all partners to agree an ambitious post-2015 **development agenda**, anchored in a single set of clear, measurable, and universally applicable goals. That agenda should address the inter-linked challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development, including climate change; deliver on the

unfinished business of the Millennium Development Goals; invest in health, food security, nutrition and education; advance the sustainable management of natural resources, sustainable energy and water management, and inclusive and sustainable growth; promote peaceful and safe societies, open and accountable governance, the rule of law, gender equality and empowerment of women, girls and persons of disabilities, and human rights for all; and revitalise a global partnership for development. We underscore the central imperative of poverty eradication and sustainable development in the interrelated economic, social and environmental dimensions. We are committed to freeing humanity from poverty and hunger as a matter of urgency.

28. Building on the progress made through the **EU-US Development Dialogue**, we will continue to utilise this forum to pursue cooperation and a division of labour to build resilience and address food insecurity. Attention should also be given to universal access to sustainable energy in Africa and other underserved regions, through public and private investment, and appropriate investment security. We agree to coordinate further our support to the UN Energy for All initiative and our interventions under the United States' Power Africa initiative and the Africa-EU Energy Partnership, with a view to formalizing this collaboration by the creation of a partnership framework.

29. We are the world's two largest humanitarian donors; providing over 60% of all **humanitarian aid** worldwide. When we join forces, we maximise our impact, leading to real improvements in the lives of millions of people affected by humanitarian crises, including refugees and other vulnerable persons worldwide. Together, we have used our diplomatic influence to support humanitarian agencies, to strengthen UN-led coordination and safely reach millions of people in need of assistance in situations of natural disasters and in Syria, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar/Burma, the Central African Republic, and other places where armed groups have blocked or hampered access. We commit to continue this robust, close, and frequent coordination in areas facing humanitarian crises around the world.

30. **Security and development** are inextricably linked, we will continue to deepen our dialogue in this regard to frame and undertake complementary and mutually reinforcing action. Working together and with other international, regional and local partners, the EU and the United States strive to put this approach into practice through early warning and prevention, crisis response and management, to early recovery, stabilisation and peacebuilding, in order to help countries to get back on track towards sustainable long-term development.

31. We welcome the EU's efforts to strengthen its **Common Security and Defence Policy**, particularly the goals articulated at the December 2013 European Council for the EU to contribute more effectively to peace and security, including by working together with key partners such as the United Nations, the United States and NATO, and to ensure the necessary means and a sufficient level of investment to meet the challenges of the future. We will continue working to strengthen fully **EU-NATO cooperation**, especially in early consultations on crises and emerging security challenges such as maritime, energy, and cyber security, as well as mutual reinforcement in developing Allies' and Member States' capabilities. Strong, coherent and mutually beneficial cooperation between the EU and NATO, in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of each, remains as important as ever, particularly in a time of constrained budgets.

32. We also committed to enhancing **practical EU-U.S. security and crisis response management** cooperation, particularly in addressing crises in Africa. We work there together with partner states and organisations such as the African Union and the United Nations in diplomatic, political, development, economic, and other areas to promote peace and security. We have worked together in training and supporting the Somali National

Security Forces. Naval forces of the United States, NATO, and EU coordinate closely within the international efforts to fight piracy off the Horn of Africa, and the EU has now succeeded the United States as Chair of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia for 2014. The United States and EU remain deeply concerned about the situations in the Central African Republic and South Sudan, and are supporting African and UN efforts to stabilise these countries. We also agreed that coordination of our efforts across the Sahel and in the Gulf of Guinea and the Great Lakes regions will be important to address the trans-national issues those regions face. Furthermore, we will work respectively with partner states and organizations to assist African partners in building the institutional capacity for conflict management, prevention and peacekeeping, through training and other measures designed to strengthen the resilience of the security sector.

33. We reaffirm our joint commitments on **non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control**. We stress the importance of compliance with, and strengthening implementation of, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and will work closely together on preparations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the 2016 BWC Review Conference. We underscore the importance of the timely entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and support to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission. We recall our continued interest in the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and look forward to the work of the United Nations Group of Government Experts established to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to such a treaty. We welcome implementation of the New START Treaty, look forward to next steps, and encourage the P5 to continue their important dialogue. We are determined to promote IAEA's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol as the universally accepted Safeguards standard. We will work together to achieve the highest standards of safety for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and of nuclear materials security, including as highlighted at the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. We will also work together to promote the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty in 2014.

Deepening the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for mutual benefit

JOINT STATEMENT

Brussels, 31 March 2014, 140331/02

1. At the invitation of the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and of the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China visited the European Union in Brussels from 31st March to 1st April 2014. The Presidents had an in-depth exchange of views on bilateral, regional and international issues.

2. Both sides agreed that this first visit by the Chinese President to the European Union was a historic landmark in EU-China relations. They welcomed the significant strengthening of bilateral ties over the last 40 years, which have benefitted both sides and the world as a whole, and underlined their determination to strengthen the

global dimension of their cooperation. Both sides are willing to deepen their understanding of each other's development choices. The EU supports China's commitment to deepen reform comprehensively, and acknowledges China's goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, while China supports the European integration process, and acknowledges the EU's reinforcement of its Economic and Monetary Union.

3. The EU and China reaffirmed their commitment to deepening their partnership for peace, growth, reform and civilisation, based on the principles of equality, respect and trust, by comprehensively implementing the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. They agreed to review its implementation at the next annual EU-China Summit.

4. In order to advance their common interests in safeguarding world peace and stability, both sides agreed to enhance their cooperation in addressing regional and global challenges. Both sides emphasised multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations in international affairs. They underlined the importance of resolving international and regional disputes through peaceful solutions.

5. Both sides acknowledged the need to reinforce their cooperation on foreign policy and security issues. They decided to continue dialogue at the bilateral and multilateral levels to promote non-proliferation and disarmament. They underlined the growing role of trans-regional and regional dialogue mechanisms to promote regional peace and prosperity, and looked forward to the next Asia-Europe (ASEM) Summit on 16-17 October 2014.

6. Both sides reviewed a number of important international political issues including Iran, Syria, Ukraine and the security situation in their respective neighbourhoods. They welcomed the recent first round of the EU-China Dialogue on the Middle East and North Africa. They exchanged views on recent developments in Africa in view of the upcoming EU-Africa Summit.

7. Both sides welcomed the joint naval exercise on counter-piracy held on 20 March 2014 in the Gulf of Aden, which reflected the successful joint efforts of the Chinese Navy and of EU operation ATALANTA in strengthening maritime security and fighting piracy. The EU welcomed China's readiness to increase the frequency of escorts by the Chinese side of the World Food Programme vessels transporting food aid to Somalia, and both sides agreed to enhance their cooperation to the benefit of partners in the African continent. Both sides agreed to gradually raise the level of EU-China dialogue and cooperation on defence and security, and to conduct high-level exchanges.

8. The two sides reaffirmed the importance of the promotion and protection of human rights. Both sides agreed to deepen exchanges on human rights at the bilateral and international level on the basis of equality and mutual respect, and to strengthen their human rights dialogue with constructive discussions on jointly agreed key priority areas.

9. Both sides share responsibility for ensuring that their economies remain key drivers for global economic growth and providing prosperity for all. The EU and China reaffirmed their shared commitment to an open global economy and a fair, transparent and rules-based trade and investment environment, opposing protectionism. They reaffirmed their commitment to create the conditions for enhancing trade and investment exchanges on the basis of mutual benefit.

10. They underlined the necessity of coordinating their policies to ensure strong, sustainable and balanced growth and to foster financial stability. They reaffirmed their commitment to implement their G20 commitments and to reinforce their cooperation within the G20, IMF, World Bank and WTO on global economic governance.

11. The EU and China welcomed the outcome of the first two rounds of negotiations on an EU-China Investment Agreement covering investment protection and market access, and looked forward to the timely conclusion of an ambitious agreement. Negotiating and concluding such a comprehensive EU-China Investment Agreement, covering investment protection and market access, will convey both sides' joint commitment towards stronger cooperation as well as their willingness to envisage broader ambitions including, once the conditions are right, towards a deep and comprehensive FTA, as a longer term perspective.

12. Both sides welcomed the recently achieved negotiated solutions in major trade remedy cases. Both sides recognised the importance of a responsible resolution of trade disputes.

13. The EU strongly supports China's swift participation in the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) negotiation. The EU and China consider the participation of China in the negotiation as an important stepping stone towards the future multilateralization of TiSA. Both sides will step up their efforts, together with other parties, to work towards the conclusion of the negotiations on the review of the Information Technology Agreement.

14. In view of the great potential to improve their transport relations, both sides decided to develop synergies between EU policies and China's "Silk Road Economic Belt" initiative and jointly to explore common initiatives along these lines.

15. Given the importance both sides attach to the rule of law, they decided, based on the principle of equality and mutual respect, to continue to develop dialogue and cooperation on legal and administrative affairs.

16. The two sides expressed their readiness to learn from each other's reform processes. Both sides are committed to exchanging experience in such key areas as urbanisation, enhanced cooperation on the environment, regional development, urban-rural integration, governance systems and governance capacity building. They reaffirmed the importance of the EU-China urbanisation partnership as a key instrument to promote sustainable development. They looked forward to it being translated into concrete projects on the ground.

17. Both sides also reiterated their commitment to closer cooperation on global governance. The EU and China expressed their readiness to further strengthen EU-China dialogue on major international development issues, as well as their respective development policies, including efforts to formulate and implement the post-2015 development agenda and sustainable development goals.

18. Both sides recognised the need to strengthen cooperation on climate change in preparing a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change applicable to all Parties to be adopted in 2015 at the Conference of Parties to the Convention (COP21) in Paris. They underlined their commitment to making significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions through credible and verifiable domestic action. Both sides agreed on the importance of all parties presenting their contributions well in advance of the Paris meeting. The EU and China will cooperate on taking domestic action to avoid or reduce the consumption of HFCs and to work together to promote a global phase-down of these substances.

19. Both sides recognised the special importance of strengthening culture, education and youth exchanges between the EU and China. They decided to hold the next round of the High Level People-to-People Dialogue in May 2014. They agreed to enhance cooperation on mobility and migration issues. They supported the development of EU-China cooperation on sustainable tourism.

20. The two sides renewed their pledge to work for further progress in EU-China relations over the next decade to the benefit of the people of the EU and China and in the interest of world peace and prosperity.

JOINT STATEMENT by Canada and the European Union

Ottawa, 08 September 2014, 140908/01

Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton, today issued the following joint statement upon the conclusion of meetings in Ottawa:

“The Canada-EU relationship has never been stronger. This was confirmed once more during our discussions here in Ottawa where we agreed to further strengthen and broaden the scope of Canada EU cooperation.

Building on this successful cooperation, we concluded negotiations on the Canada-European Union Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). This initiative sets out a framework for continued dialogue and cooperation between Canada and the European Union. The SPA complements the expansion of our economic relationship and enhances our commitment to the principles and values of open economies and societies.

The SPA also outlines our many shared and long-standing values, and the objectives which we are working towards together – such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, international peace and security and effective multilateralism. It consolidates our cooperation on energy, sustainable development and the environment, and opens new opportunities on research and innovation. These and many others are areas in which Canadian and EU expertise can be leveraged to improve lives both at home and around the world.”

Annex



Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CAR	Central African Republic
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear defence
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CERTs	Computer Emergency Response Teams
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGPCS	Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
CIESIN	Center for International Earth Science Information Network
CIR	Common Implementing Regulations
CISE	Common Information Sharing Environment
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPM	Civil Protection Mechanism
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG	Directorate General

DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDF	European Development Fund
EDTIB	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENISA	European Network and Information Security Agency
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament
ERCC	Emergency Response Coordination Centre
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESF	European Social Fund
ESS	European Security Strategy
EUAV	European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps EU Aid Volunteers
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUSC	EU Satellite Centre
EUSR	European Union Special Representative

FPA	Framework Participation Agreement
fYROM	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGC	Gulf of Guinea Commission
GPS	Global Positioning System
HQ	Headquarters
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICI	Industrialised Countries' Instrument
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IFS	Instrument for Stability
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
INSC	Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IT	Information Technology
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MFA	Macro-Financial Assistance
MPF	Multiannual Financial Framework

MISCA	International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (<i>Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine</i>)
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (<i>Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad</i>)
MS	Member States
MSC	Maritime Safety Committee
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIS	Network and Information Security
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDSO	Programming Document for the Sustainable Development of Greenland
PI	Partnership Instrument
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PSC	Political and Security Committee
R&D	Research and Development
R&T	Research and Technology
RCA	<i>République centrafricaine</i> (Central African Republic)
RCD	<i>Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique</i>
RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons

SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SEESAC	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SMEs	Small and medium-sized enterprises
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USD	US dollars
WHO	World Health Organisation
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

The EUISS *Yearbook of European Security* (YES) 2015 is the Institute's annual publication compiling key documents and data related to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) for the year 2014. The 2015 edition also includes a chapter on climate change that investigates which regions of the world may be particularly vulnerable to security challenges arising from shifting climatic trends. Updated factsheets, maps, graphs and charts provide added clarity on some of the key issues facing the European Union and its external action today.

YES is an indispensable publication that aims to inform experts, academics, practitioners and, more generally, all those wishing to know more about the EU and security-related matters through innovative, evidence-based analysis and the display of crucial facts and figures.

